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Abstract 
Contractarianism has a distinguished history and is one of the most influential 
schools of thought nowadays, yet there are only few general discussions about this 
school. The research question which intrigues me is whether contemporary 
contractarianism can provide a satisfactory normative justification for political 
principles. I argue that contractarianism, as a methodology, consists of three 
elements: a conception of practical reason, hypothetical contractors, and a 
hypothetical contract. Based on various conceptions of practical reason, different 
contractarian models can be developed. In this thesis, I examine three possible 
contractarian models: Hobbesian contractarianism (represented by David Gauthier), 
Kantian contractarianism (represented by T. M. Scanlon) and hybrid 
contractarianism (represented by John Rawls). I diagnose the shortcomings of these 
three existing models respectively. Hobbesian contractarianism assumes a conception 
of rationality, hence it conceives hypothetical contractors as individual utility-
maximizers, and the hypothetical contract as a mutually advantageous agreement. 
Kantian contractarianism assumes a conception of reasonableness, hence it conceives 
hypothetical contractors as moral persons who would behave in a way which could 
be justifiable to one another, and the hypothetical contract as an agreement that no 
one could reasonably reject. These two models fail since their conceptions of 
practical reason are too one-sided: the former overlooks reasonableness, whereas the 
latter overlooks rationality. Due to their one-sideness, these models can at best justify 
political principles that are general but not overriding. Hybrid contractarianism 
avoids this problem by assuming that hypothetical contractors were both rational and 
reasonable and proving that rationality and reasonableness would justify the same 
hypothetical contract. However, in order to show the congruence between rationality 
and reasonableness, this model inevitably assume substantial, controversial 
conceptions of practical reason. Hence, hybrid contractarianism can at best justify 
political principles that are overriding but not general. The failures of these three 
models show the limit of this methodology. No matter how contractarians construct 
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their models, their models are subject to the fatal dilemma of choosing between 
generality and priority. While these two properties are necessary for political 
principles, this implies that contractarianism does not have the resources to offer a 
satisfactory normative justification for political principles. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The justification of political principles is a long-standing question in political 
philosophy.1 Political philosophers have used different methodologies to justify that 
certain principles have normativity, that is, people are bound by these principles and 
ought to follow them. Contractarianism is one of the most commonly used 
methodologies. I take contractarianism to be a methodology of justifying political 
principles by arguing that these principles represent an (appropriate) agreement 
between individuals who are ruled by these principles. Philosophers offer 
contractarian arguments in various ways and to various purposes, but they all share 
this fundamental conviction. As Rawls emphasises, at the heart of the social contract 
tradition is the notion of agreement.2 Unless a political principle can be shown to 
represent the outcome of an agreement, its authority is unjustified and individuals are 
not obligated to follow it. 
This methodology has a long pedigree and enjoyed a revival in 1970s. However, 
although it is widely used, the methodology itself receives very little attention. There 
are three main attitudes in philosophical discussions of contractarianism. First, 
philosophers might concentrate on specific contractarians.3 Secondly, philosophers 
might simply praise the methodology, and even argue that this is the only model of 
normative justification.4  Thirdly, philosophers might argue that this methodology is 
redundant or untenable.5 I believe that all three attitudes are inadequate. The first 
attitude fails to abstract from discussions on particular contractarians and study 
contractarianism from a more general perspective, while the second and third 
                                                 
1
 Anscombe (1981: 136). 
2
 Rawls (2007: 159). 
3
 See, for example, Boucher and Kelly (1994) and Vallentyne (1991a). 
4
 Gauthier (1991a). 
5
 See Dworkin (1973), Pettit (2006) and Hooker (2002). 
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approaches only focus on one side and are not critical enough. A general and critical 
discussion of the contemporary development of this methodology is almost absent.6 
The aim of this thesis is to fill this space and discuss the methodological value of 
contractarianism by comparing various contemporary contractarian models.  
The question that interests me is whether contractarianism is a good approach to 
justifying the normativity of political principles. Here, normativity refers to 
normative reason. When something is normative, it gives us a reason for action in a 
particular way. 7  Can contractarianism justify certain political principles as 
normative? What are the problems of the contemporary contractarian theories? For 
these problems, are they merely an outcome of applying this methodology badly, or 
are they unavoidable consequences of employing this methodology? In this thesis I 
will show that, by examining three different contractarian models, we can see that 
contractarianism, as a general methodology, has critical problems for justifying 
political principles that any theory based on this methodology cannot avoid.   
A distinctive feature of contemporary contractarianism is that it presupposes a 
conception of practical reason in order to explain its source of normativity. Based on 
three different conceptions of practical reason, three contractarian models can 
possibly be developed, which are also the three contractarian models that appear in 
contemporary political philosophy: Hobbesian contractarianism, Kantian 
contractarianism and hybrid contractarianism.8  These three models have different 
                                                 
6
 There are some monographs about the development of classical contractarianism, but not about 
contemporary contractarianism, such as Lessnoff (1986) and Riley (1982). Most of the general 
discussions are superficial and merely used for an introductory purpose, such as Darwall (2003b), 
Sayre-McCord (2000) and Hampton (1993a). 
7
 This definition of normativity is a fairly common view nowadays. See Finlay (2010). 
8
 I should clarify here my use of the term ‘contractarianism’, for there is no a standard way of using 
this term in current academic discussions. Stephen Darwall (2003b) uses ‘contractualism’ to refer to 
the strand of social contract theories which are influenced by Kant and emphasize agreement which 
could be reasonably accepted by everyone, and uses ‘contractarianism’ to refer to the strand of social 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
17 
 
weaknesses, and I will further argue that if these weaknesses are understood against a 
wider background, we can see that these weaknesses are actually linked to the 
contractarian methodology. Hobbesian and Kantian contractarianism are vulnerable 
to the problem of priority because the former ignores reasonableness and the latter 
ignores rationality in their conceptions of practical reason. Although hybrid 
contractarianism avoids this problem by incorporating both rationality and 
reasonableness into the conception of practical reason, it suffers from another 
problem: it would be accepted only by a limited number of people. By studying these 
three models, we can see that contemporary contractarianism inevitably faces a 
dilemma: either it fails to prove that these political principles have the highest 
priority, or it fails to demonstrate that these political principles are generally 
acceptable. This dilemma can be attributed to the tension between rationality and 
reasonableness in our practical reason. As long as the contractarian methodology 
relies heavily on practical reason as the source of normativity, this dilemma between 
priority and generality is inevitable to contemporary contractarians. Once a 
philosopher employs this methodology, he will face this dilemma no matter how he 
employs it. Through a general study of contemporary contractarianism, a flaw of this 
methodology which is generally unrecognised by both contractarians and anti-
contractarians alike can be made explicit. 
                                                                                                                                          
contract theories which are influenced by Hobbes and emphasize agreement which could advance the 
rational interests of everyone. However, not everyone agrees with this label. For example, Geoffrey 
Sayre-McCord (2000) and Jean Hampton (1993a) use ‘Kantian contractarianism’ to refer to the 
former family and ‘Hobbesian contractarianism’ to refer to the latter family. Nicholas Southwood 
(2010) uses a distinction between Hobbesian and Kantian contractualism (Southwood 2010). Samuel 
Freeman prefers a distinction between an interest-based contract and a right-based contract (Freeman 
1990). 
I disagree with all the distinctions above since they overlook the third possibility of contractarianism, 
the hybrid model. In my usage, contractarianism is a broad term which can be used to refer to all the 
theories that use social contracts to justify political principles, regardless of whether this contract is 
rational or reasonable. Hence, unlike Darwall’s usage, this term does not specifically refer to the 
Hobbesian model of social contract theorising. Under the label of contractarianism, I derive into three 
families: Hobbesian, Kantian and hybrid. I will discuss these three models in this thesis. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Before beginning, it would be instructive to define the object of my discussion and 
some key terms. The purpose of this introduction is to set the boundaries of my 
discussion. Since contractarianism is such a large school and this methodology is 
used by people in many different ways, it is impossible to discuss them all. I will first 
distinguish classical contractarianism and contemporary contractarianism. Then I 
will discuss which function of contractarianism I want to examine. I will also define 
political principles and explain why a justified political principle should satisfy two 
conditions. After that, I will briefly outline my whole argument and explain why the 
feminist critique of contractarianism, though it is well-known, is not relevant to my 
discussion.  
1.1 A very brief history of contractarianism 
Contractarianism has a long and distinguished history. Its roots can be traced as far 
back as Plato’s Republic, where Glaucon presents it as a view of justice. It also 
appeared in political writings in medieval times and had its heyday in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.9 The popularity of contractarianism can be attributed to the 
Reformation, which strengthened the ideas of free individual choice and 
responsibility in moral thinking. At that time the majority of philosophical notables 
used the notion of the social contract to justify their political theories. These included 
Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.10 However, contractarianism’s popularity started to 
decline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, because of the rise of 
utilitarianism and Marxism. These substantial alternatives advanced their own 
                                                 
9
 Gough (1957: 1). 
10
 See Grotius (2005), Hobbes (1994), Pufendorf (1991), Locke (1988), Rousseau (1987), Kant 
(1998), Kant (1991). 
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political theories along with their criticisms of contractarianism. 11  Nevertheless, 
contractarianism did not become a doctrine of purely antiquarian interest. Its 
popularity enjoyed a renaissance in the later twentieth century due to the publication 
of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Now, there are a number of political 
philosophers who develop their theories on the basis of this methodology, including 
David Gauthier, Gregory Kavka, James Buchanan, T. M. Scanlon, Brian Barry, 
Thomas Nagel, David Richards, and John Harsanyi.12 
This is a very brief description of the development of contractarianism; from this we 
can see that contractarianism has a history of over two thousand years. It is 
unrealistic to expect that all contractarians throughout this period used precisely the 
same methodology. Indeed, with the exception of some very basic convictions, the 
structure of contractarian argument has changed significantly in its long history. For 
reasons of space, I cannot include all contractarian models in this discussion. I have 
chosen to focus on the contractarian theories that appeared in the latter part of the 
twentieth century. However, the characteristics of contemporary contractarianism 
can still be made explicit by comparing it with classical contrarianism. Classical 
contractarianism refers to those contractarian theories that appeared in the medieval 
period and flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By contemporary 
contractarianism, I mean those contractarian theories that appeared during the later 
twentieth century. Contractarianism underwent a massive change when it developed 
from classical contractarianism to contemporary contractarianism. This change can 
be seen in three dimensions.  
                                                 
11
 See, for example, Hume (1994) and Marx (2000). 
12
 See Rawls (1999a), Rawls (1993), Gauthier (1986), Kavka (1986), Buchanan (1977), Scanlon 
(1998), Barry (1995), Nagel (1991), Richards (1971) and Harsanyi (1976). 
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First, the contractual relationship gradually changes from a relationship between the 
ruler and the ruled to a relationship among the ruled. At the beginning, the social 
contract was conceived as a bilateral contract between the people and the ruler. On 
the one hand, people elected a ruler and agreed to obey him. On the other hand, the 
authority of the ruler was also subject to certain limits. This understanding of social 
contract was prevalent in the medieval period, and was also adopted by Grotius and 
Pufendorf, and to some extent Locke. However, this understanding was succeeded by 
another understanding after the seventeenth century. To Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, 
and the contemporary contractarians after them, the social contracts was a 
multilateral contract among individuals living in the same society. These 
contractarians present a scenario in which all of these individuals discussed together 
and agreed upon certain kinds of political arrangement. The contractual relationship 
in contractarianism changed because the form of state changed from a monarchy to a 
constitutional state. In a monarchy, when the kings stood apart from and in obvious 
contrast to their subjects, it was natural and useful to think in terms of a contract 
which defined the relationship between them. But in a modern constitutional state, all 
people, including the rulers, are united under the terms of a constitution. When both 
government and citizens are only parts of society subject to the rule of a constitution, 
the focus of contractarians naturally changes to what this constitution should be. As 
Sir Ernest Barker argues, in contemporary contractarianism, ‘the one political 
contract—which unites us all (rulers and subjects alike) in terms of a constitution, 
and under the constitution—this one contract is enough, and it is the only contract’.13 
Secondly, the hypothetical character of the social contract is strengthened. In the 
beginning, the social contract was taken to be an historical explanation of the origin 
of the state. Some medieval contractarians believed that, in the distant past, a group 
of people, living in a state of nature, really did agree to be bound by a contract. 
                                                 
13
 Barker (1980: xiv). 
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Hence political principles bound us because of the explicit consent of our ancestors 
and our tacit consent. However, the historical character began to fade away along 
with the development of contractarianism. This is because there is obviously no 
evidence that such a historical event actually occurred. To quote Barker again, from a 
historical perspective, ‘society is not constituted, and was never constituted, on any 
basis of contract’.14  Hence more and more contractarians started to concede that 
their social contracts were actually hypothetical. Contractarians were no longer 
interested in the historical origins of the state, but wanted to provide a philosophical 
description of how individuals would make a social agreement under suitable 
circumstances.15 This model of social contract theorising appeared in the seventeenth 
century. But at that time contractarianism, such as that of Hobbes and Locke, still 
had a dual character. They presented a hypothetical story of how a group of 
individuals could agree upon a social contract, but also believed that there were 
historical events that supported their hypothetical contractarian model. 16  After 
Rousseau and Kant, the historical character of contractarianism completely 
disappeared and, nowadays, all contractarians argue that there is no historical basis 
for thinking that any original contract was ever made. The social contract is merely a 
hypothetical test to evaluate whether or not the existing state is justified. This is why 
                                                 
14
 Barker (1980: xiii). 
15
 Gough (1957: 244). 
16
 Hobbes’ theory is a reduction of human nature, and the state of nature is only a kind of fictional or 
hypothetical model (Hobbes 1994: 453-454) to show what society would become in the absence of 
state, and, inside that, the contract is a depiction of the regulations that might logically be accepted by 
people. However, in the Part III and IV of Leviathan, Hobbes also attempted to give a ‘Hobbesian’ 
interpretation to the history in the Bible for the sake of showing that the social contract that he 
presented really existed historically. For an interpretation of Hobbes as a hypothetical contract 
theorist, see Peters (1956: 158).  
Similar dual features can also be found in Locke. Locke is normally understood as a theorist very 
different from Hobbes but who still argued that the social contract was a real historical event and that 
the obligations we have now are derived from this old contract. Locke himself tries to give such a 
history in sections 100-122 of the Second Treatise. However, on the other hand, Locke’s social 
contract theory has hypothetical character. For an interpretation of Locke as a hypothetical contract 
theorist, see Pitkin (1972). 
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Kant, for instance, asserted: ‘If the law is such that a whole people could not possibly 
agree to it…it is unjust’.17 
Thirdly, the account of political authority changes from voluntarism, which respects 
the choice of people, to rationalism, which supposes that their choices must follow 
certain definite rules. The idea of consent becomes gradually less important. 
Classical contractarianism usually takes voluntary consent to be the source of the 
normative power of social contract.18 A political principle is justified because it has 
the voluntary consent of the people who are subject to it. But what counts as 
voluntary consent? There are usually two accounts, explicit consent and tacit 
consent, yet both are problematic. It seems that even the most justified political 
principles cannot receive the explicit consent of every citizen. Moreover, even if 
such a consensus can be reached, it may be the product of coercion or 
misinformation. Tacit consent is not satisfactory either, since an unjustified state can 
also invoke tacit consent to justify its political authority. The account of tacit consent 
is too open-ended and depends on the interpretation of the state. A state can define 
tacit consent however it likes and people cannot defend themselves against a claim 
which has not been actually consented by them. 19  While both accounts are 
problematic, contemporary contractarians (and also some classical contractarians, 
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 Kant (1991a: 79). 
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 One of the examples is Hobbes. As we saw before, Hobbes’ social contract is hypothetical. But 
because of its dual character, he also believed that the political obligation to obey a sovereign is based 
on the actual promise of individuals to an actual sovereign: ‘every subject in a Commonwealth, hath 
covenanted to obey the Civil Law…And therefore obedience to the Civil Law is also part of the Law 
of Nature’. (Hobbes 1994: 175) Hobbes even argues that political obligation can only be derived from 
the actual promises of individuals. There is ‘no obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some 
act of his own’, hence our political obligation depends on ‘what rights we pass away, when we make a 
commonwealth’. (Hobbes 1994: 141) Therefore, it seems that, to Hobbes, our obligations to political 
principles are not only justified by hypothetical consent. The actual consent is also a necessary 
condition. 
19
 Since my purpose is merely to contrast contemporary contractarianism with classical 
contractarianism, I will not examine the criticism of explicit and tacit consents in details here. For 
detailed criticisms of explicit and tacit consent, see Wolff (2006: 41-44), Simmons (1981) and 
Pateman (1985). 
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such as Kant) place less emphasis on voluntarism and look for other accounts of 
political authority. They argue that not all forms of consent can authorize political 
principles. Only rational (or reasonable) consent can authorize. This also means that, 
provided that a political principle is able to receive the rational consent of people, 
then it is justified even though it has not been voluntarily consented to by people. 
Contemporary contractarians place more importance on the idea of rationality (and 
reasonableness) than on the idea of voluntary consent. Unlike classical 
contractarians, who take consent itself to be the source of normative power, 
contemporary contractarians see consent as a heuristic device that reveals what 
political principles people are rational (or reasonable) to agree to. 
By comparing classical contractarianism and contemporary contractarianism, the 
distinctive features of contemporary contractarianism become more evident. In the 
long history of contractarianism, different critiques of this methodology have 
appeared and contractarians have continued to revise this methodology. Nowadays 
this methodology is highly different from its original version. Classical 
contractarianism conceives of the social contract as an historical, voluntary contract 
formed between the ruler and the ruled. As we saw before, for different reasons, 
these three characteristics were gradually abandoned by contractarians. Currently, 
contemporary contractarians clearly define their social contract as a hypothetical, 
rational (or reasonable) contract formed among individuals. 
1.2 Various functions of contractarianism 
In the last section we saw the difference between classical contractarianism and 
contemporary contractarianism. However, in the contemporary age, the social 
contract has a variety of uses. It is crucial to clarify which function of 
contractarianism I am concerned with. First, contractarianism can have two 
functions: descriptive and evaluative. For descriptive contractarianism, the social 
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contract is used to explain why morality or political institutions would naturally 
emerge among human beings. According to Sayre-McCord, this approach is inspired 
by David Hume, who took for granted ‘neither a concern for morality nor any 
particular account of what people have reason to do or accept’.20 It merely uses the 
social contract to make sense of the evolution of existing morality and political 
institutions. Descriptive contractarians argue that, through social contract argument, 
the rationale behind morality and political institution can be made explicit.  
This approach is normally adopted by game theorists who use mathematical models 
to explain how human beings interact with one another and finally form social 
conventions, which are the implicit social agreements on morality and political 
institutions. Representatives of this approach are Ken Binmore, Brian Skyrms, and to 
some extent Jean Hampton.21 To these theorists, the social contract refers to the 
social conventions that act as the basis of morality and political institutions. Insofar 
as people continue to support these social conventions, these conventions continue to 
exist and comprise morality and political institutions. However, these social 
conventions are not formed arbitrarily. They are created by the interactions between 
people and these interactions can be articulated clearly by game theory. These 
theorists believe that, through game theory, we can see how people coordinate their 
behaviour in equilibrium in the game of life. This equilibrium then forms a set of 
common understandings among people, and this is where the social conventions 
come from. Hence, the descriptive contractarians are concerned with what morality 
and political constitutions are. The nature of these social practices is the social 
conventions that evolve from the rational interactions between individuals. I would 
like to note that this approach to contractarianism is merely descriptive. Even if a 
state is based on this social convention, it does not mean that this state is a justified 
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 Sayre-McCord (2000: 263). See also Binmore (2005: 3-4). 
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 Binmore (2005), Skyrms (1996) and Hampton (1986). 
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or legitimate regime. It merely shows that contractarianism successfully explains 
how a state is generated.  
This approach to contractarianism is not the kind of contractarianism that I will 
discuss in this thesis.  The approach that interests me is the approach that uses 
contractarianism in an evaluative way. In evaluative contractarianism, the social 
contract is used to justify certain moral and political principles that can impose 
obligations on individuals. It is concerned with what moral principles or political 
principles ought to be. Contractarians first imagine a hypothetical situation. A group 
of people discuss with one another under appropriate circumstances and agree upon 
some principles. This hypothetical contract can then be used as a testing device of the 
justifiability of the existing moral customs or states. The moral or political principles 
which are defined by this hypothetical contract have such normative authority that 
real people are obligated to follow them, despite the fact that they did not actually 
agree to them. Therefore, the social contract can be used to perform two distinctive 
functions. It can be used to describe the nature of morality or political institutions, 
and can be used to evaluate the justifiability of a given moral outlook or political 
institution.  
However, we should be aware that contractarians usually do not have only one 
ambition. They can attempt to explain some existing moral or political principles, but 
may also want to justify these moral or political principles. For example, James 
Buchanan uses his contract theory to make sense of some social relationships (such 
as slavery), but he also argues that a justified law should represent a mutually 
advantageous agreement. 22  Scanlon says that his project is to give a 
‘phenomenologically accurate’ account of moral motivation, but he also believes that 
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people ought to follow principles that could not be reasonably rejected.23  Hampton 
even explicitly claims that her contractarianism has two functions: explanatory and 
justificatory. ‘The contractarian, while explaining how any existing state is a human 
creation and how it is a product of human convention, must leave behind history and 
posit a process of state creation that will reveal what reasons make that creation 
rational’. 24   Because of some contractarians’ two-fold ambitions, readers might 
confuse these two functions of contractarianism. Nevertheless, I believe that these 
two functions are independent and I will focus only on the evaluative function of 
contractarianism in this thesis.  
Furthermore, even if it is used for justificatory purposes, the social contract can be 
used to justify either moral principles or political principles. Both of these two kinds 
of principles are normative in nature, but the scopes that they govern are different. In 
general, the scope of moral principles is much larger than that of political principles. 
Moral principles represent general regulation of conduct. They purport to set forth 
conditions under which an action is right or wrong or something is good or bad. In 
Socrates’s words, it is about ‘how we ought to live’. These principles govern various 
aspects of human life, such as how we should treat one another, how we should treat 
the environment and animals and how we should treat ourselves. Compared with 
moral principles, the scope of political principles is more limited. Political principles 
are also a kind of moral principle since they also regulate conduct. However, these 
principles are applied only in basic political institutions, such as the political 
constitution, the legal system, the system of economic redistribution and the 
market.25  They govern only the political aspect of human life, that is, how the state 
should relate to individuals. For example, political principles define how a ruler can 
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justifiably rule over citizens. They also define what laws citizens are obligated to 
follow and how citizens ought to behave in the public domain. In general, both moral 
and political principles share the same nature, but the latter has more limited 
concerns. In this thesis, contractarianism that justifies political principles will be my 
main focus. 
Some contractarians, such as Scanlon, Gauthier and Richards, use the social contract 
to justify morality (moral contractarianism). They are more ambitious and aim to use 
the social contract to provide a foundation for morality. But some contractarians, 
such as Rawls and Barry, have more limited ambitions and clearly concede that they 
are only interested in justifying a normative theory of political institution (political 
contractarianism). At first glance, it seems that the former group of contractarians are 
irrelevant to my discussion. However, since political principles are also a kind of 
moral principle, the former group of contractarians cannot avoid the issue of political 
morality. As some moral contractarians acknowledge, the moral principles that they 
justify do have political implications.26  Hence, although my concern is political 
contractarianism, the political implications for some moral contractarian theories will 
not be overlooked.  
Hence, by illustrating the distinction between descriptive and evaluative and the 
distinction between moral and political, the kind of contractarianism that I will 
discuss in this thesis can be clarified. The contemporary contractarian theories that I 
will discuss are political contractarian theories which aim at justifying political 
principles. 
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1.3 The nature of political principle  
It will be helpful to clarify what political principles mean and why the justification of 
principles is fundamentally important in political philosophy. People inevitably live 
together and form a state. The state is influential because it can coerce people and 
shaper people’s lives. For example, people have to pay taxes, their careers and 
wealth are affected by the economic policies, and what they are free to do is also 
defined by the law of that state. The coercion of a state even involves matters of life 
and death, since a state conducts wars and uses deadly methods to punish dangerous 
lawbreakers. Given that a state has this much control, why should we accept such an 
authority? As Jean Hampton argues, political authority should be able to give reasons 
to its subjects so that those subjects understand that the coercion is rightful and 
legitimate, and not merely take coercion for granted.27 
Political principles are the conditions that justify this political authority. They 
represent a set of normative standards detailing what a state should be and how 
coercive political power can be justifiably exercised. Given that a state rules in 
accordance with these political principles, its political authority is justified and it can 
justifiably enforce rules upon its citizens as well. One should not confuse political 
principles with existing laws here. Indeed, political principles are only abstract 
normative principles and do not refer to any existing laws. Existing laws may fail to 
conform to these principles, but this merely means that existing laws are not 
satisfactory and ought to be revised. Moreover, these political principles also define 
what political obligations people have to their state. If the political authority is 
justified, then people will have a political obligation to obey it.28   The laws or 
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commands from this political authority should be taken as a reason for action. 
Political obligations stand for what people should do under a justified political 
authority. As John Horton argues, a justified political obligation represents a proper 
relationship between the state and its citizens.29  Hence, political principles generally 
define two things: how a state can justifiably rule its citizens and what obligations 
citizens have to the state.  
But how can we evaluate a political principle? There are two properties that a 
political principle must possess. First, a political principle must be general, which 
means that it must be justified to each citizen in society publicly. Political principles 
can be justified on cultural grounds or religious grounds. However, the authority of 
these political principles would only have limited acceptability because only specific 
cultural groups or religious groups would acknowledge their authority. This goes 
against our common thought about political authority, for we usually think that all 
citizens in society generally have an obligation to follow the commands of political 
authority. The authority of political principles is unconditional and objective. People 
should have reasons to acknowledge the authority of political principles, irrespective 
of who they are and what group they belong. This feature of political principles is 
also accepted by contractarians since they also believe that, even though citizens in a 
society are highly diverse, citizens should still generally accept the same social 
contract and this social contract can form the basis of social cooperation.30 
Secondly, a political principle must be overriding, which means that the reason to 
follow political principle should be accorded lexical priority (or very strongly 
                                                                                                                                          
people have a moral obligation to follow it but political obligations depend on voluntary consent. See 
Stark (2000). 
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 Horton (1992: 13). 
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 Contractarians generally hold this viewpoint. See Gauthier (1986: 19), Rawls (1999a: 114) and 
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weighted priority) over other reasons. Citizens may have various reasons for doing 
something that political principles forbid. For example, they may have different 
projects and relationships that they want to pursue. These projects and relationships 
may be crucial to citizens and can be reasons for citizens to challenge the political 
authority. A justified political principle must prove that the reason to follow political 
principles can override or outweigh other competing reasons. The laws and 
commands from this authority should be authoritative in determining what citizens 
ought to do. This is why Joseph Raz argues that the demands of a political authority 
should operate as exclusionary or pre-emptive reasons.31 If citizens agree with a 
political principle, but still place it below other commitments in their lives, then this 
principle exists in name only, for it does not possess the supreme authority that we 
think a political principle should possess. This is also the ambition acknowledged by 
many contractarians for they normally aim at proving that the political principles 
justified by their social contract can override other commitments in people’s lives. 
As Rawls emphasises, ‘[citizens] desires and aspirations are restricted from the 
outset by the principles of justice which specify the boundaries that men’s system of 
ends must respect’.32 
Hence, a justified political principle must meet these two conditions:  
(i) Generality: It must be generally acceptable to the citizens who are subject to 
its ruling 
(ii) Priority: It must explain why it can override other commitments in a citizen’s 
life 
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In general, the first condition is a requirement of scope, to the effect that the political 
principle can be generally accepted by people as a justified, normatively binding 
principle. The second condition is a requirement of status, to the effect that, to those 
people who accept the political principle, this principle has deliberative priority over 
other considerations in practical reasoning.  
These two conditions are necessary since they are closely related to our intuitions of 
what a justified political authority should be. As H. L. A. Hart says, a political 
authority should be binding on all subjects and should be peremptory.33  While the 
first nature refers to the general acceptability of political authority, the second refers 
to the priority of political authority. If a political principle is general but not 
overriding, then although citizens generally accept the political obligations, they may 
still challenge the authority of this principle because of other commitments they have 
in their life. If a political principle is overriding but not general, then although 
citizens who accept the political obligations will respect the supreme authority of this 
principle, these obligations will not be accepted by the majority of citizens in the 
society. Therefore, a political principle that fails to satisfy either of these conditions 
is merely a coercive power that commands citizens in an unjustifiable way. This 
section offers only a brief description of these two conditions. In Chapter 2, I will 
discuss these two conditions in more details and study what kind of contractarian 
models can satisfy these two conditions.  
1.4 Method and outline 
In section 1.1 and 1.2 I identified the kind of contractarianism that I am concerned 
with: contractarian theories which aim at justifying political principles. In section 1.3 
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I suggested two criteria to evaluate whether a political principle is justified. The aim 
of my thesis is to use the latter to evaluate the former.34 In the next six chapters, I 
will discuss whether or not contractarian theories can provide a satisfactory 
justification for political principles.  
In Chapter 2, I will discuss contractarianism as a general methodology before I begin 
to discuss different contractarian models separately. Although contractarianism had a 
revival in the second half of the twentieth century, it suffers from a number of 
famous critiques. I will first discuss the virtues of this methodology so that we can 
understand why so many philosophers are preoccupied with it. Then I will discuss 
the ‘standard critique’ of this methodology, which is to say, that a hypothetical 
contract does not have any normative force. I argue that the normativity comes from 
the conception of practical reason behind contractarianism. Provided that practical 
reasoning is governed by certain conceptions, and these conceptions justify certain 
political principles, people will have obligations to these political principles even 
though they have not consented to these principles.  
From the discussion in Chapter 2, we should gain a better understanding on the 
structure of the argument of contemporary contractarianism. Contractarian argument 
consists of three elements: the conception of practical reason, the characteristics and 
circumstances of hypothetical contractors, and the hypothetical agreement. The first 
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element determines the content of the other two. In Chapter 3, I will argue that, based 
on different conceptions of practical reason, different contractarian models can be 
developed. There are two aspects of practical reason: rationality and reasonableness. 
Based on the conception of rationality, contractarians such as Gauthier justify a 
social contract that could advance the rational interests of everyone. I call this model 
Hobbesian contractarianism. Based on the conception of reasonableness, 
contractarians, such as Scanlon justify a social contract that could not be reasonably 
rejected by anyone. I then further argue that, apart from these two models which are 
commonly recognised, there is also a third possible contractarian model, hybrid 
contractarianism. Hybrid contractarians, such as Rawls, assume that people are both 
rational and reasonable, and thus a social contract should be both rationally and 
reasonably justified. These three models represent three approaches to employing the 
contractarian methodology to justify political principles.  
The next four chapters are then case studies of these three models. In Chapter 4, I 
will discuss Hobbesian contractarianism. Hobbesian contractarians construct their 
theory on the basis of a formal conception of rationality and assume that hypothetical 
contractors are rational utility-maximizers. Then political principles should represent 
a hypothetical contract which could be mutually advantageous to every rational 
contractor. I argue that this contractarian model can satisfy the condition of 
generality but fails to satisfy the condition of priority. It can satisfy the condition of 
generality because the formal conception of rationality is so weak that it can be 
generally accepted by everyone, so the political principles which are rationally 
justified should also be generally justified. However, it fails to satisfy the condition 
of priority because it overlooks the conception of reasonableness, which is another 
aspect of practical reason. Reasonableness may justify obligations which are 
incompatible with these political principles. Since reasonableness is equally 
important as rationality in practical reason, actual people have no reason to prefer 
complying with these political principles to violating them.  
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I will argue that Kantian contractarianism makes a similar mistake in Chapter 5. 
Unlike Hobbesian contractarianism, Kantian contractarianism relies on a conception 
of reasonableness. Hypothetical contractors are reasonable people who mutually 
respect each another by behaving in a way which could be justifiable to each other. 
Political principles should represent a hypothetical contract which could not be 
reasonably rejected by anyone. Again, this contractarian model can satisfy the 
condition of generality, but it fails to satisfy the condition of priority. The conception 
of reasonableness is a generally accepted conception of practical reason, so Kantian 
contractarianism, which is based on this conception of practical reason, should be 
able to satisfy the condition of generality. However, it fails to satisfy the condition of 
priority because, in opposition to Hobbesian contractarianism, it overlooks the 
conception of rationality, which is another aspect of practical reason. If political 
principles are irrational, then even though people generally accept these principles, 
they may refuse to acknowledge the supreme status of these principles.  
In the failure of these two models, we can see that the key to satisfying the condition 
of priority may be to include both rationality and reasonableness into the conception 
of practical reason. This is exactly what Rawls seeks to do in his contractarian 
theory. Chapter 6 will be devoted to discussing the earlier version of Rawls’ 
contractarian theory. In his theory, hypothetical contractors, free and equal persons, 
are assumed to possess two moral capacities, which correspond to rationality and 
reasonableness respectively. These contractors are willing to behave in a justifiable 
way, but are also concerned with several ‘highest-order interests’. Thus the social 
contract they will make should be both rationally and reasonably justified; it 
represents regulation which could be publicly justified, but also represents an 
effective way to advance the highest-order interests of individuals. In this chapter I 
point out the possibility that these highest-order interests may conflict with each 
other, but I also suggest that Rawls’ contractarian model can still satisfy the 
condition of priority by adding certain presuppositions. Nonetheless, although it can 
satisfy the condition of priority, it fails to satisfy the condition of generality. For, in 
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order to show that rationality and reasonableness lead to the same political principles, 
Rawls adopts a substantial conception of rationality which is not generally 
acceptable. Due to this flaw, the condition of generality becomes the Achilles’ heel 
of hybrid contractarianism.  
Rawls recognises this flaw, and makes a political turn in his later writings. Chapter 7 
discusses whether this can rescue Rawls’ theory. The later Rawls makes two 
changes, one to admit that the application of his theory is only limited to liberal 
democratic societies, another to emphasise that the assumptions of his theory are so 
freestanding that they are compatible with most of the comprehensive doctrines in 
the liberal democratic societies. I argue that, even if we lower the standard of 
generality and concentrate only on liberal democratic societies, Rawls’ social 
contract is still not generally acceptable. In spite of being freestanding, the 
assumptions of Rawls’ contractarian theory are actually more substantial than Rawls 
acknowledges. These assumptions presuppose that people are ‘strongly reasonable 
citizens’ who are willing to take political conceptions as the only ground of 
justification for political principles. However, even in a well-ordered society, which 
is the most idealist form of liberal democratic society, people may still not be 
‘strongly reasonable citizens’ due to the freedoms allowed in their society. I will 
argue that citizens in the well-ordered society are generally ‘weakly reasonable 
citizens’, so the assumptions of hybrid contractarianism will only be accepted by a 
small group of ‘strongly reasonable citizens’ in the well-ordered society.  
After we examine all these three models of contractarianism, we can discover a 
general weakness of contractarianism as a methodology. These three models are 
three possible approaches to employing this methodology. When all of them have 
problems, we must ask whether there is something wrong with this methodology. 
The distinguishing feature of contemporary contractarianism is that it relates political 
principles and practical reason by hypothetical contract. But this also means that 
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contractarianism inevitably has to rely on practical reason, or else it is unable to 
explain the source of normativity. However, if contractarians rely on a conception of 
practical reason, then they have to choose between generality and priority. Either 
they assume rationality or reasonableness as the conception of practical reason, or 
they include both rationality and reasonableness into the conception of practical 
reason. In the former case, contractarianism loses the virtue of priority. In the latter 
case, they lose the virtue of generality. Contractarianism is caught on the horns of a 
dilemma: once political philosophers adopt this methodology, they cannot avoid it. 
1.5 Contractarianism: a patriarchal theory?  
My aim in this thesis, as I have said, is to provide a general discussion of 
contractarianism as a methodology, but I have to admit that my discussion cannot 
cover all contemporary critiques. While contractarianism is one of the most popular 
approaches of justification in contemporary political philosophy, it has also been the 
subject of various critiques. For example, Carole Pateman famously criticizes 
contractarianism as an unsatisfactory political theory because patriarchal 
relationships are implicit in it.35 This is a well-known feminist critique.36 However, 
for reasons of space, it is impossible for me to deal with this critique in detail. 
Moreover, since I am concerned with the normativity of contractarianism, which is 
about its binding power, whether contractarianism excludes or disadvantages a 
particular group is not central to my concern. Hence, I will now discuss only briefly 
this feminist critique.  
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My point is that classical contractarianism may be vulnerable to Pateman’s critique, 
but her critique surely does not pose a problem for contemporary contractarianism. 
Pateman’s argument is that a sexual domination underlies all social contract models 
and this sexual domination is always ignored by political philosophers. ‘The sexual 
contract is a repressed dimension of contract theory, an integral part of the rational 
choice of the familiar, original agreement’.37 Contractarian theories cannot avoid this 
sexual domination because they presuppose that only individuals who are endowed 
with certain capacities or attributes can enter into the social contract. However, these 
capacities or attributes are usually defined through a very masculine approach. At the 
end, only men are qualified to participate in the social contract. ‘Women are 
excluded from the original pact. Men make the original contract’.38  The role of 
women in civil society is only as the property of men, subjected to the rule of men. 
Women are part of the civil society, but they do not enjoy the same protection and 
freedom that men do. Therefore, Pateman argues, even though contractarianism has 
an appearance of equality and justice, it is actually unsatisfactory because it allows a 
patriarchal relationship between men and women to exist in society. Beneath the 
equal social contract is the unequal sexual contract.  
Men’s dominance over women, and the right of men to enjoy equal sexual access to women, is 
at issue in the making of the original pact. The social contract is a story of freedom; the sexual 
contract is a story of subjection. The original contract constitutes both freedom and 
domination. Men’s freedom and women’s subjection are created through the original 
contract.39 
Classical contractarians, as Pateman observes, really overlook the status of women in 
their social contract. For example, Locke seems to think that women, unlike sons, 
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can never emerge from the ‘protection’ of men.40 However, this critique does not 
apply to contemporary contractarianism. As we will see later in Chapter 2, in 
contemporary contractarianism, the qualification of contractors is that they are 
capable of engaging in practical reasoning governed by certain conceptions, such as 
rationality or reasonableness. The capacity for practical reason is so common that 
every human being should possess it. The criteria of qualification do not have the 
kind of masculine inclination described by Pateman. For example, Scanlon assumes 
that every contractor has a capacity for reasonableness. In his contractarian model, 
contractors are reasoning creatures that have a capacity to recognise, assess, and be 
moved by reason. 41 They can give reasons to justify their acts and respect each other 
as creatures that are capable of asking for justification. This capacity is so common 
that, as Scanlon believes, all human beings possess it. If having this capacity is the 
qualification of being included in the social contract, then all women should be 
capable of entering into the contract. Indeed, many contemporary contractarians are 
also aware of this underlying patriarchal relationship. Even Rawls, who is criticized 
for only allowing heads of families to enter into social contract and ignoring other 
family members,42 also clarifies that principles of justice protect the basic liberties of 
all family members.43 Provided that a person has two moral capacities, that is, they 
are rational and reasonable, they are in the scope of the social contract and protected 
by justice as fairness, regardless of gender. Rawls believes that this scope includes 
‘the overwhelming majority of mankind’.44  While the criteria of qualification in 
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contemporary contractarianism are so low, women will always be included and fairly 
treated in contemporary contractarian models.45 
Pateman might argue that, even though the criteria are weak, many women may still 
fail to qualify because they are socially and educationally disadvantaged. This reply 
would be over-cautious because the criteria I have mentioned are so weak that people 
who were not properly educated or reared should still be able to fulfil them. Even if 
women were so unfortunate that they did not have the chance to realise their 
capacities for practical reason, they could not be excluded from the social contract. 
For contemporary contractarians argue that people who have the potential to be 
capable of assessing these rules of practical reason must be included in the social 
contract. An individual may not have the chance to realise their potential, yet they 
can still enter into social contract given that they have the potential. As Rawls says, 
‘only scattered individuals are without this capacity, or its realization to the 
minimum degree, and the failure to realise it is the consequence of unjust and 
impoverished social circumstances, or fortuitous contingencies’.46 
Hence, in light of the weak criteria of qualification, I believe that Pateman’s feminist 
critique cannot apply to contemporary contractarianism. In contemporary 
contractarian theories, women are never the property of men because they are 
participants in the social contract. What should worry contemporary contractarians 
more is the relationship between the hypothetical contract and these people. They can 
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 Kantian and hybrid contractarianism do not need to worry about this critique. But Pateman might 
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be present with a very beautiful hypothetical contract story, but how can this story 
bind people or define what people ought to do? This question will be addressed in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 Why Contractarianism? 
2.1 Introduction  
Twenty years ago, David Gauthier wrote an article ‘Why Contractarianism?’ 
explaining why contractarianism is an attractive methodology in the contemporary 
age. This article is valuable since there have been few methodological discussions of 
contractarianism before or since. Nevertheless, it is unsatisfactory because Gauthier’s 
account of contractarianism’s appeal is not comprehensive enough, and he does not 
respond to some commonly known critiques of contractarianism. For example, some 
philosophers, such as Ronald Dworkin, doubt the normative force of the hypothetical 
contract, but Gauthier does not take this critique seriously. 1  Before I begin my 
discussion of various contractarian models, I should deal with this unanswered 
critique and explain, from a methodological perspective, why contractarianism is still 
worth taking seriously today. Therefore, this chapter picks up Gauthier’s task again 
after twenty years. 2  The ambition of this chapter is to demonstrate that 
contractarianism is a useful method for justifying normative principles. I will provide 
a more comprehensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this 
methodology.  
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 See, for example, Brudney (1991), Dworkin (1973) and Hampton (1993b). 
2
 However, it does not mean that I am going to take Gauthier’s philosophical position, such as the 
‘moral-error’ meta-ethical position. In ‘Why Contractarianism’(Gauthier 1991), Gauthier holds a 
‘moral-error’ position that denies any objective moral constraints and moral fact. He argues that most 
of our moral intuitions are unreliable and hence moral principles are unjustified unless they have 
rational foundation. However, not all contractarians take this philosophical position. Some 
contractarians, like Scanlon and Nagel, disagree with this ‘moral-error’ standpoint. Other 
contractarians, like Rawls, even want to avoid this kind of meta-ethical controversies. Hence, I believe 
that contractarianism can be a freestanding methodology and does not necessarily connect with any 
meta-ethical position. Contractarian can have different understandings of what the nature of morality 
is, but still use the same methodology (hypothetical contract) to justify normative principles. 
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I would like first to define contractarianism. Here contractarianism refers to the 
normative political theories which use hypothetical contracts as a method for 
determining the nature and content of political principles. ‘This doctrine of 
justification, tying reasons in interaction to the test of hypothetical agreement, is the 
core of…contractarianism’.3 There are two central features of hypothetical contract: 
an idealised choice situation and a hypothetical agreement among people. 
Contractarians first define an idealised choice situation in which there are no 
sovereigns, laws, courts, established property rights or contract.4  They then ask us to 
imagine that we have been placed in this ideal choice situation. In order to escape 
from the chaos, we would have to create political principles to govern our society. 
After deliberation, we would come to an agreement on certain political principles. 
Contractarians argue that these political principles (and our obligations to these 
principles) are justified, and use these political principles to evaluate existing social 
institutions. As Gauthier says in his article, the main task of the hypothetical contract 
is to establish an evaluative criterion: ‘Hypothetical agreement provides a test of the 
justifiability of our existent practices’.5 This is the general form of contractarian 
argument.  
Although contractarians disagree about the ideal choice situation that should frame 
the choice of political principles, they share this general framework of 
contractarianism. Some assume that people in an idealised choice situation would 
have strong moral motivation, whereas some assume that people would be wholly 
self-interested. Different assumptions of the idealised choice situation lead to 
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 Gauthier (1997: 135). 
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 Here ‘idealized’ does not mean those people who are in the idealized choice situation are perfect and 
virtuous. The term only means that, at this stage, some of their morally relevant characteristics are 
sharpened prominently, and, on the contrary, some of their irrelevant characteristics are excluded. So 
‘ideal beings’ are human beings who have certain prominent characteristics. The purpose of 
idealization is to eliminate the influence of factors we consider irrelevant to the decision making of 
hypothetical agents. 
5
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different hypothetical agreements. From the variety of contractarian models, one 
should notice that contractarianism is a methodology which is compatible with a 
diverse range of conclusions.6  The variety is so large that it is difficult to see them as 
belonging to the same philosophical camp. Someone may then think that 
contractarianism is only an empty method which can be used by any political 
theorists.7 Anyone who has designed an idealised choice situation and proposed a 
hypothetical agreement can be called a contractarian. However, such a broad 
definition fails to explain why so many contractarians really take this philosophical 
position seriously. For example, even though his hypothetical contract story was 
subject to many critiques, Rawls never gave up the label of contractarian throughout 
his life and believed that it was a distinctive philosophical position.8 It seems that 
contractarianism has some special philosophical commitments apart from this 
general framework. 
I believe that contractarianism has certain special characteristics and these 
characteristics differentiate contractarians from other political theorists. These 
characteristics can also be interpreted as the virtues of this methodology which 
explain why so many theorists are attracted to this approach. The distinctive virtues 
of contractarianism will be discussed in the following section. After this section, I 
will then discuss a common issue raised by critics of contractarianism, which is the 
relationship between the hypothetical contract and the real world.  
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 Here contractarianism does not commit one to any particular meta-ethical theory about the nature or 
ontological status of injustice. It is compatible with the view that injustice is an irreducible, non-
natural property, but it is also consistent with a meta-ethics that views attributions of injustice as ways 
of projecting one’s disapproval onto actions. However, it does not mean that contractarianism does 
not have any meta-ethical implications. For example, contractarian principles must be possible to be 
‘chosen’ by human beings. Hence the principles must be stance-dependent, that is, they must depend 
on an intentional psychological state (a stance), such as a belief or a conative or an affective attitude. 
For this meta-ethical implication of contractarianism, see Milo (1995: 191-192).  
7
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2.2 Three virtues of contractarianism 
Contractarianism has had its heyday, but there are still a number of contemporary 
theorists who continue to use this methodology. This phenomenon should not be 
ignored. Nor should we think that these theorists have coincidentally chosen the 
same method. There may well be some particular virtues inherent in this 
methodology, which are the key to explaining why it has been chosen. In this section, 
I will try to show what these virtues are and explain why contractarianism is so 
prevalent in political philosophy. 
2.2.1 The virtue of naturalism 
I can think of three virtues of contractarianism, which also seem to be the reasons 
why contemporary contractarians endorse this approach. First, contractarianism does 
not justify political principles by strange, non-natural properties or objects; nor does 
it credit human beings with what J. L. Mackie calls ‘magical power’ which is capable 
of discerning some moral truths out there’.9 Instead, it takes the normative principle 
as a ‘contract’, a product of human volition, that we commend to the extent that we 
would choose it when we are placed in an idealised choice situation. This 
characteristic is a virtue because it is compatible with the scientific, secular outlook 
in the modern world.  
Here it is important to note the difference between the modern outlook and the 
ancient outlook. In the ancient times, people usually conceived of the world as 
purposely ordered.10  Everything was subjected to an order that different elements in 
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creation expressed and embodied a certain order of purposes. This order gave all 
beings innate purposes which would guide what they ought to do. The way people 
treated each another was somehow inscribed in the universal realm. Since this 
purposive order was independent of people’s subjective will, people could only 
recognise their given purposes and pursue them faithfully.  
This outlook changed radically following the Enlightenment. Because of the 
emergence of modern science, represented by the scientific theories of Newton and 
Galileo, people began to understand the order of the world as a mechanistic, non-
purposive order. This is, in Max Weber’s words, the ‘disenchantment of the world’, 
which is the feature of modernity. ‘The new notion of objectivity rejected the 
recourse to final causes; it was mechanistic in the sense of relying on efficient 
causation only’.11 In the new world order, people are not given any objective, final 
purpose of life.12 The natural scientific order no longer tells people what they ought 
to do. The purposes of life do not exist objectively, but rather are determined by the 
subjective will of individuals. Therefore, unlike the ancient worldview that the whole 
world was governed by an independent purposive order, in the modern age, the 
factual world is explained by science, but science says nothing about what people 
should do.  
This change in outlook influences the justification of political principles. The ancient 
approach to political justification took the political order to be a part of the cosmic 
order; thus a justified political principle was independent of what people thought. It 
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 In a more accurate wording, it does not mean that no one conceives the world order as purposive 
during or after Enlightenment. Indeed, a purposive interpretation of history is still prevalent in the 
writings of Enlightenment thinkers, such as Kant (See Kant 1991b: 108-109). However, the purposive 
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could be justified by an external metaphysical order which was indifferent to the 
subjective will of the individual. However, this approach encounters severe 
difficulties in the modern world. The assumption that there is some external 
metaphysical truth out there which can be discovered by us and can guide our actions 
is incompatible with the scientific, natural worldview.   
Hence contractarianism became the mainstream of political theory after the 
seventeenth century, since the justificational approach to contractarianism does not 
rely on any metaphysical properties which are indifferent to the subjective will of 
individuals. Contractarianism justifies principle by showing that it is the constraint 
which would be chosen by us in an idealised choice situation. In this approach, 
political principles come from the creation of individuals which represent the 
disposition of their subjective wills.13 Political authority is not something that can be 
derived from some sort of innate authority possessed by a set of supposedly superior 
persons, nor something that is derived from God. Instead, political authority should 
be a creation of the people who constitute it. Thus Michael Oakeshott is right to call 
contractarianism a doctrine of ‘will and artifice’.14 Contractarians take the subjective 
will of people as the starting point for reflection on society. They deny ‘an 
independent realm of moral facts and a special faculty of reasoning to ascertain 
them’. 15  It is this naturalistic virtue which attracts some theorists to adopt this 
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 Indeed, the feature of ‘anti-natural authority’ of the social contract can even be traced back to the 
earlier history of political thought. One of the examples of this is the ‘nature and convention’ debate 
among the Greek philosophers. As Sir Ernest Barker observes, early Greek philosophers normally had 
two approaches to explaining the existence of law, one accepted their own laws as unalterable law by 
nature, if not divine; the other argued that law was just a product of customs and conventions, the 
existence of political authority being based on the consent of ruled. The sophists of the latter camp, 
though they did not adopt contractual language, had very similar ideas on the formation of political 
organization to the modern social contract theorists. For a discussion of distinction between the 
‘nature’ and ‘convention’ schools, see Barker (1960: 53). For the interpretation that the idea of 
consent-based political authority is actually implicit in the ‘convention’ school, see Kahn (1981). 
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approach, for example, David Gauthier, who believes that a normative constraint 
cannot be independent of the subjective will of people. 
If, independent of a person’s actual desires and aims, there were objective values, and if, 
independent of their actual purposes, they were part of an objectively purposively order, then 
we might have reason to insist on the inadequacy of the [ancient approach.]…But the 
supplanting of teleology in our physical and biological explanations closes this possibility, as it 
closes the possibility of religious explanation.16 
Hence, contractarianism is an attractive approach to justifying political principles 
because it justifies principles in a way which is compatible with a modern scientific 
worldview, without relying on any questionable external metaphysical assumptions. 
No wonder some contractarians even believe that their approach can provide the 
‘only plausible foundation’ of normative principle in the modern world.17 
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 Gauthier (1991a: 98). Similar emphasis can also be seen in Rawls (1999a: 398), Rawls (1980: 350), 
Hampton (1986: 273) and Barry (1995a: 5). 
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2.2.2 The virtue of public justifiability 
Secondly, contractarianism shows a respect for the choices of rational/reasonable 
individuals. Contractarians emphasise that political authority is unjustified unless it 
represents an agreement which is publicly acceptable to everyone in a society. This 
characteristic shows a basic normative commitment of contractarianism, that is, all 
persons should have equal moral standing. No-one is naturally superior or inferior to 
another. If we all have equal moral standing, then no-one, or no group, could have 
authority over others unless this authority is acceptable to others. An unjustified 
authority imposed on an individual represents disrespect for the freedom of this 
individual. As Gough points out, ‘the ultimate raison d'être for the contract theory, 
all through its history, has been to reconcile the apparently conflicting claims of 
liberty and law’.18 
It does not mean that contemporary contractarians believe that a justified principle 
must be based on the voluntary consent of people, since sometimes the voluntary 
consent of people may not represent a rational/reasonable choice. Indeed, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 1, contemporary contractarians rarely take voluntary consent 
as the source of normativity.19 Nevertheless, contemporary contractarians still insist 
on the importance of public justifiability. Since a political principle frequently has a 
significant impact on the lives of people, contractarians argue that such an influential 
rule cannot be imposed on people arbitrarily. Even though it is unrealistic to show 
that a principle is a wholly voluntary scheme, contractarians believe that, at least, a 
principle should show that rational individuals would voluntarily accept its ruling. As 
John Rawls says, a political society should not be taken as a straightforwardly 
voluntary scheme. Nevertheless, a political society which is governed by 
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contractarian principles has a virtue, for it represents a voluntary scheme which is 
rational to free and equal persons.   
No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal 
sense; …Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society 
can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons 
would assent to under circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members are autonomous 
and the obligation they recognise self-imposed.20 
Some contractarians even believe that this emphasis on the importance of 
acceptability is the central virtue in the long tradition of contractarianism.21 One of 
the examples is T. M. Scanlon, who believes that no normative principle can be 
imposed on people unless it can be demonstrated that it is acceptable to these people.  
Fundamental economic and political institutions cannot be justified simply on the ground that 
those to whom they apply have consented to their authority. Nonetheless, in order to be 
justifiable, institutions must give individuals the power to shape many of their particular 
obligations through the choice they make. The fact that an individual has chosen a certain 
outcome, or could have avoided it by choosing differently, is often an important reason why 
that outcome is legitimate.22 
[A]ccording to my version of contractualism, one needs to make claims about the reasons that 
individuals have for accepting or rejecting certain principles as standards of conduct…This 
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emphasis on what principles others have reason to accept (or reject), and on our reasons for 
caring about this, led me to call my view ‘contractualist.’23 
2.2.3 The virtue of respecting plurality  
Thirdly, the contractarian justification of principles does not need to assume that any 
substantial moral consensus exists in the society. Modern society is highly pluralistic. 
People usually have diverse, or even conflicting, perspectives on how political 
society should be arranged. On the view of some people, such as Rawls, this situation 
is an inevitable consequence of liberal democracy, which allows people to develop 
their own viewpoints freely.24 If a political principle is based on some substantial, 
controversial values, then it may have to assume that everyone in the society takes 
these substantial values as fundamentally important, which is obviously an 
unrealistic assumption in most modern societies. As Rawls indicates, a unified moral 
consensus can only be achieved by the oppressive use of state power: ‘In the society 
of the Middle Ages, more or less united in affirming the Catholic faith, the 
Inquisition was not an accident; its suppression of heresy was needed to preserve that 
shared religious belief’.25 
The strength of contractarianism is that it can justify political principles without 
making such a problematic assumption. The contractarian justification usually relies 
on some less controversial, commonly accepted ground, for example, rationality. It 
does not mean that contractarian justification is neutral, for some contractarians also 
acknowledge that their contractarianism clearly has some normative assumptions.26 
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Indeed, it is also impossible to have a theory which is completely normatively 
neutral.27  Despite their partiality, contractarians at least are highly aware of the 
plurality of modern societies and try their best to avoid controversial justifications 
which are not publicly justified. The ideal picture of contractarianism is always that, 
even if people have widely divergent perspectives about political arrangements the 
political principle is still justified by some grounds which are commonly shared 
among these people.  
Gauthier is one of the contractarians who emphasises this virtue of contractarianism. 
Gauthier’s contractarian principles are justified by a weak assumption of 
instrumental rationality which is compatible with many interests and preferences. 
Although the society is highly pluralistic and conflicts are inevitable, the 
contractarian political principles can still be publicly justified to people. No matter 
what interests or preferences people have, all of them share the rationality of 
satisfying these interests or preferences effectively. Thus people will agree upon 
Gauthier’s contractarian principles given that following these principles can lead to a 
mutually beneficial outcome. 28  These principles can still be the focus of social 
agreement even though an antecedent substantial consensus is absent. This awareness 
of plurality is commonly seen in the writings of other contractarians as well.29 No 
contractarian would simply assume that certain substantial moral doctrines are 
widely accepted, or propose that the diversity of modern societies should be replaced 
by a substantial moral consensus. Since the fact of pluralism is hard to deny, this 
realistic understanding of society can be seen as one of the virtues of 
contractarianism.  
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 See Rawls (1993: 30-37). Similarly, although Scanlon presupposes that all people have an 
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Chapter 2 Why Contractarianism? 
52 
 
By having a better understanding of the virtues of contractarianism, we can 
understand why so many political theorists are interested in this approach. Moreover, 
one can also see the distinctiveness of contractarianism. Contractarianism is not a 
wholly freestanding methodology which is compatible with any political theories. It 
justifies principles without relying on controversial metaphysical backgrounds, it 
respects the rational will of the individual, and it provides a public ground of 
justification in a pluralistic society. These three virtues are the strengths of 
contractarianism and can also explain why this methodology has been revived in 
contemporary political philosophy.  
2.3 The ‘standard critique’: why am I bound by a hypothetical contract? 
The virtues of contractarianism have been identified, but the weaknesses of this 
methodology should not be ignored. Some critics argue that the source of normativity 
of hypothetical contract is doubtful. The obligation which would be accepted by a 
hypothetical person cannot constitute a reason for action for a real person. This 
critique was first raised by Ronald Dworkin, and soon became the ‘standard critique’ 
of contractarianism.30 I take this critique as pointing out the most serious weakness 
of the contractarianism that I am discussing, because if this critique is sound, then the 
hypothetical contract merely specifies political principles with no normative force. 
Hence, in this section, I will concentrate on this standard critique and discuss how 
contractarianism might in fact be immune from this critique.  
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2.3.1 The necessity of idealisation 
Before I discuss this critique, it would be helpful to discuss the role of idealization in 
this theory. Contractarianism is sometimes misunderstood as relating to a 
hypothetical question about actual reactions, that is, whether the principles would be 
agreed to by people who live in the real world if they were asked. Indeed, if 
contractarians are really concerned with this issue, then what they would need to do 
is to conduct an empirical survey of actual people. However, what contractarians 
care about is actually the question of whether their principles would be agreed to by 
hypothetical contractors. It is rather a doubly hypothetical question, that is, a 
hypothetical question about a hypothetical reaction. Contractarians are concerned 
with neither what actual agreement would be reached by actual people, nor whether 
their hypothetical contract would be agreed to by actual people.31  This question is 
then a theoretical rather than an empirical question. 
Given that contractarians are concerned with a doubly hypothetical question, the 
worry of critics should be clear. What is the point of caring about this doubly 
hypothetical question? Why is the perspective of hypothetical, idealised people 
relevant to the perspective of actual people? There are two reasons which can justify 
the necessity of studying this doubly hypothetical question. The first reason is one of 
practical limitation and the second reason is one of normative significance. First, 
given that the opinions of real people are so diverse, it is impossible to reach a 
unanimous agreement with everyone in a real society. There will always be some 
dissenters. Even if such a unanimous agreement is possible, it may be so vague that it 
cannot provide any substantial guideline for policy-making. If contractarians want to 
get some substantial principles through the device of hypothetical contract, then the 
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idealization of this contract is necessary. As Rawls acknowledges, ‘without 
[idealisation] we would not be able to work out any definite theory of justice at all’.32 
Secondly, even if a unanimous, substantial actual agreement is possible, this 
agreement might be affected by some irrelevant factors. Suppose that a political 
principle is able to be unanimously agreed by everyone in a society. Nevertheless, 
some of them might agree with this principle because they have been coerced, 
because they lack information, or because of their ideological beliefs.33 In this case, 
this principle does not have too much normative significance and we intuitively think 
that people do not have an obligation to comply with this political principle. Hence, 
an idealised hypothetical contract is necessary in order to show what principles 
people would agree with in a situation viewed as morally untainted.  
These two reasons can explain why contractarians insist on justifying principles by a 
purified, idealised hypothetical contract, for the content of the agreement can become 
more determinate and irrelevant factors can be excluded. Without idealisation, the 
contractarian principles may either be too vague, or be corrupted by enforcement and 
fraud.  
2.3.2 The standard critique 
Idealisation prevents contractarianism from becoming desperately complicated or a 
product of force, but it might be gained at the expense of vacuousness. 
Contractarianism becomes vulnerable to the critique of being irrelevant to the real 
political world. Since some factors affecting people’s reasoning are excluded in the 
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idealised choice situation, the decision of a hypothetical person in the idealised 
choice situation is surely different from the decision of an actual person in the real 
world. Because of this gap, actual people might not agree with the hypothetical 
agreement even if they were asked; given that I have not agreed with this 
hypothetical agreement in my life, and I would not agree with it if I were asked, why 
should I be bound by this hypothetical agreement?  
This standard critique has often been mentioned in the literature.34  It is usually 
represented by Dworkin’s critique of Rawls’ idea of original position, which argues 
that a hypothetical consent cannot generate any obligation to real people.  
I might concede that I would have agreed for that reason, and then add that I am lucky that you 
did not raise the point. The fact that I would have agreed if you had insisted neither adds nor 
suggests any argument why I should agree now. The point is not that it would have been unfair 
of you to insist on your proposal as a condition of playing; indeed, it would not have been. If 
you had held out for your proposal, and I had agreed, I could not say that my agreement was in 
any way nullified or called into question because of duress. But if I had not in fact agreed, the 
fact that I would have in itself means nothing.35 
That is why Dworkin famously suggested that ‘A hypothetical contract is not simply 
a pale from an actual contract; it is no contract at all’.36 Hypothetical contract seems 
to assume that you can be bound by an agreement that others, different from you, 
would have made. This seems unconvincing because the relationship between the 
hypothetical contract and actual people is unclear. Thus some critics mischievously 
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35
 Dworkin (1973: 18-19). 
36
 Dworkin (1973: 18). 
Chapter 2 Why Contractarianism? 
56 
 
say that hypothetical contract is merely ‘good clean intellectual fun’.37 Other critics, 
such as Dworkin and Pettit, are more sympathetic to this methodology, but still claim 
that contractarianism is incomplete unless it is supplemented with an additional 
moral theory. Dworkin argues that what is behind contractarianism should be a 
theory of natural rights. Since everyone has a natural right to equal concern, we are 
obligated to given each person equal respect.38 The hypothetical contract is a medium 
for deriving substantial principles from abstract natural right. Pettit believes that 
contractarianism threatens to collapse to a kind of consequentialism. 39  When 
contractors reject a certain principle, they usually reject on grounds of certain 
impersonal values, such as fairness and happiness.40  So what ultimately matters 
should be these impersonal values but not the rejection of hypothetical contractors. A 
political principle is unjustified not because it would be rejected in a hypothetical 
contract, but rather is because it fails to promote certain impersonal values.  
2.3.3 The orthodox reply and its inadequacy 
Theorists who believe that contractarianism is a self-sufficient, complete theory 
intend to clarify that contractarianism is not a theory of obligation and authority, but 
rather a theory of content. It does not try to define what normative obligation people 
actually have. Rather, it only aims at proposing an appropriate decision procedure for 
political philosophy. A hypothetical contract merely demonstrates an ideal situation 
that ideal contractual parties would reason properly and would agree on several 
political principles. This contract is a heuristic device which clarifies the content of 
political principle. Through the hypothetical contract, people can know how political 
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principles are ‘constructed’ through certain decision-making processes. But this 
philosophical project can be conducted without requiring a theory of obligation and 
authority. Contractarians can acknowledge that the hypothetical contract itself cannot 
create any political obligation. Whether actual people are obligated to these political 
principles and whether they would accept this obligation are beyond the concern of 
contractarians. This strategy is an orthodox answer given by theorists who try to 
defend contractarianism.41  One of the examples is Jean Hampton: 
If we understand the structure and the role of the contractarian device in our moral thinking, 
the contract idea isn’t in any sense foundational, or even necessary, for effective moral 
reasoning. It is merely a test that is heuristically valuable for the moral agent in virtue of the 
fact that it is informed by ideas that they are the real source of moral reasoning.42 
It is true that the hypothetical contract itself is inadequate to generate political 
obligation, for it is hard to deny that there is a gap between hypothetical contractors 
and actual people. However, it seems that most of the contractarians do not think 
their theories are merely theories of content. Although many contractarians are 
concerned with the problem of content, 43  they also believe that the problem of 
obligation and authority can be solved by their theories. For example, Rawls believes 
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that every individual has a natural duty of justice, which ‘do[es] not presuppose an 
act of consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in order to apply’.44 
From the standpoint of justice as fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of justice. 
This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institution that exist and apply to us. It 
also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be 
done without too much cost to ourselves. Thus if the basic structure of society is just, or as just 
as it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in 
the existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, 
performative or otherwise.45 
Rawls is not alone at this point. Gauthier and Nagel also believe that a hypothetical 
contract can justify enforced compliance to political principles.46 In general, these 
contractarians do not treat the hypothetical contract as, following Hampton, ‘just a 
way of reasoning that allows us to work out conceptual answers to moral problems’ 
and has nothing to do with whether the actual people will accept this way.47 Rather, 
they believe that this hypothetical consent can be used as a substitute for actual 
consent. So the contract which is justified by this hypothetical consent has 
normativity, regardless of what responses actual persons have.  
This shows that even if a gap between hypothetical contractors and actual people 
exists, contractarians still think that coercive obligations to particular principles can 
be justified by a hypothetical contract and we, as actual people, are truly bound by 
this hypothetical contract. But where does the normativity of hypothetical contract 
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come from? Indeed, some critics seem to think that this binding power is merely an 
illusion, since only actual consent can justify coercive obligations.48  If a person 
consents only in a hypothetical situation but does not consent in an actual situation, 
this consent has no normative force for anyone. However, this account of coercive 
obligation is too narrow. The standard critique sets a very high standard for imposing 
political obligations: it assumes that the imposition of obligation must be voluntary. 
It is an unrealistic standard because, in fact, most people have never voluntarily 
expressed their consent to their political obligations. If this assumption were true, 
then most of the people in the world would have no political obligations to their 
states, which is absurd, or at least inconsistent with any non-anarchist stance.49 
Moreover, sometimes even when a person actually consents to something, it is still 
unjustified to impose obligations on him. Not every actual consent creates an 
obligation. 50  For example, if people are misinformed or threatened, their actual 
consent should not have any normative force. Therefore, actual consent is neither a 
necessary condition nor a sufficient condition for coercive obligation. If actual 
consent is irrelevant, then it means that even without actual consent, a hypothetical 
contract can still have normative force. But what are the conditions?  
2.4 The normativity of hypothetical contract 
The standard critique is correct in that hypothetical consent should not be confused 
with actual consent, yet it is too early to claim that normativity can only come from 
actual consent. So when does a hypothetical contract establish normativity? Some 
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theorists argue that hypothetical contract is justified when it is supported by ‘good 
reasons’.51 If people have good reasons to accept the premises of a hypothetical 
contract, then they should also accept the hypothetical contract. But what can be 
counted as good reasons? This account is too vague and we must go further to 
discuss the source of normativity of hypothetical contract. In this section, I will show 
that a hypothetical contract has normative force only when it can model practical 
reason correctly.   
2.4.1 The normativity of practical reason 
The source of normativity of the hypothetical contract can be made explicit by 
discussing the role that practical reason plays in contractarian theory. Here practical 
reason means a general human capacity for deliberating upon practical issues. Unlike 
theoretical reason, which determines what one ought to believe, practical reason is 
concerned with what one ought to do (which is why it is ‘practical’). It represents a 
capacity for thinking through a distinctive process. When people deliberate about 
actions and choices, they think about themselves and their situations through this 
process, and eventually come up with certain actions and choices. This is why 
practical reason also has a crucial role in explaining human motivations and 
behaviours. An action or choice can be justified insofar as it can be accounted for by 
practical reason. In short, practical reason determines the actions and choices of 
people.  
Practical reason, as a process of thought, is not wholly arbitrary, for it is governed by 
certain antecedent normative rules. These constraints are unchosen and bind the 
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practical thinking of human beings.52 One example of these rules is the syllogism 
mentioned by Aristotle. Given that people have certain beliefs, they are committed to 
certain actions or choices. Given that I want to take the train at 4pm, and if I do not 
leave home now I cannot reach the train station before 4pm, I should leave home 
now. In the following chapters, I will discuss these rules, which fall into two 
conceptions of practical reason: rationality and reasonableness. But at this stage I 
will only define practical reason as a capacity for deliberating upon practical issues 
in terms of certain rules. ‘Practical reasoning is a vehicle for solving casuistic 
problem of what to do in a particular situation, given that certain…principles have 
been designated or established as personal commitments to be acted upon by an 
agent’.53 
The normativity of practical reason is independent of and more fundamental than 
other rules that bind people. There are many rules in the world. For instances, in the 
rules of football, we cannot play football with our hands. In the rules of chess, the 
King cannot be moved two squares. However, we can reflect upon our obligation to 
these rules. We do not necessarily have to follow them and can escape from them 
whenever we want. But we cannot avoid deliberating in terms of rationality or 
reasonableness, since these rules are actually the principles of logic of practical 
deliberation. These rules determine our way of reflection. Hence there is no sense at 
all in reflecting upon whether we should deliberate in terms of rationality and 
reasonableness, since reflection itself has to follow these rules. Asking about the 
obligation to these rules is merely begging the question.54 Whenever we exercise 
practical reason, we necessarily commit ourselves to complying with these rules. 
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Commitment to such rules is inevitable in practical reasoning. Hence, the normativity 
of practical reason is independent and people are involuntarily bound by them.55 
Also, the normativity of practical reason is fundamental since the normativity of 
other rules is determined by practical reason. We are committed to complying with 
different rules in our lives, but whether these obligations are justified is determined 
by practical reason. For example, a person promises to follow a rule in a game. But if 
she then discovers that this rule is irrational/unreasonable, she will think that this 
promise is unjustified and does not have any binding power. In light of this, one can 
see that practical reason is the sources of normativity of other rules. Our 
commitments to complying with other rules are justified insofar as they are justified 
in the reasoning governed by rationality and reasonableness. Hence, one cannot 
reject the conclusions of practical reason because of other commitments in one’s life. 
One might doubt the involuntary normative force of practical reason, since one could 
imagine an insane person who ignores these rules. Taking the train example again, an 
insane person could want to take the train at 4pm, and know that he must leave home 
now in order to catch the train, but still refuse to leave home. This is biologically 
possible, yet it is also obvious that these cases are extremely rare. In most 
circumstances, people deliberate under the guidance of rationality and 
reasonableness. These rules are the normal pattern of human behaviour. It is surely 
possible that people not strictly follow this pattern, yet this is only because of the 
influence of some irrelevant factors, such as laziness, coercion and misinformation. 
If people could deliberate without being affected by these irrelevant factors, then 
they would generally follow the guidance of rationality and reasonableness. We 
simply think that the behaviour of an insane person does not make sense if this 
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person did this even after thorough deliberation. In short, although it is biologically 
possible to violate the rules that govern practical reason, it is impossible to do so 
intelligibly. Our practical reasoning is inevitably regulated by these normative rules.  
2.4.2 Hypothetical contract and practical reason 
Practical reason explains where the normativity of hypothetical contract comes from. 
The basic strategy of contractarianism is to explain the normativity of certain 
political principles in terms of practical reason, and the device is hypothetical 
contract. 56  The rules that govern practical reason can be applied to different 
questions, such as the question of political principles. This is the function of 
hypothetical contractors. They are defined as ideal agents who are placed in carefully 
circumscribed conditions and deliberate about certain questions without being 
affected by irrelevant factors. Their thought and judgment reveals the deliberative 
results of actual people when they think strictly in accordance with the rules that 
govern practical reason. In short, the hypothetical contractors model the practical 
reasoning of actual people. Contractarians then discuss what political principles 
would be chosen by these hypothetical contractors. Through discussing this scenario, 
contractarians show what will happen if the rules that govern practical reason are 
applied to the question of political principle. The political principles that are chosen 
by the hypothetical contractors represent the conclusion of practical reasoning when 
actual people deliberate upon the question of political principles correctly. 
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An example of this way of modelling practical reason is the hypothetical contractors 
in Gauthier’s contractarian theory. In this theory, hypothetical contractors are 
rational, fully-informed utility-maximizers. The purpose of defining the hypothetical 
contractors in this way is to show the pure practical reasoning of a rational person. In 
the real world, actual people might fail to deliberate fully rationally. Their practical 
reasoning might be influenced by some irrelevant factors, such as deception and 
short-sightedness. The rational utility-maximizers show what would happen when 
actual people deliberate in accordance with the rules of rationality. The choices of 
these hypothetical contractors reveal what political principles are rationally justified.  
In light of the rationale behind contractarians’ definitions, it is also clear why actual 
people should accept the choice of hypothetical contractors. Suppose we assume that 
the hypothetical contractors can perfectly model the practical reasoning of actual 
people. These hypothetical contractors deliberate in accordance with the rules that 
regulate the practical reasoning of actual people as well. Since the practical reasoning 
of hypothetical contractors and actual people is governed by the same normative 
rules, the result of their practical reasoning should be the same. If hypothetical 
contractors agree with certain political principles, then these political principles 
should be justified to actual people as well. These principles are principles that actual 
people should accept insofar as they can deliberate correctly. The function of 
hypothetical contractors is to help actual people to clarify their practical reasoning 
and uncover the obligations that actual people have reason to accept. As Rawls 
points out, his original position is indeed a kind of ‘thought experiment for the 
purpose of public- and self-clarification’.57 Provided that hypothetical contractors 
can model our practical reasoning correctly, we have no reason to reject the choices 
of hypothetical contractors; contractors’ choices are actually our choices.  
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However, one should not misunderstand that a hypothetical contract would be agreed 
by actual people if they were asked. In the real world, actual people might be 
affected by laziness, coercion, prejudice or misinformation, and hence might choose 
differently. As Gaus writes, ‘actual people do not always act on their sound and 
overriding reasons’.58 Despite the weaknesses of actual people, the normativity of the 
hypothetical contract is unaffected, since its normativity is based on practical reason, 
not on the possibility of being actually agreed to. Why actual people make different 
decisions is simply because they are influenced by factors which are irrelevant to 
practical reasoning. Their practical thinking is still regulated by the normative rules 
that govern practical reason. If actual people were aware of the existence of these 
factors, they would also prefer excluding them from practical reasoning. Hence the 
choices of hypothetical contractors are justified to actual people regardless of their 
actual responses.  
Therefore, the source of normativity of the hypothetical contract is made explicit 
after we understand the relationship between hypothetical contract and practical 
reason. A hypothetical contract has normative force when the hypothetical 
contractors can model the practical reasoning of actual people adequately. Our 
practical reasoning is governed by certain normative rules, and it is impossible 
intelligibly to deny the normativity of these rules. The hypothetical contractors are 
defined for the sake of showing the process of practical reasoning when these rules 
are strictly followed. The political principles chosen by hypothetical contractors 
represent the conclusion of proper practical reasoning. The normativity of these 
principles is explained by practical reason.59 Hence, actual people have good reasons 
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to accept these political principles, since the reasoning of hypothetical contractors is 
actually their reasoning. The gap between hypothetical contractors and actual people 
is bridged by practical reason.  
2.4.3 The problem of the standard critique 
Once the source of normativity of hypothetical contract becomes clear, we should be 
able to see the problem with the standard critique. The critique is based on the wrong 
question: ‘why should I accept the hypothetical contract?’ The reason for asking this 
question is understandable, since the hypothetical contract seems to argue that one 
can be bound by the consent of fictional characters that are irrelevant to one’s 
concern. Hypothetical contractors legislate for actual people and create some 
obligations that actual people would not agree with. It seems that the will of actual 
people is ignored and thus some theorists question why we should be bound by this 
contract.  
However, the theorists who offer this critique misunderstand the relationship 
between hypothetical contractors and actual people. As I discussed in the last section, 
                                                                                                                                          
we can see that these conceptions are not independent sources of normativity. Rather, these 
conceptions merely represent the context in which people apply the rules that govern practical reason, 
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provided that the hypothetical contractors are properly defined, hypothetical 
contractors and actual people share the same methods of practical reasoning. The 
point of view of hypothetical contractors is my point of view. Actual people should 
accept the hypothetical contract, since they also deliberate in accordance with the 
same normative rules. They can only recognise the results of proper practical 
reasoning, but not reject them. So the hypothetical contract does not create any 
obligations; it merely discovers the obligations that actual people already have. The 
hypothetical contract is not a story that a fictional, irrelevant character legislates for 
you. Rather, it is a thought experiment that helps you to clarify what you should 
legislate for yourself in the political realm. Hence, the question of why we should 
accept the hypothetical contract is misleading, since the hypothetical contract is not 
an external constraint that is imposed by some authorities outside of us. Rather, it is 
an internal constraint that we are already committed to but we have not realised. The 
hypothetical contract simply shows us what we should think and, indeed, do think. 
This understanding of the hypothetical contract can also be seen in the writings of 
some contractarians. For example, Rawls believes the original position is important 
in clarifying the implications of our conception of the person, which is characterized 
by rationality and reasonableness. ‘[The hypothetical contract] helps us to work out 
what we now think’.60 Hence, the principles derived from the original position have 
normative force to us because these principles are justified by the conception of the 
person that ‘we do in fact accept’.61 The aim of the original position is not to create 
any obligations, but ‘to uncover a public basis for a political conception of justice’.62 
It merely shows us what political principles we should accept, given that we have a 
particular conception of the person. 
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The context of the problem guides us in removing vagueness and ambiguity in the conception 
of the person, and tells us how precise we need to be…Thus the structure defined by the 
original position may enable us to crystallize our otherwise amorphous notion of the person 
and to identify with sufficient sharpness the appropriate characterization of free and equal 
moral personality.63 
In light of this relationship between practical reason and hypothetical contract, we 
can also see why those theorists who claim that contractarianism is incomplete 
wrongly understand the nature of contractarianism. Dworkin suggests that 
hypothetical contract indeed assumes a self-evident theory of natural rights. 
However, he misunderstands the real assumption of contractarians. In most of the 
contractarian theories, individual rights are not taken for granted; rather, they are the 
product of people’s agreement and are justified by their conceptions of practical 
reason.64 In the discussion above, we can see that the source of normativity of the 
hypothetical contract is practical reason, not natural rights. If contractarians take 
natural rights as the source of normativity, then they have to worry about explaining 
the relationship between the world and these natural rights. But if they take practical 
reason as the source, then this worry can be avoided because the rules that govern 
practical reason are merely general patterns of thought that are induced by empirical 
studies of human behaviour.  
Pettit argues that contractarianism must presuppose a consequentialist theory of 
promoting certain impersonal values. What matters is not the fact that the contractors 
would reject certain principles, but rather the consequences that certain impersonal 
values would be promoted by following these principles. These consequences are the 
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reasons for contractors to reject these principles. However, contractarians resist this 
consequentialist assumption. They argue that the rejection of rational or reasonable 
contractors is the fundamental ground of rejecting a political principle. The 
consequentialist considerations of promoting impersonal values would be considered 
by those rational or reasonable contractors, but these would not be the only 
considerations. There are some other non-consequentialist considerations which 
cannot be reduced to consequentialist considerations, such as reasons to keep one’s 
promise.65 Rational or reasonable contractors would deliberate in accordance with 
the rules that govern practical reason, weigh these considerations and choose 
political principles. There is no an consequentialist theory behind contractarianism. 
Rather, contractarianism is a self-sufficient theory which reveals our practical 
reasoning and takes consequentialist considerations into account.   
One distinction may help us to see how Dworkin and Pettit misunderstand the 
function of hypothetical contract. In Plato’s Euthyphro Socrates asks whether 
something is holy because the gods love it, or whether the gods love it because it is 
holy. Similarly, we can ask whether a political principle is justified because it would 
be chosen in the hypothetical contract, or whether it would be chosen in a 
hypothetical contract because it is justified. For the former case, the hypothetical 
contract is definitional of what it is to be justified. For the latter case, the 
hypothetical contract merely identifies principles that are justified by other 
independent grounds. Dworkin and Pettit think that the latter account for 
hypothetical contract is correct. Hypothetical contract merely identifies principles 
that protect natural rights or promote impersonal values. However, most of the 
contractarians think that hypothetical contract should be definitional. For example, 
Rawls proposes the idea of procedural justice and argues that the original position is 
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the correct procedure of defining principles of justice.66 Apart from this procedure 
there are no independent criteria of justifying political principles. Gauthier and 
Scanlon also define principles of right in terms of what would be agreeable to 
rational or reasonable parties.67 Hence, the contractarian principles are defined by 
hypothetical contract which reveals proper practical reasoning and are not justified 
by other independent normative grounds.  
In conclusion, I do not intend to disagree with the standard critique of hypothetical 
contract. The standard critique is correct that, because of idealisation, hypothetical 
consent cannot be taken for actual consent. However, as long as hypothetical 
contractors can model the practical reasoning of actual people correctly, the 
normativity of the hypothetical contract is justified, regardless of whether or not a 
person actually consents to it. The political principles specified by the hypothetical 
contract represent the requirements of practical reason. In short, the function of the 
hypothetical contract is not to create political obligations, but to discover political 
obligations that are justified by practical reason.  
2.5 Two conditions: the condition of generality and the condition of priority  
In the last section, I showed that the normativity of hypothetical contract depends on 
whether the definition of hypothetical contractors can correctly model practical 
reasoning. Therefore, a contractarian theory must be based on a conception of 
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practical reason, an assumption about the rules that govern the practical reasoning of 
actual people.  However, there are so many ways of modelling practical reasoning 
and how should a contractarian choose? As I mentioned in Chapter 1, political 
principles must satisfy two conditions: the condition of generality and the condition 
of priority. If a contractarian theory aims at justifying political principles, then its 
conception of practical reason must help it satisfy these two conditions. In this 
section, I will discuss how a conception of practical reason can perform this function.  
2.5.1 The condition of generality 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the condition of generality is a requirement of scope, to 
the effect that the political principle should be widely accepted by people to which it 
is going to apply. In order to satisfy this condition, a contractarian theory should be 
based on an account of practical reason which is widely accepted as well.68  As 
Andreas Eshete points out, the normative force of a hypothetical contract will be 
weakened if the design of this hypothetical contract is not based on some general 
descriptions.  
If the contractarian program is to succeed, it is essential that the principles adopted on the basis 
of the primitive facts of justice be acceptable to men in any specific situation within the range 
of general facts…Hence, contractarian theories are undermined when it is shown that they 
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favour a particular model of society, a partisan conception of the good, or a special 
interpretation of human psychology.69 
This is why contractarians usually rely on rules that govern practical reason, but not 
other rules in our lives, to justify the normativity of the hypothetical contract. The 
normative force of many rules in our lives is contingent. These rules are contingent 
in that whether one is bound by them depends on one’s contingent circumstances. 
We acquire these rules in various ways. Some, such as our profession or religion, are 
chosen by us. Others we are born into, such as being someone’s son or being a 
member of a certain culture. However, all of these rules merely bind us contingently. 
If we were born in another place, then we would follow the rules of another family. 
Similarly, if we grew up in another context, then we might choose another job. 
Unlike these contingent rules, rationality and reasonableness, which are the rules that 
govern the process of thought, are unconditional. People can only think within the 
constraints of these rules. No matter which family one belongs to, which choices one 
makes, the normative force of rationality and reasonableness are unaffected, for these 
rules bind people irrespective of their personal context.  
However, there are various interpretations of these rules, and not all interpretations 
provide a suitable basis for contractarianism. Some are substantial conceptions such 
that only a particular group of people really think in accordance with these rules. For 
example, the Thomistic conception of rationality assumes that human beings share an 
ultimate end in life, that is, to pursue eternal happiness in Heaven. All rational human 
behaviours should serve this ultimate purpose. Although this interpretation is called 
rationality, it is not generally acceptable since many non-Catholics do not think that 
this conception correctly describes their pattern of reasoning. Unlike the Thomistic 
conception, there are some formal conceptions of rationality that are more acceptable 
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to many people, from a wide range of backgrounds. For instance, most people 
believe that their patterns of reasoning are guided by an instrumental conception of 
rationality. This conception of rationality is compatible with a wide range of ends 
and it merely describes that rational people will pursue their ends effectively. In 
order to make sure that the normativity of contractarian principles will not be 
affected by any contingent factors, contractarians should adopt the latter kind of 
conception of practical reason rather than the former.  
Hence the conception of practical reason assumed in a contractarian theory should 
represent a common way of practical thinking shared among persons holding 
different substantive views. This is the condition of generality. Satisfying the 
condition of generality means that the conception of practical reason is generally 
acceptable to the actual people who are bound by the political principles. Only when 
the rules that guide practical reasoning of the hypothetical contractors are general 
rules, can actual people generally be identified themselves as the hypothetical 
contractors. The choice of the hypothetical person is then not a completely strange, 
irrelevant choice to actual people.  
2.5.2 The condition of priority  
Apart from the condition of generality, the condition of priority is also necessary for 
a hypothetical contract to justify political principles. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, 
this condition is a requirement of status, the status of the reason for following 
political principles in a person’s practical reasoning. To those people who accept the 
political principle, this reason should have lexical priority (or very strongly weighted 
priority) over other considerations.  If there are some acts that are demanded by 
political principles, we cannot escape them because of our other considerations. This 
feature of political principle is widely accepted among contractarians. When 
contractarians justify our obligation to certain political principles by hypothetical 
Chapter 2 Why Contractarianism? 
74 
 
contract, they do not take this obligation as simply one which is meant to weight up 
against other competing considerations.70 
The key to justifying this deliberative priority is to rely on the ultimate normative 
authority of practical reason. It would be helpful to clarify the relationship between 
practical reason and the justifiability of other social norms. There are various social 
norms in people’s lives, such as family norms, religious norms and cultural norms. 
Political principles are some of them. These social norms impose different 
obligations on these people. They then have to engage in practical reasoning and 
reflect on whether or not they should comply with these social norms. Suppose 
eventually their conclusion of practical reasoning is that political principles should 
have the highest priority. Then it is unjustified for them to violate political principles 
because of social norms. This is because, when these people decide whether they 
should comply with political principles or social norms in their practical reasoning, 
these social norms have already been taken into account. So they no longer constitute 
reasons for them to ignore this conclusion.  
From this example we can see the difference between the rules that govern practical 
reason and other norms. They are rules of different natures. For the former kind of 
rules are rules that govern the a priori structure of practical reasoning and guide how 
we should think. For the latter kind of rules, they are merely considerations that we 
take into account when we engage in practical reasoning. Whether our obligations to 
the latter rules are justified or not depends on practical reasoning that is governed by 
the former rules. If the former rules do not justify obligations to the latter rules, then 
we have no reason to comply with the latter rules. In short, the relationship between 
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the rules that govern practical reason and other norms is not coordinate. Rather, they 
stand in a relationship of superordinate and subordinate.  
Hence, if a contractarian can demonstrate that a hypothetical contractor, who thinks 
in accordance with the rules that govern practical reason, will give political 
principles an overriding status, then actual people are unjustified in going against 
these political principles because of other norms. The condition of priority is fulfilled 
since the priority of political principles is the conclusion of proper practical 
reasoning which has taken obligations to other norms into account.  
However, there is more than one rule governing practical reason. What if these rules 
conflict with each other? These rules represent different approaches to resolving 
conflicts of reason and establishing that which one should do. By adopting different 
approaches, the conclusion of practical reasoning might be different. For example, 
both rationality and reasonableness are rules that govern practical reason, and it is 
commonly argued that there is a sharp opposition between these two rules. 71 
Reasonableness requires people to take due account of the interests of others and to 
maintain a mutuality of consideration between themselves and others during practical 
reasoning. Rationality is a matter of means-end calculation that is concerned with the 
way of pursuing particular ends effectively. These two rules might justify opposite 
reasons for action since sometimes the most effective way to pursue certain ends 
involves violating the equitable relationship between oneself and others. While both 
of these rules are the fundamental constraints that govern practical reasoning, their 
normative forces are the same. People have fundamental reasons for action to pursue 
their ends effectively, but also have a fundamental reason for action to maintain the 
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equitable relationship as well. Neither of these reasons can necessarily override the 
other.  
This implies that if a conception of practical reason fails to include all the rules that 
govern practical reason, then the priority of the political principles cannot be 
guaranteed. Suppose that a contractarian takes rationality as the whole of practical 
reason, defines hypothetical contractors as rational pursuers of ends, and eventually 
comes up with an agreement that specifies certain political principles. To actual 
people, they have an obligation to these principles because these principles are 
justified by rationality. But on the other hand reasonableness, another aspect of 
practical reason, justifies obligations that violate these political principles; so actual 
people will have two conflicting obligations. Rationality justifies obligations to 
follow political principles, whereas reasonableness justifies opposite obligations. 
Since these two obligations have the same weight in practical reason, actual people 
have no need to choose either of them.  
In order to avoid this problem, contractarians should make sure that their conceptions 
of practical reason do not capture only a part of practical reasoning. They should 
attribute all the rules that govern practical reason to the modelled contracting parties, 
and show that all these rules justify their hypothetical contract. This is the condition 
of priority. Satisfying the condition of priority means that all the rules that govern 
our practical reasoning are included in the conception of practical reason and 
shown to support the political principles. Only when this condition is satisfied, can 
the deliberation of hypothetical contractors be seen as modelling the complete picture 
of practical reasoning of actual people. If not, the political principle may fail to 
possess an overriding status in people’s practical reasoning.  
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2.5.3 Case study: John Harsanyi 
The importance of these two conditions becomes clearer if we look at one contract 
model which fails to satisfy this condition. I will take John Harsanyi’s contract 
model as a counter-example. Although Harsanyi is a rule-utilitarian,72 his theory also 
has contractarian elements, as he uses the idea of rational bargaining in a 
hypothetical contract to justify the utilitarian principle.73 Harsanyi asks us to imagine 
that hypothetical individuals are behind a veil of ignorance, where they are unaware 
of their own social and economic positions and their own capacities and talents.74 
They know that they have equal probability to become anyone of the society’s 
members, but now they have to choose a political principle for this society. In this 
idealised choice situation, the hypothetical persons become impartial sympathetic 
observers. They are sympathetic because they take the utility function of each 
participant into account. They are impartial because they are not biased in favour of 
any participant.75 From the perspective of these impartial sympathetic observers, the 
political principle should be the principle of average rule-utilitarianism. However, 
why is the choice of these hypothetical contractors relevant to us? Harsanyi answered 
that actual people should agree with the choice of these hypothetical contractors 
because actual people, who are rational, should have a moral preference, which is a 
preference ‘to judge the world from a moral, i.e., from an impersonal and impartial, 
point of view’.76 Because of this preference, actual people will accept the principle of 
average rule-utilitarianism, and this is why the hypothetical contract story is not only 
irrelevant.  
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Harsanyi’s contract theory is based on a conception of rationality that views people 
as rational when they guided by a moral preference. However, this conception of 
practical reason is unrealistic because the moral preference assumed by Harsanyi is 
rarely seen, even when people were rational. According to Harsanyi, because of this 
moral preference, we are willing to identify ourselves with the average utility-
maximizer in the hypothetical contract. But, as an average utility-maximizer, one 
might have to make enormous sacrifices for the sake of maximizing the average 
utility of the whole society. These enormous sacrifices include giving up some basic 
liberties, such as liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. Therefore, having a 
moral preference and being an average utility-maximizer mean that one has to be 
unlimitedly altruistic to the extent that one is often willing to sacrifice one’s 
fundamental interests. In light of our observations of human nature, this conception 
of practical reason is too altruistic to be generally acceptable to most human beings. 
Human beings usually have some fundamental interests that they must protect if they 
can, such as the interest in choosing and revising their ends of life.77 No matter what 
interests they have, they still want these interests to be protected. Unless they are 
very altruistic, individuals are not willing to sacrifice these interests for others and be 
willing to be merely a means to maximize the average utility of the whole society. 
Thus, the conception of practical reason in Harsanyi’s theory can hardly be seen as a 
general description of practical reason.78 This contractarian theory fails to fulfil the 
condition of generality.  
Moreover, Harsanyi’s conception of practical reason competes with the rules that 
govern our practical reasoning: rationality and reasonableness (here rationality refers 
to the instrumental conception of rationality, but not Harsanyi’s conception of 
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rationality). Indeed, from the perspective of actual people, the principle of average 
rule-utilitarianism is neither rational nor reasonable. It is irrational because the 
choice of hypothetical contractors is made behind the veil of ignorance. The choice 
of the principle of average rule-utilitarianism makes sense when individuals know 
nothing about their particular information. However, actual people are fully 
informed. Their rational deliberation is highly different from the rational deliberation 
of hypothetical contractors in Harsanyi’s contract. Thus, actual people may rationally 
choose other alternative principles. The principle of average rule-utilitarianism is 
unreasonable as well. Reasonableness requires people to take the claims of others 
seriously. People should respect one another as creatures that are capable of asking 
for justification, ‘a non-derivative source of reason’.79 This entitlement to respect is 
absolute and cannot be infringed because of aggregate social welfare. However, this 
entitlement to respect is exactly the thing which is ignored in the principle of average 
rule-utilitarianism. According to this principle, the government should merely aim at 
maximizing average utility; even some people think that this is seriously unjustified. 
People under this principle are merely taken as a means to maximize average utility, 
but not ends that can ask for justification. Hence, Harsanyi’s hypothetical contract 
also fails to fulfil the condition of priority, since both rationality and reasonableness 
justify obligations that go against the principle of average rule-utilitarianism. 
Surely, it is going too far to say that Harsanyi’s rule-utilitarian theory is a bad moral 
theory. Harsanyi could respond to my objection by clarifying that he intends to offer 
a theory of content, but not a theory of obligation and authority. The practical 
reasoning of his hypothetical contractors does not reveal the practical reasoning of 
ordinary people. Rather, it merely shows an objectively correct way of deriving 
moral principles. If actual people deny their obligation to these moral principles, then 
it is because of their weakness and selfishness, but not the flaw of his contract theory. 
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Although Harsanyi’s theory can be understood in this way, his theory is still 
dissatisfactory when it is evaluated from a contractarian perspective. As I explained 
before, contractarianism aims at justifying normative principles and explaining why 
people ought to follow these principles. These aims are also widely accepted by 
contemporary contractarians. However, Harsanyi’s theory merely lays out a set of 
moral principles which are derived from a hypothetical contract story. It fails to offer 
a persuasive account of the relationship between the hypothetical contract and the 
actual people. Thus even though Harsanyi’s theory may not be a bad moral theory, it 
is nevertheless a bad contractarian theory.  
In conclusion, fulfilling the condition of generality justifies the imposition of 
political principles. The condition of generality ensures that the practical reasoning 
of the hypothetical contractors is generally understandable to actual people. On the 
other hand, fulfilling the condition of priority justifies the overridingness of political 
principles. The condition of priority ensures that the hypothetical contractors take all 
the rules that govern practical reason into account.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Contractarianism is a methodology which attracts a lot of advocates in contemporary 
political philosophy, yet it also attracts various critiques. Gauthier’s ‘Why 
Contractarianism?’ is an attempt to defend contractarianism as an attractive 
methodology. I appreciate his ambition but I do not think his discussion goes deep 
enough, since he puts too much attention on only one of the virtues of 
contractarianism (the virtue of naturalism) and does not take critiques of 
contractarianism seriously enough. Hence, in this chapter I took up the aims of 
Gauthier’s article but pushed the discussion deeper. I suggested three virtues of 
contractarianism in order to explain its attractiveness to philosophers. First, 
contractarianism justifies political principles by the subjective will of individuals 
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without relying on non-natural, metaphysical properties which conflict with the 
prevailing scientific worldview. Secondly, contractarian justification shows respect 
for the will of the individual without taking them merely as means to achieve certain 
goals. Thirdly, the assumption of contractarianism is more realistic because it does 
not assume that members of society share a substantial consensus on political affairs. 
Clearly this list does not exhaust all the virtues of contractarianism, but it goes some 
way to explaining why contemporary contractarians insist on using this 
methodology. By adopting this methodology, contractarians can avoid the problems 
of natural law theorists, utilitarians and communitarians, and justify political 
principles in a more secular, acceptable and realistic approach.  
I have also discussed the standard critique of contractarianism in this chapter. Many 
critics argue that the consent of hypothetical contractors cannot have normative force 
for actual people, so it is unclear why actual people are bound by the hypothetical 
contract. The standard critique is correct that the hypothetical contract should not be 
confused with actual contract. However, this critique misunderstands the relationship 
between hypothetical contractors and actual people. The function of the hypothetical 
contract is to model practical reasoning. Why actual people should follow the 
hypothetical contract is not because the hypothetical contractors legislate for them, 
but rather because the political principles specified by the hypothetical contract are 
the results of correct practical reasoning. The normativity of the hypothetical contract 
is justified by practical reason. Through the hypothetical contract, we can clarify 
what political principles would be agreed when a group of people deliberate upon the 
question of political principles in accordance with the rules that govern practical 
reason.  
Hence, although it is correct that hypothetical consent itself does not have any 
normative force, it has binding power insofar as the hypothetical contractors can 
model the practical reasoning of actual people correctly. I then further argue that 
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whether the practical reasoning is modelled correctly depends on two conditions: the 
condition of generality and the condition of priority. Provided that these two 
conditions are satisfied, the political principles specified by the hypothetical contract 
have their root in the practical reason. Actual persons are involuntarily subjected to 
the normative force of these political principles. Although the problem mentioned in 
the standard critique really exists, it can be avoided as long as the two conditions are  
In conclusion, compared to other schools of thought, contractarianism has several 
virtues, but it also has the flaw of being detached from the real world. This flaw can 
only be compensated insofar as certain conditions are fulfilled. In the following 
chapters, I will examine three contractarian models, which are based on different 
conceptions of practical reason. Then I will examine whether these three models can 
fulfil the condition of generality and the condition of priority. If they fail to fulfil 
either of these conditions, then they are vulnerable to the standard critique of 
contractarianism and fail to develop a connection between the hypothetical contract 
and actual people.  
Chapter 3 Three Models of Contractarianism 
83 
 
Chapter 3 Three Models of Contractarianism 
3.1 Introduction 
Contractarianism is a methodology rather than a theory; thus there are different ways 
of employing it. In the last chapter I argued that contractarianism is a heuristic 
methodology which derives substantial political principles from an abstract 
conception of practical reason. The decision of hypothetical contractors represents 
the conclusion of correct practical reasoning. This is the general spirit which is 
shared among different versions of contractarianism. However, despite this, 
contractarianisms can differ from each other because of different assumptions. The 
task of this chapter is to introduce different contractarianisms and discuss the 
assumptions behind them.  
In general, a contractarian theory consists of the following three elements:  
(1) A conception of practical reason 
(2) Hypothetical contractors 
(3) A hypothetical agreement 
 
The conception of practical reason is a description of our ordinary practical thinking. 
Our practical reasoning is not arbitrary but rather governed by certain rules. What 
these rules are depends upon a contractarian’s understanding of the practical 
reasoning of human beings. By defining the conception of practical reason in terms 
of these rules, contractarians describe a correct way of reasoning of a person.  
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Contractarians have to define hypothetical contractors who can model this way of 
practical reasoning. These contractors have specific characteristics and are placed in 
specific circumstances so that they think in accordance with the rules that govern 
practical reason and are not affected by irrelevant factors. Their reasoning represents 
a ‘pure’ form of practical reasoning. Contractarians then describe a ‘state of nature’, 
that is, a hypothetical situation in which these hypothetical contractors deliberate 
about how their society should be organised. These contractors discuss with one 
another in order to reach an agreement. Obviously this state of nature has never 
before existed in history. It merely helps us clarify what political principles would be 
accepted in a society if every person could reason correctly. Finally, these 
hypothetical contractors will agree on certain political principles. This agreement 
will govern the basic structure of the society, which has a profound influence on the 
life prospects of the society’s members. The distribution of fundamental rights and 
duties, and the division of the advantages of social cooperation are determined by 
this agreement. Contractarians then answer the philosophical question of how the 
society in the real world ought to be organised by adducing this hypothetical 
agreement.  
These three elements constitute the general structure of a contractarian argument. 
Versions of contractarianism share this structure, and fill in this structure with 
different elements. Definitions of these three elements are not independent of one 
another. First, the content of the hypothetical agreement depends on how one defines 
the hypothetical contractors. Secondly, hypothetical contractors’ characteristics and 
circumstances depend on what conception of practical reason the contractarian 
assumes. Hence, the conception of practical reason is the most fundamental 
assumption of the whole contractarian argument. It determines definitions of all the 
other components.  
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There are usually two conceptions of practical reason with which contractarians are 
concerned. One is the conception of rationality; and the other is the conception of 
reasonableness.1 Based on these conceptions, two models of contractarianism are 
possible, each of which may be associated with a different historical figure in the 
contract tradition. The model which is based on the conception of rationality and 
presents the hypothetical contract as an agreement among individual utility-
maximizers is usually called Hobbesian contractarianism. The Kantian 
contractarianism model is based on the conception of reasonableness and presents the 
hypothetical contract as an agreement among reasonable persons who respect one 
another. Although this classification is widely adopted,2 it is incomplete, since it 
overlooks a distinctive contractarian model which cannot be categorised into either 
of these two strands. This third model is based on an assumption that people have a 
dual conception of practical reason, that is, people are both rational and reasonable. 
Since this model has the features of both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarianism, 
this model can be called hybrid contractarianism. In the following section, I will 
discuss these contractarian models separately and show how these models are 
developed from their assumptions regarding practical reason.  
                                                 
1
 The definition of rationality should be clarified here. Rationality usually has two definitions, a broad 
definition and a narrow definition. The broad definition refers to a general name for all capacities for 
reasoning of human beings, including theoretical reason and practical reason. Practical reason is only 
a part of rationality. The narrow definition refers to the instrumental conception of rationality, which 
defines practical reason in terms of several commonly accepted rules, such as the mean-ends rule. 
This instrumental conception of rationality is only one of the interpretations of practical reason. In this 
thesis, I adopt the narrow definition of rationality. Hence, rationality and reasonableness represent two 
conceptions of understanding practical reason.  
2
 See Hampton (1993a); Hampton (1991); Hampton (1993b); Freeman (1990); Freeman (2006); 
Hamlin (1989); Darwall (2003b);  Watson (1998); Buchanan (1990) and Sayre-McCord (2000). Brian 
Barry’s categorization is also relevant, although not explicitly about contract theory. See Barry (1989). 
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3.2 Hobbesian contractarianism and the conception of rationality  
Hobbesian contractarianism takes the conception of rationality to be the conception 
of practical reason and proposes that a mutually advantageous agreement is rationally 
justified. This strand of contractarianism includes David Gauthier, James Buchanan, 
Gregory Kavka, Jean Hampton and Gilbert Harman. 3  This is not to deny that 
different Hobbesian contractarians adopt different assumptions and conclusions. 
Since it is impossible for me to discuss all of them, I will choose the most plausible 
version; the Hobbesian contractarian model of David Gauthier. In this section, I will 
explain how Gauthier defines rationality and constructs a contractarian model on the 
basis of this conception of practical reason.  
3.2.1 The conception of rationality 
The conception of rationality is initially attributed to Homo sapiens in virtue of their 
capacity for reasoning and acting upon the result of deliberation.4 To say that an 
individual person is rational is to say that this person measures up to a minimal 
standard of competence. The origin of the modern study of rationality can be traced 
back to Hobbes and Hume. According to Hobbes, something can be called good for 
people only if it is an object of their desire.5 A person usually has various desires. 
                                                 
3
 See Gauthier (1986), Buchanan (1977), Hampton (1986), Kavka (1986) and Harman (1977). In fact, 
Kavka’s contract theory is not a typical Hobbesian contractarian theory. Rather, Kavka attempts to 
combine Hobbesian contractarianism and Rawlsian contractarianism together. However, since Kavka 
emphasizes throughout the book that human beings are generally motivated by their self-interests, and 
he has a significant contribution to the development of Hobbesian contractarian theories, he should be 
treated as a Hobbesian contractarian. For the discussion of the ‘hybrid’ character of Kavka, see Kraus 
(1993: 204-215). 
4
 Miller (1987: 419-420). 
5
 Hobbes (1994: 15-17). 
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Reason comes into account when a person has conflicting appetites and aversions.6 
Hobbes argues that there are ‘general rules’ of action which apply to all persons and 
which can be found by reason. By following these rules, persons can satisfy their 
desires effectively. People are creatures pulled by desire, and reason serves as an 
instrument for the satisfaction of desires. As he famously writes, ‘Reason is the pace; 
increase of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end’.7 Like Hobbes, 
Hume also holds that actions are produced by two elements: passion and reason, with 
reason as merely a means which guide us to satisfy our passions. ‘Reason is, and 
ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office 
than to serve and obey them’.8 
Nevertheless, the descriptions of rationality of Hobbes and Hume are too simplistic. 
Hence, Hobbesian contractarians borrow a more sophisticated conception of 
rationality from the contemporary rational choice theory. To rational choice theorists, 
rationality is a formal procedure which ranks preferences in terms of utility and 
maximizes individual utility. This conception of rationality is formed by three 
fundamental conceptions: preference, utility and maximization. First I will explain 
the conception of preference. When a person is motivated to do something, it can be 
seen as a preference, which is a consideration related to a state of affairs. A 
preference refers to an intention that a person has when they think that a particular 
state of affairs is valuable and they want to achieve this state of affairs: ‘one speaks 
of preferring an apple to a pear, but more strictly one prefers the eating of an apple to 
the eating of a pear in some given environment’.9  When this state of affairs is 
realised, then this preference is satisfied. Hobbesian contractarians argue that human 
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 Hume (2000: 266). 
9
 Gauthier (1986: 22).  
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beings are animals of preferences and their lives are a journey of satisfying various 
preferences.10 
However, one has only limited time and resources, so one has to order one’s their 
preferences and choose to satisfy certain preferences first. To this end, some 
preferences are more important than others. Therefore we need the idea of utility to 
act as a measure. Utility is an ordinal measure of preference which is ‘defined over 
the possible outcomes in any choice situation if and only if preference weakly orders 
those outcomes, from most preferred to least preferred’.11 A rational person assigns a 
utility to each of their preferences. In order to achieve a consistent order of 
preferences, the assignation of utility has to be governed by several principles of 
coherence. For example, a person must follow the principle of completeness when 
they rank their preferences, that is, ‘for any two possible outcomes in a choice 
situation, the chooser must either prefer one to the other or be indifferent between 
them…it rules out preferentially non-comparable outcomes’.12 Another example is 
the principle of transitivity, which requires a person not to rank their preferences as a 
cycle, that is, they cannot prefer A to B, prefer B to C, then prefer C to A. ‘Such 
cycle would divest choices of all rationality’.13 By ranking preferences in accordance 
with these principles of coherence, a person can get a coherent order of preferences 
which is measured by utility. The higher the utility is, the more desirable the 
preference is.14 As Gauthier notes,  
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 Gauthier (1977: 338-340). 
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 Gauthier (1986: 39). 
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 Gauthier (1986: 39). 
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 Gauthier (1986: 41). 
14
 Actually, the individual utility refers to the expected utility here. The expected utility does not only 
depend on how much an individual desires a state of affairs, but also depends on the probability of 
achieving this state of affairs. By multiplying the utility by its probability, we can get expected utility, 
and it is this, rather than just utility judgments alone, that affects our decision-making. This can gain 
support from the fact that one outcome being preferred to another is not enough in itself to make us 
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Given a set of [relations of preference], constituting the preferences of one individual in a 
choice situation, then a utility is to be assigned to each possible outcome in such a way that one 
may infer the person’s preference between any two outcomes from the utilities. For any two 
possible outcomes the one with greater utility must be preferred.15 
It is worth noting that the preferences and utilities of an individual are merely 
subjective: ‘values are ascribed to states of affairs, the ascription is attitudinal, not 
observational, subjective, not objective’.16 Whether a state of affairs is valuable is 
only relative to particular individuals. While one might desire a particular state of 
affairs, the other might have no interest in it. Even if everyone is rational and given 
full information, a person’s preference might still differ from others’. ‘Each person’s 
preferences determine her values quite independently of the values of others’.17 
The idea of preference explains why an individual is motivated to do something, and 
the idea of utility explains how individuals rank their preferences. After ranking the 
preferences by utility, rational people should maximize their individual utility; 
‘Practical rationality in the most general sense is identified by maximization’.18 
Practical reason itself cannot motivate an individual to act. Also, it cannot tell 
individuals what they should prefer. All these things are out of the control of practical 
reason.19 What practical reason is concerned with is only how to maximize utility. To 
this end, practical reason acts only as an instrument to find a way that satisfies 
preferences better than any other available alternatives. ‘The rational actor 
maximizes her utility in choosing from a finite set of actions, which take as possible 
                                                                                                                                          
pursue the former rather than the latter. For successfully securing the latter outcome may be much 
more probable than securing the former. However, since this point is not so relevant, I will continue to 
use individual utility to represent the utility function of an individual, instead of using expected utility. 
For the discussion of expected utility, see Gauthier (1986: 43). 
15
 Gauthier (1986: 23). 
16
 Gauthier (1986: 25). 
17
 Gauthier (1986: 25). 
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 Gauthier (1986: 22). 
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 Gauthier (1986: 26). 
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outcomes the members of a finite set of states of affairs’.20 She will concentrate on 
making good use of her finite time and resources, seeking the most effective way in 
order to achieve the highest possible utility. Gauthier articulates this disposition as 
such: ‘The rational man is…simply the man who seeks more’.21 
In general, rationality can be seen as a ‘weighing model’. It solves the conflicts 
among different preferences by weighting their importance to the person. People can 
rank preferences by individual utility and satisfy them in a way which maximizes 
their individual utility. Moreover, the aim of this formal procedure is to look for a 
way of living well. It aims at the satisfaction of preferences and believes that, by 
satisfying more preferences, a person’s life can improve. Putting it in another way, it 
takes the notion of good as the fundamental notion and defines the notion of right as 
maximizing individual good.  
3.2.2 Hobbesian contractarianism 
This conception of practical reason is a suitable ground for developing contractarian 
theory because it is a process of reasoning that is widely accepted.22 The conception 
of rationality does not presuppose any substantial goals.23 It is impartial with respect 
to all goals and simply posits people pursuing these goals consistently. The 
hypothetical contract of Hobbesian contractarianism is to illustrate what agreement 
would be made if every citizen could reason in accordance with this conception. I 
will leave the detailed discussion of the hypothetical contract to Chapter 4, which 
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discusses Hobbesian contractarianism in-depth, for this section aims only to explain 
how rationality can be used to ground contractarian theory. This section will discuss 
the characteristics of hypothetical contractors and the hypothetical contract of 
Hobbesian contractarianism only briefly. 
After adopting rationality as the conception of practical reason, the next task of 
Hobbesian contractarians is to clarify what political principles would be agreed upon 
if all people were rational. Hobbesian contractarians propose a ’state of nature’ in 
which a group of well-informed utility-maximizers bargain with each other. These 
utility-maximizers have to agree on certain political principles in order to exit the 
non-cooperative state in which everyone is worse-off. 24  One of the famous 
descriptions of the state of nature is that of Hobbes, who argues that, without a 
system of law enforcement, each person fears others as potential attackers and may 
also attack others in order to remove potential future threats. Therefore, a state of 
nature is a war of all against all. Hobbesian contractarians usually do not adopt this 
negative picture, but they all agree that the non-cooperative state is undesirable. 
Hence the Hobbesian contract story is of how a group of well-informed utility-
maximizers cooperate with each other in order to leave this undesirable state.  
Since all hypothetical contractors are utility-maximizers, they care most about how 
to maximize their utility in the agreement. However, everyone also understands that 
others would not agree if the agreement only favoured the pursuit of his utility. 
Hence, not surprisingly, the agreement will be political principles that are mutually 
advantageous. These principles should guarantee a Pareto-optimal outcome, an 
outcome where everyone’s utility is maximized in a way compatible with each 
other.25 Such an agreement brings all hypothetical contractors out of this mutually 
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disadvantageous situation and coordinates them to be their mutually advantage, that 
is, compared with the state of nature, all gain a higher utility.  Hobbesian 
contractarians then further argue that this hypothetical agreement is justified to actual 
people as well. Since the practical reasoning of actual people is also governed by 
rationality, they would agree with political principles if they recognised that this 
agreement is rationally justified.26 
We can now conclude our exposition of Hobbesian contractarianism. The three 
elements of Hobbesian contractarianism are: (1) the conception of rationality, (2) 
hypothetical contractors that are well-informed utility-maximizers and, (3) a 
hypothetical agreement that is mutually advantageous. Among these three elements, 
the second and third elements depend on the first. The conception of rationality 
determines the remaining parts of the whole Hobbesian contractarian argument. 
Hobbesian contractarians make this assumption because rationality is a weak 
assumption that people widely accept. The generality and formality of rationality 
may be able to explain why Hobbesian contractarianism is so intuitively appealing to 
many people: given that we always prefer having higher utility, why resist a principle 
which could bring us higher utility? 
3.3 Kantian contractarianism and the conception of reasonableness  
Rationality is a widely accepted interpretation of practical reason, but it is not the 
only interpretation. Some contractarians make a different conception of practical 
reason. This assumption is the conception of reasonableness. The second strand of 
contractarianism is in many ways the opposite of the first. Since contractarians of 
this strand take Kant as their predecessor, this strand is usually called Kantian 
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contractarianism. In contrast with Hobbesian contractarianism, Kantian 
contractarianism interprets practical reason in terms of reasonableness, and proposes 
a fair agreement which could be justified to everyone. 27  This strand of 
contractarianism includes T. M. Scanlon, Brian Barry, Thomas Nagel, David 
Richards and Stephen Darwall. 28  In this section I will introduce Kantian 
contractarianism and focus particularly on the most impressive and influential 
version of it that has been advanced by T. M. Scanlon.  
3.3.1 The conception of reasonableness 
Both rationality and reasonableness derive from the same Latin root ratio.29 However, 
unlike rationality, reasonableness presents a different picture of practical reason. It is 
a ‘testing’ model, a procedure which takes certain constraints as absolute and tests 
desires by this constraint. Hence it does not focus upon which desires are more 
important to a person or how to rank these desires in order to lead a good life. Rather, 
it focuses only on whether or not these desires violate the absolute constraint. The 
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constraint in the conception of reasonableness is the ‘constraint of justifiability’.30 It 
is a constraint that requires us to take public justifiability as a criterion for evaluating 
our behaviour. Kantian contractarians presuppose that reasonable persons share an 
aim of living with other reasonable persons.31 Every reasonable person desires to 
cooperate with others under fair terms of social cooperation. 
In the contractualist analysis of right and wrong, what is presupposed first and foremost is the 
aim of finding principles that others who share this aim could not reasonably reject. This aim 
then brings other reasons in its train. Given this aim, for example, it would be unreasonable to 
give the interests of others no weight in deciding which principles to accept. For why should 
they accept principles arrived at this way?32 
Since reasonable people want to live with other people who are also reasonable, they 
have to respect other people’s capacity for reason-giving. 33  The way to respect 
others’ reason-assessing capacity is to take the possible claims of others into account. 
A reasonable person has to be fair-minded, judicious and able to see other points of 
view. One should try to put oneself in the shoes of others and should think about 
whether or not ‘I’ would accept this behaviour if ‘I’ were ’the other’.  Hence one 
should ‘test’ one’s actions by the constraint of justifiability.  
This constraint is an absolute criterion because any desires which violate this 
criterion should be rejected, no matter how important the desires are. As Scanlon 
argues, this constraint should not be seen as a consideration which is weighted 
against other desires. Rather, it is a criterion that determines the weight of a person’s 
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desires.34 If a reason violates this constraint, then it has no weight. That is why 
reasonableness is a ‘testing model’, which is different from the weighting model 
represented by rationality. It does not simply take all desires into account and weigh 
the importance of them. Rather, it sets a constraint as absolute and only those desires 
which are compatible with this constraint can be taken into account. Whether a desire 
is compatible with this constraint is more important than how much weight this 
desire has in a person’s utility function. Some Kantian contractarians believe that this 
testing model is a more phenomenologically accurate account of normative 
reasoning. 
It is, phenomenologically, much more plausible to suppose that, certainly for the fully moral 
person and even for most of us much of the time, these considerations are excluded from 
consideration well before the stage at which we decide what to do. Being moral involves 
seeing reason to exclude some considerations from the realm of relevant reasons (under certain 
considerations) just as it involves reason for including others. The contractualist account can 
explain this fact, since these considerations are ones that others could reasonably refuse to 
license us to count as reasons.35 
In light of this absolute constraint, it is unsurprising that reasonableness, in contrast 
with rationality, does not presuppose that human beings are merely animals with 
preferences. Rather, it presupposes that human beings will not be governed by 
preferences unless these preferences ‘can be publicly justified to others according to 
the system of norms generally accepted within the group’.36  Human beings can 
control their desires in order to comply with the constraint of justifiability, even at 
the cost of lowering their individual utility. 37  Practical reason is not a slave to 
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passions, for it can reject passions if they are unreasonable. ‘We judge and act 
autonomously…by proceeding from and regulating our activities according to certain 
principles’.38 It shows that the aim of practical reason is to seek a way of living right. 
This conception of practical reason takes the notion of right as fundamental and 
restricts the pursuit of individual good within the limit of rightness.  
3.3.2 Kantian contractarianism 
Like rationality, reasonableness is also an important aspect of practical reason. 
People usually have a sense of respect for one another and this can be seen by the 
sense of guilt that appears when people find that they are treating others in an 
unjustifiable way. The generality of reasonableness explains why Kantian 
contractarians take it as the conception of practical reason. This assumption 
determines the characteristics of hypothetical contractors and the content of 
hypothetical agreement in Kantian contractarianism. Again I will leave the detailed 
discussion of these two elements to Chapter 5, which discusses Kantian 
contractarianism specifically, because this section is merely to illustrate the 
relationship between Kantian contractarianism and the conception of reasonableness. 
Let me briefly explain here these two elements in Kantian contractarianism.  
In order to derive political principles from the conception of reasonableness, 
hypothetical contractors are defined as well-informed reasonable persons who 
mutually respect one another. Kantian contractarians ask us to imagine a situation in 
which a group of reasonable persons deliberate together for the sake of achieving an 
agreement on political principles.39 Since they are reasonable, they will not propose 
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principles which could not be justifiable to any of them. For example, they would not 
propose principles that favour certain people arbitrarily. This is because, if they were 
people who were disadvantaged arbitrarily, then they would not agree with these 
principles.40 Hence contractors will only propose principles which could be publicly 
justifiable to all.  
However, there is more than one principle which could be justifiable to everyone. 
Publicly justified principles can be incompatible with one another. So reasonable 
persons have to give reasons to justify their proposals and explain why the proposals 
of others should be rejected. The process of exchanging reasons will go on. 
Numerous proposals will continue to be suggested and rejected. Consequently, 
reasonable persons will get political principles which are supported by the strongest, 
the most persuasive reasons.41 They are ‘principles which no one could reasonably 
reject’. 42  Kantian contractarianism then proposes that a justified state should be 
governed by these principles. Even though real people have not actually agreed with 
these principles, they would agree with them since their practical reasoning is, like 
that of hypothetical contractors, also guided by reasonableness. ‘A legitimate 
government is one whose authority citizens can recognise while still regarding 
themselves as equal, autonomous…agents’.43 
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We can now conclude our exposition of Kantian contractarianism. The three 
elements of Kantian contractarianism are: (1) the conception of reasonableness, (2) 
hypothetical contractors that are well-informed reasonable persons who mutually 
respect one another, and; (3) a hypothetical agreement that no one could reasonably 
reject. Like Hobbesian contractarianism, the second and third elements depend upon 
the first; the conception of reasonableness. Kantian contractarians believe that, 
compared with the conception of rationality, the conception of reasonableness offers 
a better account of practical reason and thus, offers a better ground for a 
contractarian theory.  
3.4 The myth of dichotomy  
In the last two sections we saw the two most commonly seen contractarian models. 
Both of them are based on widely accepted conceptions of practical reason. 
Hobbesian contractarianism is based on the conception of rationality, while Kantian 
contractarianism is based on the conception of reasonableness. Rationality and 
reasonableness emphasise different aspects of human nature. Rationality emphasises 
the passive side of human nature, our capacity to be pleased and satisfied. In this 
description, we are attracted to various preferences, and are finally motivated by the 
most attractive. Reasonableness emphasises the active side of our human nature; our 
capacity for control and constraint. In this description, we can stand aside from these 
preferences, evaluate them by the constraint of justifiability and resist temptation by 
them if they violate this constraint. Here different ethical concerns can be identified. 
The former is more concerned about the notion of good, while the latter is more 
concerned about the notion of right. Also, from these different perspectives on 
human nature, they deliberate upon practical issues in different ways. The former 
uses a model that weights preferences by individual utility and aims at maximizing 
individual utility. The latter uses a model that tests preferences by the constraint of 
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justifiability.44 The differences between these two conceptions of practical reason are 
set out in the table below:  
 
Table 1 Rationality and Reasonableness 
 Rationality Reasonableness  
Agency Passive  Active  
Aim  In the pursuit of good  Acting according to right 
Model of 
deliberation 
Weighing model, ranks 
preferences in a way which can 
maximize individual utility 
Testing model, makes sure that 
preferences do not violate the 
constraint of justifiability 
Contractarianism Hobbesian contractarianism Kantian contractarianism 
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It seems that the dichotomy between Hobbesian and Kantian contractarianism is 
exclusive and other possible contractarianisms will only be similar to Harsanyi’s 
contractarianism, which is based on a supererogatory conception of practical reason. 
However, I will argue that this dichotomy is too simple because it fails to include 
those contractarians who belong to neither of them. Some contractarians, such as 
Rawls, develop a distinctive model which has characteristics of both of these 
contractarianisms.45 In this section, I will explain why Rawls’ contractarian theory 
does not belong to either side and how the dichotomy of contractarianism does not 
reveal fully the complexity of certain contractarian theories.  
3.4.1 A re-interpretation of Rawls’ contractarianism 
Before I discuss Rawls’ contractarian theory, there is a misunderstanding that should 
be noted. People usually take the original position, a situation in which hypothetical 
contractors choose behind a veil of ignorance, to be the hypothetical contract of 
Rawls. This is not a sound interpretation of Rawls’ contractarian theory because this 
interpretation is vulnerable to many critical objections. For example, because of the 
veil of ignorance, there is a great gap between the reasoning of hypothetical 
contractors and actual people. It is questionable why actual people should take the 
decisions of hypothetical contractors seriously, for these decisions are made with 
very limited information. 46  These critiques can be avoided if we adopt another 
interpretation of Rawls’ contract theory. We should instead understand Rawls’ social 
contract as describing a public agreement in a well-ordered society. 47  In this 
interpretation, the hypothetical contractors are not mutually disinterested parties 
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behind the veil of ignorance,, but rather well-informed rational and reasonable people. 
The hypothetical agreement is not the agreement made in the original position, but 
rather the agreement publicly acknowledged in the well-ordered society. I will 
discuss further about the advantage of this interpretation in Chapter 6, which 
discusses Rawls’ contractarianism specifically. But at this stage we need only pay 
attention to the characteristics of hypothetical contractors in Rawls’ contract.  
The hypothetical contractors in Rawls’ theory are free and equal persons who have 
two moral powers: ‘first they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a 
conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are 
capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally 
effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice’.48 Since these two 
capacities refer to rationality and reasonableness in our practical reason respectively, 
Rawls’ contractarian theory has the features of both Hobbesian and Kantian 
contractarianism.  
3.4.2 The conception of reasonableness in Rawls’ contractarianism 
I will begin by examining the similarity between the capacity for a sense of justice 
and reasonableness. First, although Rawls is arguably rather vague in defining this 
motivation, the sense of justice is a testing model which rejects interests that are 
incompatible with certain absolute evaluative criteria. Being reasonable means 
looking for a way of living in accordance with the constraint of justifiability. The 
constraint of justifiability acts as a principle of ‘right’, which regulates the ‘good’ of 
individuals, since it has an absolute priority over the pursuits of all goods and values. 
This requirement of priority can also be found in the sense of justice. According to 
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Rawls, the sense of justice is ‘a regulative desire to act upon certain principles of 
right’.49 People who have an effective sense of justice accept ‘the main idea…that 
given the priority of right, the choice of our conception of the good is framed within 
definite limits. The principles of justice and their realisation in social forms define 
the bounds within which our deliberations take place’.50 To them, the conceptions of 
the good which, ‘require the violation of justice have no value. Having no merit in 
the first place, they cannot override [justice’s] claim’.51 Hence, they are willing to 
honour these principles ‘even at the expense of their own interests as circumstances 
may require, provided others likewise may be expected to honour them’.52 Therefore, 
although Rawls does not use the phrase ‘testing model’, the sense of justice 
effectively describes the testing model of the conception of reasonableness. 
Secondly, the sense of justice also requires people to regulate themselves in a way 
which could be justifiable to others. The sense of justice is always misunderstood as 
merely representing an empty sense of duty towards moral principles. But, according 
to Rawls, the sense of justice is not merely an empty motivation. It ‘expresses a 
willingness…to act in relation to others on terms that they also can publicly 
endorse’. 53  This willingness implies an acknowledgement of the ‘burdens of 
judgment’. Free and equal persons must acknowledge that others inevitably affirm 
conceptions of the good different from their own.54 If they want to cooperate with 
others, then they must respect others and cooperate in the terms that could be 
publicly justifiable to others.55 That is why they have to honour principles of justice, 
since these principles represent fair terms of social cooperation that take the claims 
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of each person into account.56 Honouring these principles represents living in a way 
that could be justifiable to each person.57 From this we see that the constraint of 
justifiability, which is the constraint presupposed in the conception of reasonableness, 
plays a crucial role in the sense of justice.  
From these two stances, one can see the similarities between Rawls’ and Kantian 
contractarianism. Both of them are based on a conception of practical reason that 
takes the constraint of justifiability as an absolute evaluative criterion. Fairness and 
respect, which are the ideas implicit in the constraint of justifiability, also, ‘shape 
Rawls’ thought at the deepest level’.58 That is why the contents of the hypothetical 
agreements of these two contract theories resemble one another. Since the 
hypothetical contractors in Rawls’ theory are reasonable, they would not propose 
principles which could not be justified to others. Hence they should finally agree 
upon principles of justice as fairness, which could be publicly acknowledged and 
could give justification to each citizen’s reason. These principles are, as Scanlon 
acknowledges, effectively positioned whereby no one could reasonably reject.59 
3.4.3 The conception of rationality in Rawls’ contractarianism 
In fact, no one should be surprised to see the resemblance between Kantian 
contractarianism and Rawls’ theory. This resemblance is widely recognized by both 
Rawls and Kantian contractarians.60 However, the hypothetical contractors in Rawls’ 
contractarianism also have another characteristic, which is often overlooked by 
commentators. Apart from reasonableness, they have a capacity for the conception of 
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the good, which entails that they want to realise their conception of the good 
rationally. This rational capacity is related to the idea of good. As Rawls said in the 
section ‘Goodness as Rationality’, the goodness of a life is defined by whether or not 
it is rational. Rawls first defines rationality in a formal way, like the way adopted by 
Hobbesian contractarians. Rationality is specified by principles of rational choice 
such as taking effective means to one’s ends, ranking one’s ends in order of 
priority.61 Rawls then defines the notion of good as a life plan chosen in accordance 
with these principles. In light of these principles, people are assumed to be fully 
informed, to be able to reflect upon their plan critically, and to appreciate its 
consequences.62 This is the ‘thin theory of good’, based on a formal definition of a 
person’s idea of the good.  
However, this definition of good is too formal, for it says nothing about the ends of a 
life plan.  Rawls believes that a theory of good cannot avoid discussing this issue.63 
Therefore, he develops a ‘thick theory of the good’. A good life plan not only has to 
be compatible with the formal principles of rational choice, but also has to be 
relevant to the highest order of interests of human beings, that is, the interests in 
realising the two moral powers. 
We take moral persons to be characterized by two moral powers and by two corresponding 
highest-order interests in realizing and exercising these powers. The first power is the capacity 
for an effective sense of justice, that is, the capacity to understand, to apply and to act from 
(and not merely in accordance with) the principles of justice. The second moral power is the 
capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good. Corresponding to 
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the moral powers, moral persons are said to be moved by two highest-order interests to realize 
and exercise these powers.64 
These two moral powers constitute the free and equal nature of human beings. 
People are free because they have the second moral power to reflect upon their 
conception of the good,65 and they are equal with one another because everyone has 
these two moral powers.66 Therefore, realising these two powers amounts to realising 
the nature of the human being as free and equal. Rawls believes that the interests in 
realising these two powers are the ‘highest-order’ because ‘these interests are 
supremely regulative as well as effective. This implies that, whenever circumstances 
are relevant to their fulfilment, these interests govern deliberation and conduct’.67 
The highest-order interests should ‘be the ends and activities that have a major place 
in rational plans’.68 
This can explain why Rawls’ hypothetical contractors will choose principles of 
justice as fairness, for these can effectively protect highest-order interests. 69 
Principles of justice as fairness assign several basic liberties an absolute weight, 
notably the liberty of conscience and equal political liberties.70 These basic liberties 
are necessary conditions for ‘the adequate development and full exercise of the two 
moral powers of citizens as free and equal persons’.71 Liberty of conscience enables 
people to revise their present way of life and change to endorse other conceptions of 
the good. The equal political liberties enable people to develop and to exercise the 
capacity to evaluate the basic structure of society. The absolute priority of these basic 
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liberties can guarantee that the highest-order interests of each person are secured 
unconditionally. Thus principles of justice as fairness will be chosen, but not other 
principles, such as the principle of average utility, since other principles would 
permit cases where the highest-order interests of people would be sacrificed for the 
sake of a greater net sum of utility.  
Hence we can see that, to Rawls, a free and equal person has two reasons to follow 
principles of justice: one relates to reasonableness, the other relates to rationality. For 
the first reason, a free and equal person follows principles of justice for they are 
principles which could be publicly justified. However, following principles of justice 
does not mean always sacrificing interests. This leads to the second reason to comply 
with principles of justice. A free and equal person also follows principles of justice 
because acting from these principles can advance their highest-order interests. By 
being just, they can realise these two moral powers and enjoy goods which are 
fundamental to their lives. Therefore it is both rational and reasonable to comply 
with principles of justice.  
3.4.4 Between Hobbesian and Kantian contractarianism 
From the assumption of highest-order interests one can see the difference between 
Rawls and Kantian contractarians. Kantian contractarianism is based on the 
conception of reasonableness. Hence the hypothetical contractors are defined as 
merely reasonable. Even if the hypothetical agreement will seriously harm the 
interests of some hypothetical contractors, these hypothetical contractors will still 
agree with it provided that this agreement is reasonably justified.72 Reasonableness is 
the only consideration in the agreement-making procedure of Kantian 
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contractarianism. However, Rawls obviously has another view of the hypothetical 
contract. To Rawls, if a hypothetical agreement requires citizens to always sacrifice 
their conceptions of the good, then it would be unstable, and an unstable agreement 
would be ‘seriously defective’.73A satisfactory political principle should not only be 
reasonably acceptable to its followers, but also consistent with their view of the 
rational good. In contrast with Kantian contractarianism, Rawls exerts commendable 
effort showing that his political principles do not harm the interests of followers, but 
rather lead them to rationally advance their highest-order interests. The rational 
capacity of free and equal persons and its relation to the idea of good are often 
overlooked in discussions of Rawls’ theory. This explains why Rawls is often 
misunderstood as a Kantian contractarian. However, a short anecdote about Rawls 
might verify my observation.  
[In a conversation with Samuel Freeman,] Rawls always referred to justice as fairness as a 
‘contractarian’ position. He was opposed to others’ use of Scanlon’s term ‘contractualism’ as a 
generic term used to refer to justice as fairness…He said contractualism was Scanlon’s own 
position, and that it was original, distinctive, and in important respects quite different from 
what he was trying to do.74 
Freeman states that part of what Rawls had in mind was that Scanlon’s contract 
theory does not focus enough on whether political principles are compatible with the 
good of people, while this is a central concern of Rawls’ contract theory.  
On the other hand, the assumption of the highest-order interests also shortens the 
distance between Rawls and Hobbesian contractarians. Clearly Rawls would deny 
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 Rawls (1999a: 518). It is important to note that Rawls does not say that an unstable agreement 
means that it is unjustified. An agreement can be justified, but still unstable.  
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 Freeman (1991: 36). A similar story can also be found in Nussbaum (2006: 418n. 9), that Rawls 
describes himself as a social contract theorist but not a Kantian.  
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that his theory is indebted to Hobbes, since he claims that his theory ‘generalizes and 
carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as 
found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant’.75 Nevertheless, the resemblance between 
Rawls and Hobbesian contractarianism should not be overlooked. As Robert Paul 
Wolff observes, Rawls is clearly affected by the neo-classical economic assumption 
of utility-maximization.76  Both Rawls and Hobbesian contractarians assume that 
hypothetical contractors want to satisfy some preferences. These preferences can be 
satisfied by following certain political principles, and this is a crucial reason why 
contractors should follow these political principles. The only difference between 
them is that they define rational preferences in different ways. Hobbesian 
contractarians take any considered and coherent preferences as rational preferences, 
whereas Rawls further insists that rational preferences have to be compatible with the 
highest-order interests.  Despite this difference, both Rawls and Hobbesian 
contractarians maintain that following political principles is a ‘good’ to contractors.77 
Following this analysis, one can see that Rawls’ contract theory not only has some 
characteristics of Kantian contractarianism, but also has some characteristics of 
Hobbesian contractarianism. By understanding the complex character of Rawls’ 
contract theory, the inadequacy of the orthodox dichotomy between Hobbesian and 
Kantian contractarianism becomes evident. In the dichotomy, contractarians are 
classified into two kinds; either Hobbesian or Kantian. However, Rawls falls into 
neither camp. More accurately, he is in both. The hypothetical contractors in Rawls’ 
theory are both rational and reasonable. Hence Rawls is not a Hobbesian 
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 In fact, the Hobbesian character is much stronger in Rawls’ earlier writings. In ‘Justice as Fairness’ 
(Rawls 1958), Rawls assumes that people are rational, mutually self-interested, and ‘sufficiently equal 
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contractarian, for he assumes that hypothetical contractors are concerned with being 
reasonable to others. Yet he is not a Kantian contractarian, for he assumes that 
contractors are also concerned with the rational pursuits of their interests. His 
contract theory is a ‘hybrid’ social contract; a hybrid of Hobbesian and Kantian 
contractarianism.78 The orthodox dichotomy fails to include this distinctive kind of 
contractarian model.  
3.5 The third possibility: hybrid contractarianism and the dual conception 
of practical reason  
Since the orthodox dichotomy can only capture ‘pure’ contractarianism, its 
inadequacy is that it overlooks hybrid contractarianism, which has characteristics of 
both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarianism. Furthermore, this kind of model is 
rare in the history of contractarianism. Rousseau and Rawls belong to this tradition 
since both of them emphasise that the social contract not only defines principles of 
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 Here one might recall Brain Barry’s analysis of Rawls’ theory of justice. Barry also takes justice as 
fairness as a combination of two theories, justice as mutual advantage, which takes justice as the 
rational cooperation for mutual advantage under circumstances of justice, and justice as impartiality, 
which takes justice as a reasonable agreement that is acceptable from all points of view. See Barry 
(1989: 179-254). Although both Barry and I take Rawls’ contractarianism to be a hybrid theory, my 
analysis is clearly different from Barry’s. From Barry’s perspective, Rawls is a ‘hybrid’ theorist 
merely because he uses the languages of both justice as mutual advantage and justice as impartiality. 
However, I concentrate on the conception of practical reason behind Rawls’ theory and indicate that it 
is this dual assumption which makes Rawls a ‘hybrid’ theorist. Moreover, the component of rational 
advantage understood by Barry in Rawls’ theory is the rational bargaining that happened in the 
original position among parties behind the veil of ignorance. This ignores Rawls’ discussion on the 
‘good’ of justice in the Part III of A Theory of Justice, which is crucial for understanding why justice 
as fairness is ‘rational’ to actual people. The rational interests in the original position should not be 
confused with the real motivations that motivate free and equal persons to follow principles of justice 
in the real world. (See Rawls 1980: 320-322, 357-358) In contrast to Barry, I understand rational 
advantage to be the highest-order interests in realizing two moral capacities. These are also 
fundamental goods valued by free and equal persons and also the goods that Rawls emphasizes in the 
Part III of A Theory of Justice. When Rawls talks about the congruence between rationality and 
reasonableness, he is talking about the congruence between highest-order interests and the sense of 
justice. Hence, I believe that my analysis based on a more correct understanding of Rawls’ theory.  
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‘right’, but also represent the fundamental good of people. As my thesis focuses upon 
contemporary contractarianism, I will take Rawls as the example of this contractarian 
model. This contractarianism has different characteristics from that of the other two 
contractarianisms. Hence it has strengths that these two contractarianisms do not 
have, while it also has to encounter problems that these two contractarianisms do not 
need to face.  
3.5.1 The dual conception of practical reason 
The distinctiveness of hybrid contractarianism originates in its attitude to the 
relationship between rationality and reasonableness. Different contractarians 
perceive this relationship in various ways. Hobbesian contractarians subordinate 
reasonableness to rationality. In this approach, reasonableness becomes one of the 
many preferences of a person, and it is one of the considerations in the weighting 
model of rationality. Kantian contractarians subordinate rationality to reasonableness. 
In this approach, the considerations in the weighting model of rationality must not 
violate the constraint of justifiability.  
Hybrid contractarians take a different approach. In the previous section, we have 
seen that the hypothetical contractors of hybrid contractarianism have dual 
characteristics: they are both rational and reasonable. This implies that the 
conception of practical reason of hybrid contractarianism is a dual assumption: it 
assumes that rationality and reasonableness are two aspects of practical reason. 
Neither is subordinate to the other. The reasonable perspective uses the testing model 
to assess the justifiability of people’s actions. The rational perspective uses the 
weighting model to rank the preferences of people by using utility as a measure to 
maximize utility.  
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But is this understanding of practical reason plausible? Actually this dual assumption 
is not uncommon since many theorists have already pointed out that it is inadequate 
to see human beings as merely rational or reasonable. Rather, rationality and 
reasonableness should be seen as two aspects of practical reason which are 
independent of, and irreducible to, the other. For example, David O. Brink argues 
that the Kantian interpretation of practical reason is inadequate and he proposes a 
‘dualism of practical reason’, which consists of the categorical imperative and the 
categorical prudence. 79  The former norm is similar to the conception of 
reasonableness, whereas the latter norm is close to the conception of rationality.80   
Brink believes that these two norms have the same categorical nature, and that they 
thus have the same status in practical reasoning. Both requirements are formal 
requirements of people’s practical reason, so neither of them has supremacy. The 
requirement of categorical imperative cannot override the demand of categorical 
prudence, and vice versa. Apart from Brink, Elster also suggests that there are two 
norms in people’s practical reason: rationality and impartiality. The norm of 
rationality, which requires people to arrange their desires according to certain logical 
rules, corresponds to the conception of rationality discussed earlier, while the norm 
of impartiality, which requires people to take certain moral rules as absolute, 
corresponds to the conception of reasonableness. Elster argues that these two norms 
are independent of each other: ‘The many attempts to deduce [rationality] from 
[impartiality] are doomed to failure’.81 A good life is a life in which rationality and 
impartiality are harmonious with each other. 82  Hence, to Brink and Elster, this 
dualistic interpretation of practical reason is a more comprehensive and accurate 
understanding than the tradition Kantian or Hobbesian interpretation. These two 
interpretations can capture single sides of the picture separately; but not the whole.  
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Although Brink and Elster are not concerned here with contractarianism, it seems 
that their proposed dualistic interpretation of practical reason is exactly like the 
conception of practical reason which underlies hybrid contractarianism. Hybrid 
contractarians, such as Rawls, assume that the practical reason of actual people 
consists of conceptions of rationality and reasonableness, both having equal status in 
practical reason. They have different functions and are concerned with different 
things: one is concerned with the pursuit of good, while the other is concerned with 
living according to the right. As Rawls emphasises, both capacities are distinctive 
and neither can be derived from the other:  
The reasonable and the rational are taken as two distinct and independent basic ideas. They are 
distinct in that there is no thought of deriving one from the other; in particular, there is no 
thought of deriving the reasonable from the rational.83 
The concept of justice and goodness are linked with distinct principles. More precisely, each 
concept with its associated principles defines a point of view from which institutions, actions, 
and plans of life can be assessed.84 
The distinction between rationality and reasonableness often appeared in Rawls’ 
writings.85  As Samuel Freeman observes, ‘there are two ideal perspectives in Rawls 
conception of justice: the original position and the deliberative rationality. The 
former provides the foundation for judgments of justice; the latter provides the basis 
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for judgments regarding a person’s good’. 86  This further proves that a dual 
conception of practical reason lies behind his contractarian theory. 87 
However, one should be careful to note that Rawls, as a hybrid contractarian who is 
closer to the Kantian tradition, does not think that the relationship between rationality 
and reasonableness is completely coordinated. In some texts, Rawls emphasises that, 
‘the Reasonableness presupposed and subordinates the Rationality. It defines the fair 
terms of cooperation acceptable to all within some group of separately identifiable 
persons, each of whom possesses and can exercise the two moral powers’. 88 
Although Rawls acknowledges that there is such an order of priority, this order is 
only to guarantee that when, unfortunately, rationality and reasonableness conflict 
with each other, reasonableness should still subordinate rationality. In most of his 
writing we can still see that Rawls takes rationality seriously and even believes that a 
conception of justice must show that it is rationally justified. In his discussion of the 
question of stability, he argues that a satisfactory conception of justice must show 
that it is stable,89 and stability depends on whether ‘it is rational (as defined by the 
thin theory of the good) for those in a well-ordered society to affirm their sense of 
justice as regulative of their life’.90 Rationality is an independent and crucial criterion 
in determining whether a conception of justice is satisfactory. Hence, a conception of 
justice must show that it is both rationally and reasonably justified. One would feel 
uncomfortable if the principles of justice always allowed for unreasonable treatments. 
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But if the principles of justice often require one to sacrifice one’s interests, then these 
principles should also be revised.  
3.5.2 Hybrid contractarianism 
Thus we can see that, according to Rawls, rationality and reasonableness are two 
separate criteria. Insofar as both rationality and reasonableness are independent 
conceptions of practical reason, and both of them are fundamentally important; a 
satisfactory contractarian theory should ‘embody all the relevant requirements of 
practical reason’. 91  Thus Rawls defines hypothetical contractors with two 
characteristics in order to model the dual nature of practical reason. Neither merely 
reasonable contractors nor merely rational contractors are adequate. Indeed, ‘merely 
reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they wanted to advance by fair 
cooperation; merely rational agents lack a sense of justice and fail to recognize the 
independent validity of the claims of others’.92 Hence free and equal persons, who 
are the hypothetical contractors in Rawls’ contractarianism, have two moral powers 
that correspond to the rationality and the reasonableness respectively.  
By studying what free and equal persons would choose, we can know what political 
principles are both rationally and reasonably justified. The content of hypothetical 
agreement in hybrid contractarianism is different from that of Hobbesian and Kantian 
contractarianism. Since contractors are both rational and reasonable, they would 
consider both how to rationally advance their interests and how to behave reasonably 
to others. Their choice can specify the content of political principles that are justified 
from both rational and reasonable perspectives.  
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[Principles of justice as fair terms of social cooperation] articulate an idea of reciprocity and 
mutuality: all who cooperate must benefit, or share in common burdens, in some appropriate 
fashion as judged by a suitable benchmark of comparison. This element in social cooperation I 
call the Reasonable. The other element corresponds to the Rational: It expresses a conception 
of each participant’s rational advantage, what, as individuals, they are trying to advance. As we 
have seen, the rational is interpreted by the original position in reference to the desire of 
persons to realize and to exercise their moral powers and to secure the advancement of their 
conception of the good. Given a specification of the parties’ highest-order interests, they are 
rational in their deliberations to the extent that sensible principles of rational choice guide their 
decision.93 
This hypothetical agreement has the character of the hypothetical agreement in 
Hobbesian contractarianism, for it represents a way to pursue the interests of 
contractors. But it also has the nature of the hypothetical agreement in Kantian 
contractarianism, for acting from it represents a way to be reasonable to others.  
Further discussion of characteristics of hypothetical contractors and the content of 
hypothetical agreement will be presented in Chapter 6 and 7, where hybrid 
contractarianism is discussed in-depth. However, the discussion above is enough to 
show the special conception of practical reason of hybrid contractarianism, and how 
this element affects the other parts of this contractarian theory. In short, hybrid 
contractarianism can be seen as having three elements: (1) the dual conception of 
practical reason, (2) hypothetical contractors that are well-informed and both rational 
and reasonable, and (3) a hypothetical agreement that could be justified from both a 
rational and reasonable perspective. These three elements show that hybrid 
contractarianism has a distinctive content which is different from that of Hobbesian 
and Kantian contractarianism.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
Although contractarianism is a widely adopted methodology in justifying political 
principles, its classification is rarely discussed. A more precise conceptual 
classification can help us to capture the nature of some contractarian models more 
correctly. This chapter shows the inadequacy of the orthodox dichotomous model. In 
the last chapter I showed that the content of a contractarian theory fundamentally 
depends on its conception of practical reason. I then showed that there are three 
possible conceptions of practical reason. Correspondingly, there should be three 
models of contractarianism. If this is correct, then the orthodox dichotomy is flawed 
for it only divides contractarianism into two strands. The three models of 
contractarianism are presented in the following table.  
Table 2 Three Models of Contractarianism 
 Hobbesian 
contractarianism 
Kantian 
contractarianism 
Hybrid 
contractarianism 
The conception of 
practical reason 
The conception of 
rationality: 
reasonableness is 
subordinated to 
rationality 
The conception of 
reasonableness: 
rationality is 
subordinated to 
reasonableness 
The dual 
conception: 
rationality and 
reasonableness are 
co-equal to each 
other 
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The characteristics 
and circumstances 
of hypothetical 
contractors 
Rational 
contractors who are 
well-informed 
utility-maximizers  
Reasonable 
contractors who are 
well-informed and 
mutually respect 
one another 
Well-informed 
contractors who are 
both rational and 
reasonable  
The hypothetical 
agreement 
Agreement that is 
mutually 
advantageous to 
everyone. 
Agreement that 
could not be 
reasonably rejected 
by anyone 
Agreement that 
could be justified 
from both rational 
and reasonable 
perspectives 
Representative Gauthier Scanlon Rawls 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that these three models cannot be separated by clear 
boundaries. A contractarian can have a philosophical position between Hobbesian 
and hybrid models, or between hybrid and Kantian model. In fact, these three models 
should be viewed on a spectrum. Hobbesian and Kantian models are the two 
extremes, while the hybrid model holds a more central position. Different 
contractarians then occupy different points within this spectrum. Therefore, precisely 
speaking, all contractarians are hybrid contractarians, because no contractarians 
would occupy an extreme philosophical position such as ‘pure’ Hobbesian 
contractarianism, or ‘pure’ Kantian contractarianism. For example, even Gauthier, 
who is normally seen as the representative of Hobbesian contractarians, does not 
deny that people can honour the value of principles of justice because of its intrinsic 
moral value and not only because of its instrumental value in serving their interests. 
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In the last chapter of his Morals by Agreement, he argues that an individual will 
appreciate the intrinsic value of mutually advantageous principles which protected 
this society and hence will follow these principles even at the cost of his interests.94 
‘Human beings have the capacity for an affective morality’ and hence are not merely 
economic persons who are only concerned with maximizing their utilities.95 
Scanlon, the representative of Kantian contractarianism, also argues that following 
moral principles can promote the well-being of followers. Although Scanlon does not 
say this point directly, this point is implicit in his theory of well-being. According to 
Scanlon, ‘what makes [a] thing good will…[be the fact that it] provides reasons for 
desiring it’.96 For example, friendship is good because it can give us reason to pursue 
it. ‘[S]uccess in achieving [this good thing] becomes one of the things that make that 
person’s life better’.97 Based on this theory of well-being, one can then recognise the 
good of following moral principles. For following moral principles implies that a 
person participates in a relation of mutual recognition. To Scanlon, following moral 
principles and protecting the relationship of mutual recognition are one and the same. 
On the other hand, the relationship of mutual recognition is a relationship that ‘is 
appealing in itself—worth seeking for its own sake’.98 It means that this relationship 
itself can give us reason to pursue it, thus it should be seen as a ‘good’. Hence, by 
following moral principles, a person can maintain this relationship; by maintaining 
this relationship, a person’s life can be made better-off. Although Scanlon does not 
say that people will follow moral principles because this will promote their ‘good’, at 
least it seems that he does not think moral principles are completely irrelevant to a 
person’s good life.  
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We can hereby see that even the representatives of Hobbesian and Kantian 
contractarians are actually not as ‘pure’ as previously suggested. In fact, a 
contractarian usually has both Hobbesian and Kantian characteristics, but different 
contractarians have different proportions of these two elements. In this sense, all 
contractarians are hybrid and they differ only in proportion. Therefore, when I 
discuss ‘pure’ contractarian models such as the Hobbesian or Kantian, I will discuss 
the models in general and will only use the theories of these contractarians when they 
can be good examples of these models. For example, although Scanlon’s 
contractarian theory has alluded briefly to the good of following moral principles, 
this argument seems to be unimportant for he also says in a passage that his 
contractarianism is not ‘about what would be the most likely to advance [people’s] 
interests’.99 Hence the Kantian element of his theory is far more substantial than its 
Hobbesian element; to the extent that the latter is even dispensable. I will focus on 
the Kantian part of Scanlon’s theory when I discuss Kantian contractarianism. These 
‘impurities’ will be disregarded because my aim is to separately discuss the three 
models, Hobbesian, Kantian and hybrid contractarianisms, and show that all three 
models are problematic. Since these three models exhaust all sound ways of 
employing a contractarian methodology, the fact they are problematic will show that 
there are some critical flaws in the methodology. No matter how one employs this 
methodology, these flaws remain. Therefore, whether Gauthier or Scanlon are pure 
Hobbesian or Kantian contractarians is not a crucial issue, for, even if their theories 
are impure, their theories can shed light on the weaknesses of Hobbesian and Kantian 
contractarianism.  
In the following chapters, I will discuss these three contractarian models. The 
normative force of these models depends on whether they can satisfy the condition of 
generality and the condition of priority. I will show that although Hobbesian and 
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Kantian contractarianism can satisfy the condition of generality, both cannot satisfy 
the condition of priority. The hybrid contractarianism is the only theory which takes 
the problem of priority seriously and tries to satisfy the condition of priority. 
However, this ambition hinders it from achieving a wide generality; therefore, hybrid 
contractarianism can only be applied to a small group of people. The condition of 
priority can only be satisfied at the cost of the condition of generality.  
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Chapter 4 Hobbesian contractarianism: Gauthier 
4.1 Introduction 
Rational interest always plays a crucial role in moral and political justification. As 
Kurt Baier observes, ‘throughout the history of philosophy, by far the most popular 
candidate for the position of the moral point of view has been rational interest’.1 
What better recommendation could there be for normative principles than the fact 
that they pay to be moral? It seems that if being moral or being just has no returns, 
then it is irrational to be so. From this we can see the considerations of rationality are 
common in our practical reasoning. As we saw in the last chapter, rationality is a 
weighting model that ranks our preferences in terms of utility and motivates us to 
maximize our individual utilities. This instrumental conception of rationality is 
widely endorsed in various subjects, and Hobbesian contractarians take it to be their 
conception of practical reason. In this chapter, I will further discuss how Hobbesian 
contractarians justify political principles by hypothetical agreement based on this 
assumption,2 and why, because of this assumption, Hobbesian contractarianism fails 
to fulfill the condition of priority.  
Before we start to discuss Hobbesian contractarianism, I should first clarify the 
relationship between Hobbes and Hobbesian contractarianism. Hobbesian 
contractarians normally claim that their roots are in Hobbes (and some argue that 
Hume is also in this tradition).3 In general, this is not a wholly false claim because 
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 Some people might argue that Gauthier’s contractarian project is more concerned with moral 
justification. Yet Gauthier also acknowledges that his contractarian theory has a political dimension 
and can be used to justify social institution and practice. See Gauthier (1997).  
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they are profoundly influenced by Hobbes in at least two ways. First, their view of 
human rationality is affected by Hobbes. Hobbes believes that human beings are 
creatures of passions and desires. Human life, then, is a journey of seeking to satisfy 
desires: ‘Life itself…can never be without desire’.4 Hobbes sees human beings as 
‘maximizers’ who aim at maximizing the satisfaction of desires. This maximizing 
behaviour is ‘a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of 
power after power, that ceaseth only in death’.5 A similar understanding of human 
nature can also be seen in the writings of Hobbesian contractarians, who believe that 
Hobbes’ words can be articulated better by the theory of rational choice.6 Secondly, 
the way that Hobbesian contractarians understand how people form a social 
agreement is also highly similar to Hobbes’. According to Hobbes, since human 
beings are rational, they should understand that they can only get rid of the state of 
nature by subjecting themselves to an absolute sovereign. Therefore, a social 
agreement which authorizes an absolute sovereign is justified, because it is a 
mutually advantageous agreement which avoids the poor state of nature and brings 
benefits to all people.7  Although, these days no Hobbesian contractarians would 
agree with absolutism, none of them would deny that a justified social agreement 
should be a mutually advantageous agreement.8 Because of these two similarities, 
Hobbesian contractarians claim that their approach can be traced back to Hobbes and 
they are indebted to his insights.  
However, there are also some critics who argue that Hobbesian contractarianism 
misunderstands Hobbes. 9  The difference between Hobbes and the ‘so-called’ 
Hobbesian contractarians should not be overlooked. For example, some people argue 
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that Hobbes is concerned only with the desire for self-preservation, and they justify 
the hypothetical contract by the satisfaction of this primary desire. However, 
Hobbesian contractarians are not concerned specifically with this preference, and 
they justify the hypothetical contract by the maximization of individual utility, which 
consists of other preferences apart from self-preservation. Whether ‘Hobbesian 
contractarianism’ is a correct label could be the subject of a chapter of its own, but I 
would like to bracket this question here first. Since my interest is in the normativity 
of Hobbesian contractarianism, regardless of whether or not Hobbesian 
contractarians misunderstand Hobbes, this theory itself is well-structured and worth 
discussing. Hence I will leave this question aside for the moment and simply keep 
using the term ‘Hobbesian contractarianism’. 
As I said in Chapter 2, the normativity of a hypothetical contract depends on whether 
it can satisfy the condition of generality and the condition of priority. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine whether Hobbesian contractarianism can satisfy these two 
conditions. I will use David Gauthier as the representative of Hobbesian 
contractarianism. First, I will explain how the conception of rationality determines 
the characteristics of hypothetical contractors and the content of hypothetical 
agreement, which are the other two elements in Hobbesian contractarianism. Based 
on the conception of rationality, Hobbesian contractarians argue that a political 
principle is justified only when it is mutually beneficial, since such a principle 
represents an agreement that is rationally justified. Secondly, I will discuss the 
inadequacy of this assumption. This assumption fails to fully model our practical 
reason because it overlooks another aspect of practical reason—reasonableness. This 
flaw explains why although Hobbesian contractarianism can satisfy the condition of 
generality, it still fails to satisfy the condition of priority. The third section will be a 
discussion of possible objections from Hobbesian contractarians. Hobbesian 
contractarians might respond that reasonableness is in fact not independent since it 
can be reduced to one of the preferences in a person’s utility function. I will argue 
that this reduction is unsound because it distorts the very nature of reasonableness.  
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4.2 Hobbesian contractarianism: an elaboration  
Hobbesian contractarians believe that actual people deliberate about practical issues 
in terms of rationality. If political principles are rationally justified, then actual 
people will have reason to accept them. These political principles can be specified by 
the hypothetical agreement that would be made by rational hypothetical contractors. 
In this section, I will illustrate how these contractors are defined and how decisions 
are arrived at.  
4.2.1 Characteristics of hypothetical contractors 
According to my definition in Chapter 3, rationality is a decision-making process 
which takes every motivation of people as preferences, ranks different preferences in 
terms of utility and aims at maximizing the utility of a person. Hobbesian 
contractarians, like Gauthier, believe that if the hypothetical contractors can 
deliberate in accordance with rationality, then the decision of hypothetical 
contractors is justified to actual people. Actual people can identify themselves with 
the hypothetical contractors and understand the rationale behind the decisions of 
contractors. Based on this belief, the characteristics of hypothetical contractors are 
defined in order to represent a pure rational process of deliberation. These 
characteristics can be shown in three aspects: the motivation of contractors, the 
qualification of contractors and the knowledge of contractors.  
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The motivation of contractors 
Hypothetical contractors are defined as purely rational contractors who have 
coherent and considered preferences.10 These rational contractors have different sets 
of preferences, which constitute their own utility functions. Based on their utility 
function, rational contractors aim at nothing except maximizing their utility 
effectively: ‘The rationality is assumed and is identified with the aim of utility-
maximization’.11  Moreover, contractors are assumed to be mutually unconcerned 
with one another (take no interests in one another’s interests).12 Each rational utility-
maximizer has their own utility function which is independent of those of others. 
This assumption easily attracts a critique that it is counterfactual, for people ‘do, at 
least to some extent, care about how other people’s conceptions of the good are 
promoted’.13 But Gauthier does not intend to make such an absurd assumption. His 
assumption is more restrictive than many critics think: he requires only that people 
are not interested in the utility of those with whom they exchange. ‘This is 
Wicksted’s requirement of “non-tuism”; my preferences do not involve you, although 
they may involve some third person not party to our interaction’.14 That is to say, 
                                                 
10
 As I discussed in Chapter 3, these two conditions are the necessary conditions for a preference to be 
counted in a utility function. These two conditions prevent those inconsistent and ill-considered 
preferences from affecting the bargain. But how to judge whether a preference is considered or not? 
Some people object that Gauthier cannot avoid assuming some a priori normative commitments and 
obligations in order to show that some preferences are ill-considered (such as the preference to 
mistreat others) while some are not. Since this critique is not highly relevant, I will discuss a possible 
response to this critique only briefly here. I do not think Gauthier is vulnerable to this critique, for he 
could simply claim that he only requires rational contractors to think about their preferences carefully 
and he trusts that, in general, those ill-considered preferences, such as the preference to mistreat 
others, could be excluded after reflection, but this reflection does not necessarily involve normative 
commitments or obligations. For example, as James Griffin suggests, a desire could be seen as 
‘informed desire’ insofar as people ‘appreciated the true nature’ of the object of these desires, and this 
appreciation could be irrelevant to normative commitments. (See Griffin 1986: 11) For an example of 
this critique, see Brandom (2001), Ripstein (2001), Baier (1988) Scanlon (1975: 78).  
11
 Gauthier (1975: 209). 
12
 Gauthier (1986: 10-11, 102-103).  
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 Vallentyne (1991c: 5).  
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 Gauthier (1986: 87). 
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rational utility-maximizers are not wholly mutually unconcerned with one another. 
Sometimes the utility function of contractors involves the utility function of others, 
but in most cases, the utility functions of contractors are independent of one another.  
The qualification of contractors  
In Gauthier’s hypothetical contract, only those rational utility-maximizers whose 
cooperation would benefit others qualify. Those people who are not able to offer 
benefits, such as children, the severely handicapped and members of future 
generations are not included as contractors.15 This scope can be explained by the 
conception of rationality. Since the hypothetical contractors aim only at rationally 
maximizing their utility, it would be irrational for them to cooperate with people who 
could not bring them a gain in utility. The only form of cooperation to which they 
will agree is a mutually advantageous agreement. Consequentially, those ‘powerless’ 
can be included in the scope of contract only when the rational utility-maximizers, 
who can participate in the contract, care about them personally. Nevertheless, even if 
those ‘powerless’ were loved, their moral standing would still be secondary, since it 
would depend only on the personal care of rational utility-maximizers, who have the 
primary moral standing.16 
The knowledge of contractors 
Rawls’ contract is famous for the veil of ignorance imposed on contractors. 
Contractors only have general knowledge of their society but know nothing about 
their particular features. Gauthier consciously distances himself from this approach 
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and argues that his contract is based on rational negotiations among well-informed 
people.17 In Gauthier’s contract, contractors are fully informed about their capacities 
and social situations. The purpose of making this assumption is clearly to reduce the 
gap between actual people and hypothetical contractors. If hypothetical contractors 
were ignorant of particular information, then they would have a utility function 
which is highly different from that of actual people. The decision that hypothetical 
contractors would make in order to maximize their utility would be rationally 
unacceptable to actual people. Hence, in order to ensure that the rational decisions of 
actual people and hypothetical contractors are the same, Gauthier rejects any veil of 
ignorance in his contractarian theory.18 
4.2.2 The state of nature: the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
These three characteristics constitute the hypothetical contractors in Gauthier’s 
contractarian theory—well-informed rational utility-maximizers who are mutually 
unconcerned with one another and cooperate with others only when others can 
benefit them. Gauthier believes that the decisions of these hypothetical contractors 
represent what are rationally justified to actual people. Hobbesian contractarians 
invite us to imagine a ‘state of nature’, that is, a situation that these hypothetical 
contractors were grouped together. In particular circumstances, these contractors can 
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 Gauthier (1986: 5) 
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 But there is another critique that well-informed reasoning is itself unrealistic. Someone might argue 
that the utility function of actual people usually involves wrong information or unconsidered 
preferences. Hence the utility function of well-informed hypothetical contractors is still different from 
that of actual people. The actual people may still fail to identify themselves with hypothetical 
contractors. It is true that wrong information and unconsidered preferences inevitably exist in our real 
life. Nevertheless, actual people rarely think that these factors are desirable and relevant. Even if well-
informed maximization is impossible in the real world, it is still instructive for actual people. No one 
would prefer pursuing a goal because of wrong or inadequate information. More precisely, utility-
maximization is valuable only when people are fully-informed, for people usually would not value 
utility-maximization when the utility function is affected by fraud. It is commonly acceptable that 
rational utility-maximization should not be contaminated by these factors. For how the decision of 
hypothetical contractors act as an instruction of actual people, see Morton (2001) 
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spontaneously achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome: an outcome where no individual 
could be made better-off without some individuals being worse-off, without any 
agreement. Gauthier believes that, under the conditions of a perfect market, the 
divergent and seemingly opposed interests of different individuals fully harmonize 
with one another. All contractors can do as well as they can, that is, their individual 
utility can be maximized subject to the utility maximization of others. Hence, no 
rules or agreement are required in the perfect market, because a mutually beneficial 
order can be spontaneously achieved by the interactions among contractors. ‘The 
perfect market, were it realized, would constitute a morally free zone, a zone within 
which the constraints of morality would have no place. In leaving each person free to 
pursue her own interest in her own way, the market satisfies the ideal of moral 
anarchy’.19 
However, this perfect outcome does not always occur. In some cases, market failures 
appear and the rational pursuit of individual utilities leads to suboptimal outcomes, 
that is, outcomes where one individual could be made better-off without any 
individuals being worse-off. One of the best-known examples is the ‘Prisoner’s 
Dilemma’. It describes a situation where two prisoners are captured and interrogated 
in separate rooms. Each is told that, if they confess before the other does, then they 
will only be sentenced to one year’s imprisonment while the other will be sentenced 
to ten years. If neither confesses, then both will only be sentenced to three years. But 
if both confess, then both will be sentenced to eight years. Their situation can be 
represented by the following matrix:  
Table 3 Prisoners’ Dilemma 
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                      B’s strategy 
A’s strategy 
Confess Not confess 
Confess -8, -8 -1, -10 
Not confess -10, -1 -3, -3 
 
In this matrix, the left-upper cell, the convergence of the rational choice of both 
prisoners, is a suboptimal outcome, because there is an alternative outcome (the left-
upper cell) that both prisoners could gain more benefit without making other worse 
off. Although each prisoner knows that the optimal outcome is the right-lower cell, 
each will ironically fall into the suboptimal left-upper cell, because each can 
maximize his utility only by confessing, irrespective of whether or not another 
prisoner confesses. We can see the divergence between rationality and optimality: 
even all people act rationally, they cannot achieve the optimal outcome.  
This is why a social contract is needed. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both prisoners 
will choose to confess only because they do not share the appropriate understanding. 
However, if they reached an agreement before they were caught, both of them would 
choose to not confess and hence they can achieve the optimal outcome. Gauthier 
believes that those contractors can get rid of market failures in a similar way. Market 
failures appear because contractors act independently without cooperating with each 
other. So what if they make a social agreement instead? Contractors can make an 
agreement with one another which guarantees that every contractor will choose a 
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collective strategy that leads them to an optimal outcome and provides them the 
opportunity to avoid market failure.  
4.2.3 The hypothetical contract: the Lockean proviso and the principle of 
minimax relative concession 
For the sake of leaving the suboptimal position, these contractors bargain with each 
other and form a social agreement which is mutually advantageous. However, 
bargaining needs a baseline which can determine the goods that each person brings to 
the bargaining table and that is not subject to bargaining. Without this baseline, one 
cannot understand the idea of advantage.20  Hence, before bargaining, contractors 
have to know what goods they can legitimately own first. Gauthier suggests that this 
‘initial distribution of goods’ is defined by a proviso on previous acquisition of 
resources. Gauthier, following Nozick, calls this proviso the ‘Lockean proviso’.21 
Goods belong to a person when they are ‘acquired by him without taking advantage 
of any other person—or, more precisely, any other co-operator’. 22  Here ‘taking 
advantage’ of another person refers to making the situation of another person worse 
in order to better one’s own. The function of this proviso is to exclude irrelevant 
factors such as coercion and free-riding. Under the constraint of this proviso, 
contractors can no longer acquire goods by coercive or predatory activities. They can 
get the goods only by their own labour. Since the Lockean proviso guarantees a fair 
initial situation without coercion, the hypothetical agreement which is reached under 
the constraint of this proviso will be a fair agreement.  
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At the bargaining table, contractors have to think about how the cooperative surplus 
should be divided. They know that by cooperating with each other, extra goods will 
be created. The question is how these goods should be divided among contractors 
who create them together. According to Gauthier, since society’s members are 
rational utility-maximizers, they will seek to get as much cooperative surplus as 
possible during bargaining. If the claims of these society members are incompatible, 
there is a second stage in which each member offers concessions to the others by 
withdrawing some portion of their original claim and proposing an alternative 
outcome. Concession making continues until a set of mutually compatible claims are 
reached. According to Gauthier, this is reached when each member makes 
concessions that are relatively equal to the concessions of others. Here the relative 
concession refers to the concession that one has to suffer when one bargains with 
others in the division of cooperative surplus: 
The relative concession that a person makes for a given option is the ratio of (a) the excess of (i) 
the utility for that person of his/her most favorable admissible option over (ii) the utility for 
that person of [the agreement] to (b) the excess of (i) the utility for that person of his/her most 
favorable admissible option over (ii) the utility for that person of the initial bargaining position 
option. An admissible option is one that is both feasible and accords everyone at least as much 
utility as the initial bargaining position.23 
Gauthier argues that the outcome of bargaining will be the ‘principle of minimax 
relative concession’, which is a bargaining solution that minimizes the maximum 
relative concession that anyone makes. This principle is most rational because it ‘is 
most favourable to [each society member], minimizing the costs of her restraint and 
maximizing the benefits she receives from the restraint of others’.24 In every other 
alternative outcome, the maximum relative concession would be greater, which 
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means that some society members would be disadvantaged and would be required to 
sacrifice more. As Vallentyne says, ‘the intuitive idea behind this solution is that, 
since one’s ground of complaint can be measured by one’s relative concession, 
minimizing maximum relative concession minimizes the grounds for complaint’.25 
Therefore, the principle of minimax relative concession is rationally the most 
acceptable solution to everyone, because any other alternative solution would impose 
more burdens on some members and would be rejected by these members. 
The principle of minimax relative concession is the outcome of a joint strategy 
choice.26 By following the principle of minimax relative concession, hypothetical 
contractors can overcome market failure and achieve an optimal outcome. However, 
someone might doubt whether, even if it is rational to make such an agreement, it is 
really rational to comply with it. It seems that, if individuals are by nature rational 
utility-maximizers, they should free-ride on others and break the agreement given 
that others must still honour the agreement. Gauthier disagrees that this is rational. 
He distinguishes two strategies for maximizing utilities. One is straightforward 
maximization, which means that an individual ‘seeks to maximize his utility given 
the strategies of those with whom he interacts’.27 Without concern about any other 
things. Another is constrained maximization, which means that an individual ‘has a 
conditional disposition to base her actions on a joint strategy, without considering 
whether some individual strategy would yield her greater expected utility…In other 
words, a constrained maximizer is ready to cooperate in ways that, if followed by all, 
would yield outcomes that she would find beneficial and not unfair’.28  Gauthier 
argues that provided the government can guarantee a sufficient degree of 
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translucency, that is, other people can have a fairly good idea what we are really like 
and free-riding is difficult, constrained maximization is a more rational strategy than 
straightforward maximization. Individuals should be disposed to act on the basis of 
the agreement, rather than maximizing their utilities directly and free-riding on 
others.  
This concludes the exposition of Hobbesian contractarianism. We can see how a 
Hobbesian contractarian develops a whole theory from the conception of rationality. 
In Gauthier’s contract theory, hypothetical contractors are well-informed rational 
utility-maximizers, who model the rational deliberative process of actual people. The 
main problem for these contractors is market failure, which is the suboptimal 
situation that contractors would fall into if they maximized their utility without any 
agreement. So they have to make an agreement with one another in order to get rid of 
these suboptimal situations and enjoy a cooperative surplus. Before bargaining, 
contractors have to define what goods belong to them, so they first agree on the 
Lockean proviso which defines the initial distribution of goods. This initial 
distribution determines the bargaining power of contractors. Based on their 
bargaining power, contractors bargain with one another and at last agree on the 
principle of minimax relative concession. This principle acts as a public constraint 
which helps them to reach optimal, mutually beneficial outcomes. Contractors will 
also change into constrained maximizers and be disposed to maximize their utility 
under the public constraint. Hence, Gauthier shows how substantial political 
principles are derived from a formal conception of rationality by the contractarian 
method.  
4.3 Hobbesian contractarianism and the condition of generality 
One of the crucial conditions of having normativity is the condition of generality. 
Contractarians must show that the social agreement is not only justified to the 
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hypothetical agents, but also justified to actual people. So the conception of practical 
reason should be generally acceptable to actual people. The strength of Hobbesian 
contractarianism is that it assumes a weak conception of rationality. This section will 
show how Hobbesian contractarianism can fulfill the condition of generality.  
4.3.1 The general acceptability of the conception of rationality  
Gauthier’s solution to the problem of generality is to rely on the weak conception of 
rationality, which is a conception ‘without any prior moral assumptions’.29 In fact, 
this strategy of avoiding moral assumptions is also the common strategy of 
Hobbesian contractarianism since making moral assumptions would lead to 
controversy.30 People who do not care so much about impartiality might refuse to 
identify themselves with the hypothetical contractors who have a strong motivation 
to be impartial. The relationship between hypothetical contractors and actual people 
would become unclear. In order to prevent this controversy, Hobbesian 
contractarians propose that a contractarian theory should appeal to ‘a non-moral, or 
morally neutral, base’.31 
Hence, Hobbesian contractarians, including Gauthier, borrow the conception of 
rationality from the theory of rational choice, which does not have any prior moral 
presupposition and provides only a ‘weak and widely accepted conception of 
practical rationality’.32 Gauthier believes that maximizing individual utility is the 
fundamental characteristic of human beings.33 It is hard to prove the generality of the 
conception of rationality; not because it is groundless, but rather because its 
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generality seems to be self-evident. Yet I can give two reasons to support this claim: 
the first is empirical; the second is theoretical.  First, the generality can be proved by 
current neuroscientific studies. According to some neuroscientists, the utility 
calculation model is actually a decision-making structure that physically exists in our 
brain.34 This structure quantitatively encodes the relative desirabilities of all possible 
courses of action. Our brain then chooses among these courses of action according to 
the relative desirabilities. This mechanism is just like the rational decision-making 
process that we discussed before. Based on these empirical studies, neuroscientists 
argue that the utility calculation model is not merely an arbitrary assumption that a 
person could choose to accept or not, but rather an innate neurobiological structure of 
the brain each person is born with. This empirical study can also explain why the 
utility-function decision-making model is transcultural; it persists in many societies 
in various forms.35 
We also have a second reason to accept this conception of rationality. As Binmore 
argues, the conception of rationality does not specify what goals people must have. 
These rules simply require people to be consistent in pursuing their goals. 36 
Regardless of the goals of people, they will be hard pressed to deny that they have to 
pursue these goals consistently. Even though sometimes people might behave 
irrationally and fail to maximize their individual utility, it does not mean that 
rationality does not occupy a crucial role in their practical reason. Hence it is sensible 
                                                 
34
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to claim that, compared with other interpretations of practical reason, rationality is a 
general interpretation which is acceptable to most of the people.37 
These two reasons can also shed light on the question of why so many contractarians 
adopt the Hobbesian approach. The standard critique of contractarianism is that the 
relationship between the hypothetical contract theory and the real world is unclear. 
However, Hobbeisan contractarianism can avoid this problem for it is based on a 
weak conception of rationality borrowed from the theory of rational choice. It is a 
minimal assumption that does not invoke any controversial moral assumptions and 
assumes only that individuals are rational utility-maximizers. In fact, this is also the 
distinctive strength emphasized by Hobbesian contractarians. As Kavka points out, 
unlike philosophers who imagine human beings as too ‘good’, ‘Hobbesians…see a 
system of plausible moral and political hypotheses emerging from a realistic 
portrayal of human nature’.38 
By grounding their theory on a widely accepted assumption, Hobbesian 
contractarians believe that actual people will have no problem in identifying 
themselves as hypothetical contractors. The hypothetical contractors are rational 
persons who aim at maximizing utility effectively, but they are also familiar with the 
‘capacities, situations, and concerns’ of actual people, hence their decisions should 
also be able to promote the utility of actual people.39  The contract that they will 
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 Here the claim that rationality is generally acceptable merely means that people are bound by the 
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make is a mutually advantageous agreement which can bring benefits to actual 
people. The actual people, who also want to maximize their utilities rationally, will 
not find this agreement weird and will accept this agreement. Therefore, the 
Hobbesian contract is not an authoritarian scheme which imposes arbitrary 
restrictions on people by relying on an irrelevant contract story. Rather, the 
Hobbesian contract explains what political principles are rationally justified and 
actual people who are rational should comply with these political principles. 
4.3.2 Presupposing hedonism? 
However, some critics might argue that the conception of rationality is less 
acceptable than those rational choice theorists believe. The wide acceptance of this 
conception of rationality depends on its neutrality to all goals.  But critics could 
argue that there is actually a hedonistic goal behind the conception of rationality. The 
neutrality of this conception is merely an illusion for it presupposes a substantial, 
ultimate goal that all human beings should pursue: happiness. 40  Rationality 
presupposes that all preferences are commensurable. This implies that it must 
presuppose an ultimate preference above these preferences, and the weight of each 
reason is measured by how much it can contribute to the satisfaction of this 
preference. These critics then argue that the ultimate preference should be the 
maximization of happiness, which is measured by some subjectively identifiable 
psychological intensity.41  Hence how we should arrange the importance of other 
preferences depends on how much each preference can contribute to the amount of 
our happiness. Since the maximization of happiness, which is a particular 
psychological quality, is itself a substantial, distinctive conception of the good, 
critics argue that the conception of rationality is in fact not neutral. This conception 
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‘cannot after all be detached from its origins: it is a child of introspective 
psychology, grounded in the British empiricist theory of happiness or the good’.42 If 
the conception of rationality presupposes a hedonistic goal, then this conception 
might fail to be an impartial process with respect to all preferences. This casts doubt 
on how general the conception of rationality is.  
Nevertheless, this critique is actually based on a misunderstanding of the nature of 
utility. It wrongly assumes that utility represents a measurable quantity of happiness, 
thus utility-maximization should presuppose a goal of maximizing happiness. 
However, utility does not refer to any specific psychological quality. Rather, it is 
simply a measure of preferences which are ranked in accordance with principles of 
coherence, such as the principle of transitivity. In fact, as some rational choice 
theorists emphasize, the most crucial idea of utility maximization is coherency rather 
than happiness.43  Hobbesian contractarians do not assume that people rank their 
preferences according to how much these preferences contribute to their happiness. 
People can rank preferences according to other grounds, such as how much these 
preferences can contribute to the promotion of certain communal values. What 
ground people should choose is up to them, and the answer is not necessarily 
happiness. Hobbesian contractarians are concerned only about whether the 
preferences are ranked in a consistent order, regardless of whether these preferences 
contribute to their happiness. If a preference A has a higher utility to a person than a 
preference B, then it does not mean that A could bring this person more of particular 
kind of psychological experience than B could offer. Rather, it means that this person 
prefers A to B only, and it has nothing to say about the psychological state of this 
person. Even if A would undermine the happiness of a person, A still has a higher 
utility. 
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Therefore, maximizing utility neither presupposes a calculation of the quality of a 
certain kind of psychological experience, nor presupposes that all our actions serve 
an ultimate purpose of maximizing this psychological experience. It presupposes 
only that a person can have a consistent order of preferences. That is why Gauthier 
says, 
We have no reason to believe that preference has a unique, measurable object such as [quality 
of experience or enjoyment]. It seems clear that preferences cannot be correlated with any 
single dimension or characteristics of the state of affairs that they relate. Indeed, it seems clear 
that preferences do not depend solely on the qualities of experience.44 
4.3.3 Presupposing egoism? 
Critics can further answer this response by saying that, even if rationality does not 
presuppose that people have a hedonistic goal of pursuing their happiness, it still 
presupposes that people have an egoistic goal of pursuing their self-interest. The 
utility function only takes preferences which are related to a person’s self-interest 
into account. For example, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord objects that the assumption of 
Hobbesian contractarianism is counter-intuitive because human beings are not 
wholly self-interested. They have altruistic preferences which are not determined by 
selfish or narrowly self-interested desires.45 
Again, this critique is still based on a misunderstanding of the nature of utility. 
Rationality does not presuppose that people are egoistic. Since utility is only a 
neutral idea, it says nothing about whether preferences in a utility function are 
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necessarily related to a person’s self-interest. People can have an altruistic 
preference, that is, they prefer a state of affairs in which other people are benefited 
but their own self-interest is harmed. In this case, their utility can still be maximized 
after their altruistic preference is satisfied. Rational calculation does not exclude this 
kind of preference.46 Regardless of whether a person’s preferences are self-interested 
or altruistic, given that these preferences are ranked consistently, they are counted as 
legitimate preferences and should be taken into account.47 That is why Gauthier says 
that Hobbesian contractarianism does not presuppose a substantial egoistic 
conception of the person:  
Neither conception of rationality requires that practical reasons be self-interested. On the 
maximizing conception it is not interests in the self, that take oneself as object, but interests of 
the self, held by oneself as subject, that provide the basis for rational choice and action. On the 
universalistic conception it is not interests in anyone, that take any person as object, but 
interests of anyone, held by some person as subject, that provide the basis for rational choice 
and action.48 
4.3.4 Too unrealistic?  
Apart from the criticisms of presupposing hedonism and egoism, the conception of 
rationality could also be condemned as being unrealistic. Some critics may argue that 
the axioms that are taken to characterize rationality are matters of controversy 
because, from empirical experiments, actual people’s choices are always the reverse 
of what the model of rationality would predict. For example, the conception of 
rationality requires the order of preferences to be complete, which means that ‘for 
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any two possible outcomes in a choice situation, the chooser must either prefer one to 
the other or be indifferent between them…[The principle of completeness rules out 
preferentially non-comparable outcomes’.49 However, as some economists argue, if 
we take the principle of completeness seriously, then it is actually a very demanding 
principle.50 Both Herbert Simon and George Shackle argue that future situations and 
consequences are incalculable.51 The world is full of endogenous factors that lead to 
complexity and uncertainty. How can I be sure that my choice can lead to the 
predicated outcome? How can I be sure that my choice must be better than any other 
alternatives if I look back one day in the future? Due to the complexity and 
uncertainty, it is impossible for people to accurately predict the utility of each 
preference and compare among various preferences. Any real future is inherently and 
fundamentally unknowable. Hence, a complete order of preferences is in fact an 
unachievable task for actual people.   
Similarly, the principle of transitivity required by rationality is also vulnerable to a 
similar critique. Transitivity requires rational people not to rank their preferences as a 
cycle, that is, they cannot prefer A to B, prefer B to C, then prefer C to A, for ‘[s]uch 
cycle would divest choices of all rationality’.52 Rather, rational people should rank 
their preferences in a consistent order. For example, if they prefer A to B and B to C, 
then they should prefer A to C. This principle is also criticized as being too harsh 
because empirical experiments show that most of the people do not choose in this 
way. In a famous betting experiment conducted by Maurice Allais, Allais shows that 
people may make intransitive choices in different gambles.53 For example, in the 
Table 4, people may prefer A to B in one gamble because B is a large-stake small-
prize gamble. They may also prefer B to C in another gamble because C is a large-
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stake small-prize gamble. But if they have to choose between A and C in one gamble, 
then they may prefer C to A because now C looks like a small-stake large-prize 
gamble.54 Hence, the principle of transitivity is, like the principle of completeness, 
controversial because it is always inconsistent with the actions of actual people. 
Table 4 A version of Allais Paradox 
Probability 
Choice 
Probability 0.4 Probability 0.2 Probability 0.4 
A 6 6 6 
B 0 10 10 
C 0 0 15 
 
Although these two critiques are valid, they do not affect my claim because they are 
challenges to the predictive power of rationality, but not the challenges to the 
normative power of rationality. As a model of practical reasoning, the conception of 
rationality has two functions. One is to predict what actual people would do under 
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certain circumstances; another is to prescribe what actual people ought to do as a 
rational being. The critiques of Simon, Shackle and Allais correctly point out that the 
predictive power of the conception of rationality is dissatisfactory. However, what I 
would like to argue is that the normative requirements of the conception of 
rationality are generally accepted by actual people. People may act irrationally in 
their daily lives because of laziness, prejudices, wrong information or inadequate 
information. But when they were told a more rational suggestion, most of them 
would prefer this suggestion and would even think that they ought to accept this 
suggestion.  
For example, suppose that you have a holiday but you cannot decide whether you 
should go to Paris or Rome.  Then you know that there is a super computer which 
can accurately predict the outcomes of your choices. The computer tells you that you 
would have an unhappy time in Paris, thus it suggests that you should go to Rome 
instead. Given that the calculation of the super computer is reliable, I believe that 
most of the people would accept its suggestion. This shows that even if people are 
incapable of having a complete order of preferences in their daily lives, they would 
prefer having a complete order and being more rational. Few people would reject the 
normative requirement of being rational. Therefore, even though the conception of 
rationality fails to predict human behavior accurately, it does not affect the generality 
of Hobbesian contractarianism. The condition of generality is concerned with 
whether actual people would generally accept what the conception of rationality 
prescribes, but not whether actual people would act as what the conception of 
rationality predicts.  
In this section I illustrated the structure of Hobbesian contractarianism and how it 
satisfies the condition of generality. Hobbesian contractarians understand that the 
practical reason of human beings is governed by the conception of rationality. Based 
on this conception of practical reason, Hobbesian contractarians develop a theory to 
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show that rational contractors will agree on political principles which are mutually 
advantageous. This contractarian theory satisfies the condition of generality because 
actual people, similar to hypothetical contractors, generally accept the normative 
requirements of the conception of rationality. So the decisions of hypothetical 
contractors, which are made in accordance with these requirements, should also be 
justified to actual people. Some critics wrongly think that this instrumental 
conception of rationality is not neutral because it takes hedonism and egoism as the 
underlying assumptions. However, these critiques are merely based on a 
misunderstanding of the formal nature of utility. Since the rational calculation also 
includes non-egoistic and non-hedonistic preferences, accepting this conception of 
rationality does not imply endorsing hedonism or egoism. Also, although the 
conception of rationality sometime wrongly predicts the behaviours of actual people, 
the normative requirements of the conception of rationality are still generally 
accepted. Nevertheless, in the remainder of this chapter, I shall argue that, although 
Hobbesian contractarianism can satisfy the condition of generality, it fails to satisfy 
the condition of priority because it overlooks another aspect of practical reason.   
4.4 Reasonable rejectability of Hobbesian contractarianism  
In Chapter 2, I argued that a satisfactory hypothetical contract not only has to fulfill 
the condition of generality, but also has to fulfill the condition of priority. 
Contractarians have to show that the hypothetical contractors have already taken all 
the rules that govern practical reason into account, so that they can completely model 
the practical reasoning of actual people. Hobbesian contractarianism is an appealing 
approach of contractarianism because it can model the rational aspect of our practical 
reason. However, I shall argue that this approach is inadequate because it fails to 
model the reasonable aspect of practical reason. The consequence of failing to model 
reasonableness is that Hobbesian contractarianism is unjustified from the reasonable 
perspective.  
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4.4.1 The reasonable aspect of practical reason 
Practical reason has two aspects: rationality and reasonableness. Hobbesian 
contractarianism captures the former but overlooks the latter. The conception of 
reasonableness is a ‘testing’ model which has an absolute moral criterion: the 
constraint of justifiability. It uses this constraint to evaluate desires. If a desire 
motivates people to violate the constraint of justifiability, then no matter how 
important this desire may be, it will still be rejected. The constraint of justifiability is 
a constraint that requires people to behave in a way which can be justified to others. 
Reasonableness presupposes that people share an aim of living with others who are 
also reasonable.55 Because of this aim, people acknowledge that they have to respect 
the capacity for reason-giving of others. All people are capable of giving 
justifications to defend their actions, assessing justifications of others, and asking for 
justification from others. Hence reasonableness requires that people should respect 
the claims of others and should ensure that their actions are justifiable to others. If 
others then suggest a strong reason to reject their action, they should refrain. This 
respect is different from the respect required by rationality. For rationality merely 
requires people to respect others on condition that this behaviour could maximize 
their own utilities, whereas reasonableness requires people to respect others 
unconditionally, no matter how their utilities would be affected.  
I have briefly discussed how reasonableness is a generally accepted conception of 
practical reason in Section 3.3.2, and will further elaborate it in Section 5.2.4. Hence, 
apart from rationality, which simply motivates people to pursue interests rationally, 
people are also reasonable in as much as they generally have a motivation to behave 
in a way which could be justifiable to others. From a reasonable perspective, the 
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pursuit of interests is an irrelevant consideration. If some actions are prohibited by 
the constraint of justifiability, then people will still refrain from doing these actions 
even at the cost of their own interests. 
4.4.2 Why Hobbesian contractarianism is to be reasonably rejected? (1): the 
powerlessness critique 
The reasonable aspect of practical reason can explain why Hobbesian 
contractarianism is objectionable even though it is rationally justified. From the 
reasonable perspective, Hobbesian contractarianism violates the constraint of 
justifiability in two ways. First, it rules out the ‘powerless’, those people who cannot 
bring benefits to others during social cooperation: children, the severely 
handicapped. 56  This exclusion can be attributed to the assumption of mutual 
unconcern. This assumption does not mean that the contractors are wholly egoistic. 
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Rather, it means that, in most of the bargaining cases, the contractors are only 
concerned with maximizing their own utilities and are not interested in the utilities of 
people with whom they bargain. Thus they will cooperate only with people who can 
help them to improve their utility. Clearly this assumption is not wholly true, for, on 
some occasions, people are willing to help others at the cost of their own utility. But, 
Hobbesian contractarians doubt, how frequent are these occasions? In general, the 
dominant motivation is still the motivation to maximize one’s own utility: ‘The 
scope of altruistic motives that are strong enough to normally override self-interest is, 
for most people, small, that is, confined to concern for family, close friend, close 
associates…’57 Therefore, Hobbesian contractarians believe that the assumption of 
mutual unconcern is generally true. Another reason for ignoring altruistic 
motivations is because these motivations are only based on contingent, special 
affective relationships. Since Hobbesian contractarians aim at justifying universal 
obligation which is independent of any affective ties, these contingent motivations 
should not be taken into account.58 Hobbesian contractarians want to show that, even 
if we have no affective relationship to one another at all, we still owe to one another 
certain obligations. Therefore, ‘other-interested desires play no role whatsoever in 
[Hobbesian] justification or explanation of the formation of the state’.59 
However, if what I said about the generality of reasonableness is true, Hobbesian 
contractarians surely underestimate how common is the motivation to justify 
ourselves. In fact, people usually care about whether their behaviour could be 
justifiable to others, even to those to whom they have no special relationship. This 
can be shown from the psychological experiments discussed in Chapter 3. The 
psychological experiments show that many people generally refrain from being the 
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kind of person who takes justifiability to be insignificant.60 Hobbesian contractarians 
might argue that people in fact do not care so much about justifiability. For example, 
most of the people always ignore the fact of severe global inequality and keep on 
spending their money on entertainment rather than spending it to aid the poor. They 
know that it is unjustifiable, but they still go on doing so. However, according to 
these psychologists, this is only because people’s information is ‘distorted’ by the 
distant location of the victims. The motivation of being reasonable is always 
underestimated only because many people do not receive adequate information in 
their daily life.  If victims appear in an ‘up-close-and-personal’ manner, say, starving 
before you, then most people will then be concerned with justifiability. Hence, 
Hobbesian contractarians’ observations are incorrect provided that people are well-
informed of the effect of their behaviour. People are also concerned with 
reasonableness.  
From this we can see that the assumption of mutual unconcern is problematic. This 
assumption is based on a wrong observation that people generally do not care about 
one another. But the truth is, even if people are unknown to one another, they still 
care about whether or not their behaviours justifiable. Because of this wrong 
assumption, the scope of contract in Hobbesian contractarianism is objectionable to 
people. People naturally care about whether they behave as a moral person who is 
concerned with justifiability. This respect is unconditional, no matter how much 
bargaining power others have. Even though the powerless do not have bargaining 
power and would not bring benefit to others, they still have the capacity for reason-
assessing. They are still creatures who are able (or have the potential to be able) to 
ask for justification from others. Few powerful people would deny that justifiability 
to the powerless matters and bargaining power is everything. The powerful might 
still give other reasons to reject the claims of the powerless, but they would rarely 
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claim like Thucycdides in the Melian dislogue: ‘the strong do what they have the 
power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept’. Although the powerful 
do not have any reason to care about the powerless from the rational perspective, 
they have one from the reasonable perspective.  
In light of the importance of reasonableness, we can explain why the scope of a 
Hobbesian contract is intuitively problematic. In fact, some critics of Hobbesian 
contractarians have already pointed out that the exclusion of the powerless is a 
critical flaw of the theory. One such critic is Jean Hampton: 
Hobbesian moral theory gives us no reason to respect those with whom we have no need of 
cooperating, or those whom we are strong enough to dominate, such as old people, or the 
handicapped, or retarded children whom we do not want to rear, or people from other societies 
with whom we have no interest in trading…[But] regardless of whether or not one can engage 
in beneficial cooperative interactions with another, our moral intuitions push us to assent to the 
idea that one owes that person respectful treatment simply in virtue of the fact that he or she is 
a person. It seems to be a feature of our moral life that we regard a human being, whether or 
not she is instrumentally valuable, as always intrinsically valuable.61 
Moreover, Brian Barry criticizes this approach in a harsher way: 
[Hobbesian contractarianism] is by ordinary standards very impoverished. In particular, the 
‘congenitally handicapped and defective’ fall outside its protection….I do not believe that 
when we talk about enabling seriously handicapped people to lead productive lives we mean 
anything except enabling them to lead lives that are worthwhile to themselves. We are not 
suggesting that caring them can be made to show profit. That Gauthier thinks we must be 
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claiming this simply shows that he seriously believes other people to occupy his own morally 
pathological universe.62 
These critiques are persuasive, but they do not get to the underlying issues. They 
simply rely on moral intuitions but do not explain why these moral intuitions are so 
crucial. If the critiques stay at this level, then Hobbesian contractarians could easily 
dismiss them by doubting how far these intuitions are reliable: ‘If the reader is 
tempted to object to [Hobbesian contractarianism], on the ground that his intuitions 
are violated, then he should ask what weight such an objection can have…’ 63 
However, our discussion of reasonableness provides a concrete ground for these 
critiques. The fact that reasonableness is an aspect of practical reason can explain 
why people have strong intuitions to object to political principles that exclude the 
powerless. For, although those powerless people cannot contribute to the pursuit of 
people’s interest, they are still able to ask for justification. They are weightless from 
the rational perspective, but they have weight from a reasonable perspective. From 
the reasonable perspective, there is a strong reason to include the powerless into 
social cooperation. That is why people have a motivation to reject the Hobbesian 
contract, even at the cost of their interests. The source of this motivation is not 
merely a groundless, unreliable intuition, but rather an obligation that is justified by 
the reasonable aspect of practical reason.  
4.4.3 Why Hobbesian contractarianism is to be reasonably rejected? (2): the 
inadequacy of the Lockean proviso 
Apart from the problem with the scope of contract, another reason why Hobbesian 
contractarianism is reasonably objectionable is that, even if people are included in 
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the contract, they can still be unjustifiably treated. Gauthier might disagree with this 
point by arguing that he also recognizes the importance of reasonableness and the 
Lockean proviso in his theory represents the constraint of justifiability in 
reasonableness. Under the regulation of the Lockean proviso, no one in the initial 
bargaining situation is unjustifiably treated. So I will now discuss whether the 
Lockean proviso can prevent people from being unjustifiably treated. In Gauthier’s 
contract, predation and parasitism are prohibited in the initial bargaining position, for 
the Lockean proviso acts as a minimum moral baseline and distinguishes the initial 
bargaining position from the mutually predatory natural situation. It says that one 
person should not appropriate some goods if this appropriation ‘betters one’s 
situation through interaction that worsens the situation of another’. 64 Whether a 
person is better-off or worse-off by the action of another depends on comparing the 
current situation with the situation in which the other was absent. I am made worse-
off by your acquisition if my utility could be higher in your absence. For example, 
suppose that there is a strong person who does not produce anything but only waits 
for a weak person to produce and then seizes these goods. This weak person is then 
made worse off because of the acquisition and hence his rights are infringed by the 
strong person. Based on this proviso, the rights of people are defined. The bargains, 
which are based on these rights, are not tainted by predation and parasitism. What 
goods a person can legitimately own depends on how much they can acquire as long 
as the Lockean proviso is not violated. This proviso is controversial for it seems that 
rational utility-maximizers have no reason to accept this proviso if their utility could 
be maximized through predation and parasitism.65 However, whether it is rational to 
accept the Lockean proviso is not my concern. What I want to discuss is how 
Gauthier might argue that his contract theory in fact does not ignore justifiability and 
the Lockean proviso is the evidence.  
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I doubt that the Lockean proviso can perform the function of the constraint of 
justifiability. For example, something can be clearly unjustified to others but not 
violate the Lockean proviso. Imagine that there is a rare but highly valuable resource 
in the world and I am the only one who knows how to exploit this resource. I then 
appropriate it, and exploit it. Since this resource is highly valuable, I become very 
rich by selling it. But my appropriation does not violate the Lockean proviso because 
if I were absent, no one would have had the skill to exploit it and the resource would 
be left alone. Since no one would be better-off if I were absent, my appropriation 
does not make anyone worse off. Even if a great gap of wealth between myself and 
others is created because of my appropriation, this is still permissible by the Lockean 
proviso. However, this is clearly unjustifiable from the reasonable perspective. Again, 
the constraint of justifiability requires people to test their behaviour by imagining 
what a person who is concerned with justifiability would do. Imagine that I was a 
person who doesn’t possess the skills to exploit this resource. I would become 
relatively poor because the resource is monopolized by people who have the skills to 
exploit it. Compared with the rich class, I would have a much lower social status and 
a relatively poor life. Many people find this situation hardly acceptable because of its 
serious unfairness. The bargaining powers would be radically unequal to the extent 
that it is difficult to call it a fair distribution. Due to this unfairness, this situation is 
unjustifiable to many people even though, according to the Lockean proviso, no one 
was made worse off. From this example we can see how the Lockean proviso fails to 
rule out behaviours that violate the constraint of justifiability.66 
There are also behaviours that are clearly justifiable, but the Lockean proviso 
prohibits them. For example, imagine that there are two fishermen, A and B. Both 
are working in the same sea area. Given that fisherman A is more talented and 
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hardworking, they do better and the poor fisherman B does badly. This result 
frustrates fisherman B. Fisherman B is an envious person and would prefer to be the 
best fisherman in this sea zone. But A is a contented person who is insensitive to this 
kind of comparison. Now it appears that the productive activities of fisherman A 
violate the Lockean proviso. For fisherman B would have a higher utility in the 
absence of fisherman A. If fisherman A were absent, fisherman B’s preference to 
become the best fisherman in this sea zone could be satisfied and hence his utility 
could increase. So fisherman B can claim that fisherman A’s use of power and ability 
betters A’s position and worsens B’s position. However, it seems absurd to say that 
fisherman A is not justified in using his abilities. Provided that the result of 
distribution is not radically unequal, there is no problem for A to exercise his talents 
and become the best fisherman, even though the preference of B will be 
compromised. B’s objection is unjustifiable because even if people were put into the 
shoes of B, many of them would still think A’s use of abilities is allowable. From 
this example we can see how Lockean proviso sometimes rules out behaviours that 
are permitted by the constraint of justifiability.  
These counterexamples show that behaviours prohibited by the Lockean proviso are 
significantly different from behaviours prohibited by the constraint of justifiability. 
One could hardly claim that these two circles are the same. In fact, the Lockean 
proviso is mainly concerned with the comparison of utility between individuals. No 
matter what the preferences are and what has occurred, once a person’s utility 
decreases because of the increase of another person’s utility, this person is made 
worse off. However, the constraint of justifiability is concerned with something 
different from this. It prohibits some actions, independent of what the effect of these 
actions on others’ utility would be. These actions are prohibited simply because 
people generally think that it would be unacceptable if they were treated by these 
actions. They are unjustifiable to people, but these actions do not necessarily violate 
the Lockean proviso. For example, the constraint of justifiability is concerned with 
fairness; it requires the distribution of goods to be fair to all people. The meaning of 
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fairness cannot be exhausted by comparison between utilities. For sometimes even if 
people are not made worse off, they can still be unfairly treated in a way that would 
be unacceptable to anyone who was in their position, as the rare resource example 
illustrates. As David Copp argues, ‘the proviso would permit a rich man to keep his 
goods, while an unlucky woman starves on his doorstep’.67 Hence we can see the 
Lockean proviso is inadequate from the perspective of reasonableness. The 
bargaining outcome which is based on the Lockean proviso can still violate the 
constraint of justifiability.  
Therefore we can see that Hobbesian contractarianism is reasonably objectionable in 
two ways. First, it fails to include the ‘powerless’ in social cooperation. Secondly, 
even within the scope of contract, it fails to prohibit behaviours which are generally 
unjustifiable (and sometimes it prohibits behaviours which are generally justifiable). 
In these two respects, Hobbesian contractarianism violates the constraint of 
justifiability. Even though the interests of people are rationally advanced in the 
mutually beneficial agreement, reasonableness would still motivate people to object 
to it. 
This explains why Hobbesian contractarianism can satisfy the condition of generality 
only, but fails to satisfy the condition of priority. Since reasonableness is one of the 
aspects of practical reason, it also has the normative authority to justify or reject 
obligations, just as rationality does. Ignoring it is a false step of Hobbesian 
contractarianism. The result is that, even though people will accept Hobbesian 
contractarianism because of rationality, this is not enough to secure the allegiance of 
people. The conception of rationality justifies the obligation to follow Hobbesian 
contractarianism, whereas the conception of reasonableness justifies the obligation to 
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reject Hobbesian contractarianism. Since both of these obligations have the same 
strong normative force, this implies that, on the one hand, people have a strong 
reason to agree with political principles and, on the other hand, people have the same 
strong reason to disagree with the same political principles. They have no overriding 
reason for adhering to political principles. Reasonableness will become a source of 
strong motivation to go against Hobbesian contractarianism.  
4.5 Can reasonableness be reduced to a preference? 
The objection in the last section explains why people generally have motivations that 
are contrary to Hobbesian contractarianism, and thus explains why it fails to fulfill 
the condition of priority. Gauthier might respond that this objection is based on a 
misunderstanding of the nature of utility. In fact, utility has a formal definition 
whereby it can include any preferences, including reasonableness, which can be 
taken as a ‘preference to be reasonable’. Thus reasonableness has been taken into 
account in the utility of an individual. If those people who care about justifiability 
can understand that their preferences have been satisfied in the optimal outcome 
already, then they should understand that they are not justified in rejecting the 
Hobbesian agreement because of justifiability, because their utilities have been 
maximized subject to the maximization of the individual utilities of others.  However, 
I doubt whether this response works. First, reasonableness has distinctive features 
which are significantly different from the preferences which are taken into account in 
the rational calculation of utility. Secondly, if Gauthier insists that following the 
constraint of justifiability is only a preference in utility function, then the definitions 
of preference and utility will be broadened to the extent that they go against our 
ordinary understanding.  
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4.5.1 The reductionist argument 
The reductionist argument is one of the most commonly used arguments when 
Hobbesian contractarians, like Gauthier, respond to the critiques that they overlook 
the moral sentiments of human beings.68 Gauthier argues that these critiques are 
based on a narrow understanding of individual utility. Although Gauthier assumes 
that people basically want to maximize their utilities, it does not mean that people are 
egoistic and care for nothing but their self-interest. In fact, utility represents only the 
preferences of a person which are satisfied, and the idea of preference is neutral. That 
people have a preference means only that they want to attain a particular state of 
affairs, and this state of affairs is not necessarily a state of affairs in which their self-
interest must be satisfied or well-being promoted. Therefore, when Gauthier assumes 
that human beings generally want to maximize their utilities, it does not mean that 
human beings care only about pursuing their self-interest. Other non-egoistic, 
altruistic preferences are also included in individual utility functions. ‘If I have a 
direct interest in your welfare, then…I have reason to promote your welfare’.69 
Therefore, Gauthier objects to the egoistic interpretation of Hobbesian 
contractarianism: 
[The idea of pursuing individual interests] is unfortunately misleading insofar as it suggests 
that morality merely constrains egoism; I want to defend morality as a rational constraint on 
the pursuit of one’s aims or objectives, whether or not these objectives have any connection 
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with one’s interest, or one’s personal well-being…the formal aim of the rational individual is 
the maximum realization of her substantive aims.70 
Hobbesian contractarians might then acknowledge that being reasonable is a general 
aspect of the behaviour of people. However, this motivation should not be 
understood as anything more than a preference which has been taken into account in 
the rational deliberation. That is to say, people prefer attaining a state of affairs in 
which they stand in a relationship to one another which is justifiable, and when they 
attain this state of affairs, their utilities increase. This preference is no different from 
any other preference that a person possesses, such as the preference to achieve 
success in business or the preference to have a happy family. Gauthier could argue 
that this is a better way to understand the conception of reasonableness as a 
preference which is subject to the conception of rationality, rather than to understand 
it as independent from rationality.  
In this interpretation, reasonableness has been taken into account when people 
bargain with each other in order to maximize their individual utility. People who 
prefer attaining a state of affairs in which all people behave justifiably to one another 
will bargain with those people who do not share this preference. After a long 
bargaining process, they will reach an optimal agreement that the preferences of 
these two parties are maximized in a mutually compatible way. This agreement will 
be the ‘principle of minimax relative concession’, which means that everyone can 
minimize the maximum relative concession that they would have to make in order to 
live with one another. This is a rational solution for everyone because everyone’s 
concession can be minimized. Adopting any alternatives represents that someone has 
to take unnecessary burden and cannot maximize his individual utility. Those people 
who have a preference to be reasonable should be satisfied with the optimal 
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agreement and not seek to attain a more ‘reasonable’ state of affairs. For breaking the 
Hobbesian agreement would only make everyone worse-off, including those who 
prefer attaining a more ‘reasonable’ state of affairs. Therefore, if those people are 
rational, they should be satisfied with Hobbesian agreement. By adopting the 
reductionist argument, Gauthier could avoid the critique that he overlooks the 
independent moral motivations of human beings by emphasizing the neutrality of 
their assumptions.  
4.5.2 The other-regarding feature of reasonableness  
I shall argue that this reductionist argument is unsound because it goes against some 
fundamental intuitions. First, this argument ignores the distinctiveness of 
reasonableness. Secondly, this argument relies on a definition of utility that is too 
broad, if not meaningless. My first objection relies on an observation that 
reasonableness is clearly different from those preferences which are included in the 
rational calculation. In general, those preferences are self-regarding, but 
reasonableness requires people to be other-regarding. They have different natures 
and the feelings that they arouse are also different. According to Gauthier, although 
preferences are not only limited to self-interest that are ‘interests in the self, that take 
oneself as object’, they must be ‘interests of the self, held by oneself as subject’.71 
That is to say, these preferences must be self-regarding. They are necessarily related 
to myself and are not necessarily related to others. When I have a preference, it must 
mean that I prefer a particular state of affairs, but does not necessarily mean that 
others prefer this state of affairs as well. However, reasonable behaviour works the 
other way around: it is by nature, other-regarding. It is necessarily related to others 
and is not necessarily related to myself. When I want to be reasonable, what matters 
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is that others prefer a particular state of affairs and I, due to the constraint of 
justifiability, should support their preference, even if I do not prefer this state of 
affairs. People rarely feel that they have to be reasonable only when being reasonable 
is related to their preferences. Rather, they would think that they have such a 
commitment, no matter what their preferences are. Here we can see the difference 
between reasonableness and those preferences which constitute individual utility.  
The difference between these preferences is more explicit in the cases where the 
satisfactions of these preferences are upset. When those self-regarding preferences 
are upset, a sense of disappointment will appear. One will feel angry and 
disappointed as long as there is a failure to attain certain states of affairs that one 
desires. For example, when an athlete takes part in racing and, unfortunately, loses, 
he will feel disappointed as his dream of becoming the champion breaks down. 
Anger and disappointment emerge only when self-regarding preferences are upset. 
However, when one ignores the importance of reasonableness, that is, when one 
recognizes that one violates the constraint of justifiability, what will appear is not 
anger and disappointment. Rather, what will appear is guilt and remorse. For 
example, when people find that they behaved in a way which could not be justifiable 
to others, they face blame from others and want to do something to compensate for 
their wrongdoing; what pushes them to compensate should be a sense of guilt and 
remorse. The feelings of guilt and remorse are distinctively different from the feeling 
of anger and disappointment. When one feels guilty or disappointed, these feelings 
are rarely relevant to any preferences for a state of affairs.  
Therefore, the sense of guilt should be related to something which has a completely 
different nature from that of the self-regarding preferences. I believe that the 
difference between guilt/remorse and disappointment/anger shows that these feelings 
come from different sources. Disappointment and anger come from self-regarding 
preferences, which constitute individual utility. Guilt and remorse come from the 
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other-regarding norm of reasonableness. These two categories of feelings are 
independent of each other and cannot be reduced to each other. This is why the 
reductionist argument fails—because it overlooks the feature of other-regardingness. 
Reasonableness creates a distinctive kind of motivation and one should not be seen 
as looking for the satisfaction of preferences when one wants to be reasonable. 
4.5.3 The cost of broadening the definition of individual utility 
Gauthier might avoid this objection by widening the scope of individual utility. He 
could say that the word ‘preference’ should not be understood literally.   A 
preference does not really mean that a person ‘prefers’ a state of affairs. It means that 
a person wants to attain this state of affairs, whether or not this state of affair would 
benefit them. As long as a person intends to attain this state of affairs (no matter what 
the reason is), this intention is taken as a preference and included in the utility 
function. So the preferences which constitute individual utility are not only self-
regarding motivations, but also include other-regarding motivations. Gauthier might 
remind us that, in the theory of rational choice, the most crucial things are whether a 
preference is considered and whether a preference is coherent with other 
preferences.72 Whether this preference is self-regarding or other-regarding is much 
less important. Insofar as an other-regarding preference is considered and coherent, it 
can be taken into account.  
In this most formal interpretation, reasonableness can be reduced to a preference and 
be included into the utility function. However, the cost of this formal interpretation is 
also enormous, for this interpretation goes against what we usually conceive about 
ideas of preference and utility. Normally when we say that our utilities increase, or 
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our preferences are satisfied, it usually implies that we become better-off. However, 
we rarely have this feeling when we push ourselves to act in a way which could be 
justified to others. When we force ourselves to comply with the constraint of 
justifiability, we usually do not feel that any of our preferences are satisfied. On the 
contrary, we feel that we become worse-off, not better-off, and our utilities decrease, 
not increase. We can imagine that, when we save the person whose leg is bleeding in 
the countryside by driving him to the hospital, we do not expect to become better-off 
after we help this person. Instead, we clearly understand that we are losing something 
when we are doing so. For example, the leather upholstery of our car may be 
damaged; our journey will be interrupted, and so on. However, we still help the 
injured person. We help them not because we will become better-off after helping the 
injured, rather; we help simply to avoid unjustifiability, even if this implies that we 
have to suffer a loss in individual utility. 73  We do not think that anything is 
maximized after we perform this reasonable behaviour. The broad definition of 
individual utility requires us to think that we are in fact better-off in certain cases, no 
matter what we really think. 
Yet Gauthier might simply bite the bullet and deny that we should take our ordinary 
understanding of preference and utility for granted. He may cut off the connection 
between preference and being better-off, and deny that the satisfaction of preferences 
necessarily implies becoming better-off. Again, a preference means only that a 
person wants to attain a state of affairs, and this state of affairs is not necessarily a 
state in which they are better-off. They can intend to attain a state of affairs in which 
they become worse-off. Nevertheless, even though the definition of preference is 
loosened to this extent, it is still perhaps odd to reduce reasonableness into a 
preference, for this will distort the very idea of reasonable behaviour. No matter how 
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Gauthier broadens the definition of preference, he still has to acknowledge that a 
preference is consequence-oriented—‘preference relates states of affair’. 74  The 
object of a preference must be a state of affairs. This is the fundamental feature of 
preference in the theory of rational choice, yet this consequence-oriented feature is 
absent in reasonable behaviour. Rather, people usually act reasonably regardless of 
the consequences. For example, when people refrain from stealing something, they 
are not aiming at attaining a state of affairs in which they do not steal anything. This 
is a strange way to describe their thinking. Rather, their thought should be that ‘no 
matter what the state of affairs I would be in, I still would not steal’. Considerations 
about the state of affairs seem to be irrelevant when a person chooses to adhere to the 
constraint of justifiability.  
Gauthier might further respond that reasonableness can still be represented by a 
‘preference for a state of affairs in which I follow the constraint of justifiability’. But 
here the words ‘state of affairs’ are merely redundant, for what ultimately matters is 
the constraint of justifiability, not the state of affairs that I follow the constraint of 
justifiability. Again, it seems hard to deny that reasonableness is significantly 
different from the preferences that are included in the rational calculation: the latter 
takes states of affairs as objects, while the former does not.  
Therefore, the reductionist argument fails to rescue Hobbesian contractarianism 
because it cannot capture the distinctive features of reasonableness. Reasonableness 
cannot be reduced to a preference in the rational calculation because of its other-
regarding feature. Hobbesian contractarians could further loosen the definition of 
preference in order to include other-regarding preferences, but the cost of this will be 
to go against our ordinary usage of preference and utility. The failure of the 
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reductionist argument shows that reasonableness has an independent status in our 
practical reasoning. It cannot be reduced to any preferences, thus it is ignored by 
Hobbesian contractarians who are concerned only with justifying a mutually 
beneficial agreement. But reasonableness is also fundamental since it is also a 
conception which governs practical reasoning. Hence, the existence of 
reasonableness as an aspect of practical reason causes problems for Hobbesian 
contractarianism, for even if people benefit by a Hobbesian agreement, they might 
still refuse to support this agreement because of the unjustifiability of this agreement.  
4.6 Conclusion 
Hobbesian contractarianism is undoubtedly one of the most commonly adopted 
approaches of contractarianism in contemporary political philosophy. This can be 
attributed to two virtues of the approach. First, this approach can capture some 
genuine and fundamental features of our daily decision-making and hence it can 
fulfill the condition of generality. People usually intend to pursue their interests 
rationally. If certain obligations which are imposed on a person are in their rational 
interest, then even if they have not consented to them, we can still predict that they 
would probably consent if they were asked. That is why readers rarely think that the 
Hobbesian hypothetical contract is a pointless story. Secondly, this contractarian 
approach can make use of game theory to develop clear conclusions. Hobbesian 
contractarians exploits the strength of the theory of rational choice to facilitate a deep 
and systematic analysis of interaction among rational individuals.75 As Jody Kraus 
notes, ‘their detailed and sustained analysis of interaction in Hobbesian hypothetical 
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settings is indeed impressive’. 76  This level of clarity is rarely seen in other 
contractarian theories. For example, Kantian contractarianism is notorious for its 
ambiguity because it fails to derive a definite conclusion which would be achieved in 
its initial choice situation.77  Compared with Kantian contractarianism, either the 
conclusion or the inference process of Hobbesian contractarianism is highly clear, 
since it borrows force from the rigorous mathematical models. These two features of 
Hobbesian contractarianism can explain why so many contractarians are impressed 
by this approach.  
Nevertheless, these merits are achieved at the cost of simplifying the complex 
structure of practical reason. Due to this simplification, Hobbesian contractarianism 
fails to fulfill the condition of priority. Since Hobbesian contractarians want to 
exploit the strength of game theory, they have to adopt the assumption that human 
beings are by nature rational utility-maximizers and regard the other features of 
human beings as irrelevant or reducible. This assumption is not wholly wrong, for 
rationality is generally acceptable to actual people. However, this assumption is not 
wholly correct, for people are not only rational. Apart from rationality, 
reasonableness is also another aspect of practical reason. Since the Hobbesian 
agreement is unjustified from a reasonable perspective, reasonableness becomes a 
source of strong motivation to push people to be ‘unjust’, and Hobbesian 
contractarianism fails to explain how their hypothetical contract can account for this 
motivation. Therefore, the normativity of Hobbesian contractarianism is 
unsatisfactory, because people will not take Hobbesian agreement as having the 
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highest priority. As Albert Weale observes, the strength of Hobbesian 
contractarianism is its instrumental conception of rationality, but at the same time, it 
is the flaw of this theory as well, and this flaw indicates that ‘the contractarian 
enterprise’ calls for a more comprehensive view of practical reason.78 
In fact, most of the critics of Hobbesian contractarianism focus too much on the 
incoherence within the theory, and place too little importance on its flawed 
psychological assumptions. 79  When theorists discuss the problem of Hobbesian 
contractarianism, they concentrate on the irrationality of constrained maximization. 
Gauthier proposes that a rational utility-maximzer should be a constrained maximizer, 
which complies with the contract unconditionally. Most of the critics are unsatisfied 
with this point and argue that a rational utility-maximizer should instead obey the 
mutually beneficial agreement conditionally. They have no reason not to break the 
rules if this will not be discovered by others. Hence, the most rational choice is to be 
a careful rule-breaker, rather than be a rule-follower. Surely this is a serious problem 
of Hobbesian contractarianism, yet I fear these critics accept the assumptions of 
Hobbesian contractarianism too easily. At least they have not examined these 
assumptions carefully enough. Only some argue that Hobbesian contractarianism 
goes against our ordinary moral intuition, but they do not discuss it in depth but 
merely take it as showing that Hobbesian contractarianism is counter-intuitive.80 Yet 
this kind of critique does not have much power because one of the fundamental 
beliefs of Hobbesian contractarians is that fragmented moral intuition is contingent 
and unreliable, so morality needs to be based on a general foundation.81 However, in 
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this chapter, I showed the real strength of this critique. The intuition is not, as some 
Hobbesian contractarians think, ‘tentative and controversial’82 but rather has its roots 
within an aspect of practical reason, which pushes people to follow the constraint of 
justifiability. This aspect of practical reason is not any less important than rationality. 
In the next chapter, we will see another approach of contractarianism which is based 
on that aspect of practical reason and develops another completely different model of 
contractarianism.  
Finally, I would like to end this chapter with a story. When I was writing this chapter, 
I went to a conference which was for the 25th Anniversary of the publication of 
Morals by Agreement. At the end, the author, David Gauthier, gave the closing 
speech. Since he has retired and this conference was likely to be his last academic 
activity, the speech can be seen as his final conclusion on the project that he has 
pursued his whole life. In the speech, he proposed that it is misleading to assume that 
hypothetical contractors are rational utility-maximizers. Rather, contractors should 
be assumed to be rational utility-optimizers, which mean that they are concerned with 
maximizing their utilities on condition that this would be acceptable to others. 
Maximization is only one of the considerations contractors care about.  Contractors 
also care about whether their acts could be justifiable to others, which is exactly 
something that reasonableness emphasizes. This change is ironic, for it seems that 
the most representative Hobbesian contractarian now also recognizes the inadequacy 
of the instrumental conception of rationality and the importance of justifiability.83 
Rational interest is crucial, yet it is not the only important issue.  
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Chapter 5 Kantian Contractarianism: Scanlon and Barry 
5.1 Introduction 
In her famous article ‘Moral Beliefs’ Philippa Foot mentions a debate between 
Socrates and Thrasymachus in the Republic.1 Thrasymachus raised a provocative 
question: ‘Why should I be just?’ He argued that being just is in fact not something 
which should be taken for granted. He began with a premise that, in certain 
circumstances, injustice was more profitable than justice. This premise ended with a 
conclusion that a person with strength to get away with injustice has reason to follow 
this as the best way of life. This argument is provocative because it is an argument 
which justifies injustice and, according to Foot, every moral and political philosopher 
should ask how they can respond to this argument. Interestingly, Hobbesian and 
Kantian contractarians give opposite answers to this question. In order to refute this 
argument, Hobbesian contractarians choose to reject the premise. They deny that 
injustice is more profitable than justice; therefore rational people should behave 
justly for the sake of maximizing their individual utility.  
In contrast with Hobbesian contractarianism, Kantian contractarianism, which is the 
focus of this chapter, accepts the premise of Thrasymaschus, but rejects his 
conclusion. According to Kantian contractarian, the conception of reasonableness, 
but not the conception of rationality, is the dominant aspect in practical reason. That 
is to say, even if violating political principles could serve a person’s utility better 
than adhering to them, a just or moral person would still comply with them because 
of reasonableness. Based on this different assumption, Kantian contractarians 
develop their contract model in a way different from that of Hobbesian 
contractarians. As Scanlon says, 
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‘Contract’ and its cognates seem to many people to suggest a process of self-interested 
bargaining that is foreign to my account. What distinguishes my view from other accounts 
involving ideas of agreement is its conception of the motivational basis of this agreement. The 
parties whose agreement is in question are assumed not merely to be seeking some kind of 
advantage but also to be moved by the aim of finding principles that others, similarly 
motivated, could not reasonably reject.2 
This strand of contractarianism, which is represented by T. M. Scanlon and Brian 
Barry, is called Kantian contractarianism because these thinkers are highly indebted 
to the ideas of Kant (and sometimes Rousseau). As Scanlon acknowledges: 
The idea of a shared willingness to modify our private demands in order to find a basis of 
justification that others also have reason to accept is a central element in the social contract 
tradition going back to Rousseau. One of the main reasons for calling my view ‘contractualist’ 
is to emphasize its connection with this tradition.3 
The similarity between Kant and Kantian contractarianism can be seen in their 
shared emphasis on the idea of justifiability. The constraint of justifiability, which is 
the absolute criterion in the conception of reasonableness, is very similar to the 
categorical imperative in Kant’s ethical theory. To Kant, when we act in a certain 
way, we commit ourselves to certain ‘maxims’, which means that our will is placed 
to under a subjective volitional principle.4 We then have to ask ourselves whether we 
can will this maxim to be a universal law, in order to see whether it could be publicly 
justifiable. That is to say, we have to ask whether or not a world in which everyone 
could act on, is possible. If such a world is possible, then my maxim is publicly 
justified and we would justifiably act on it. This kind of maxim is called the 
categorical imperative. The categorical imperative test undoubtedly affects Scanlon. 
He also admits that his idea of reasonable rejectability ‘does have an obvious 
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similarity to Kant’s Categorical Imperative’.5  To Scanlon, asking whether an act 
would be allowed by principles that no one could reasonably reject, is highly similar 
to asking whether an act could pass through the categorical imperative test.6 Based 
on this shared concern with justifiability, Scanlon aligns himself with Kant and 
believes that he inherits from Kant a distinctive model of social contract—a 
hypothetical contract that is governed, not by mutual advantage and self-interest, but 
by mutual respect among free and equal persons.  
Like Hobbesian contractarianism, the brand of Kantian contractarianism is also 
disputable. Some critics argue that it overlooks Kant’s ‘two worlds’ distinction.7 
Kant is famous for arguing that there are two realms: the realm of nature and the 
realm of freedom. While people are not free in the former realm for they are subject 
to the laws of causality, these people, as rational beings, are free in the latter realm 
for they can stand in a noumenal standpoint and determine the actions of their 
phenomenal selves. The emphasis on transcendental freedom is one of the most 
distinctive features of Kant’s ethical theory, yet this idea of freedom is generally 
avoided by Kantian contractarians.  They usually try to discard the ‘transcendental’ 
characteristics of Kant’s theory.8  Hence, some people might argue that ‘Kantian 
contractarianism’ is the wrong label since there are too few ideas shared among Kant 
and Kantian contractarians. Again, I will not go into this question in this chapter for 
my interest is in the normative force of Kantian contractarianism, rather than the 
relationship between Kant and Kantian contractarianism. Also, despite its 
controversy, this label has already been widely used in the relevant literatures.9 I will 
focus in this chapter on discussing theories of Kantian contractarians, such as 
Scanlon and Barry—regardless of what their arguable connection with Kant may be.  
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5.1.1 A brief comparison between Scanlon and Barry 
At first glance, if the object of our discussion is the justification of political 
principles, it seems that Barry’s contract theory should be the major subject of our 
analysis, for Barry defines his project as ‘a theory about the kinds of social 
arrangement that can be defended’,10  while Scanlon is more concerned about ‘a 
narrow domain of morality having to do with our duties to other people’.11 Simply 
speaking, Barry is more ‘political’ while Scanlon is more ‘moral’. 
However, it does not mean that Scanlon should be excluded in the discussion of 
Kantian contractarianism. On the contrary, Scanlon’s theory is a valuable resource 
which can help us to understand the conception of reasonableness and why this 
conception should have the highest priority. First, compared with Barry, Scanlon 
provides a more detailed account of the conception of reasonableness. Barry’s 
contractarian theory can be conceived as an elaboration of the earlier Scanlon’s 
approach. As Barry himself admits, ‘I cannot therefore see any alternative to 
returning to the idea of reasonable agreement itself and trying to elaborate it’.12 
When Barry’s Justice as Impartiality was published in 1995, the conception of 
reasonableness came mainly from the account provided by Scanlon’s famous 1982 
article ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’. However, this account of the conception 
of reasonableness is unclear and inadequate since, to Scanlon, his article is ‘only an 
outline’ and ‘much more needs to be said to clarify its central notions’.13 Scanlon 
does not give very much content to the conception of reasonableness and the word 
‘reasonable’ is mostly used in a literal way. It was not until 1998, when What We 
Owe to Each Other was published, that the idea of reasonableness was explained in a 
more precise and philosophical way. Hence, Barry’s contractarian theory suffers 
from the problem of vagueness because its account of the conception of 
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reasonableness is merely a ‘primitive’ account that comes from Scanlon’s earlier 
writings.  
Secondly, although the word ‘justice’ and ‘social institution’ rarely appear in What 
We Owe to Each Other, this does not mean that the question of what social 
institutions are justified to people falls outside Scanlon’s concern. In a paragraph 
devoted to taxonomizing these matters, Scanlon says that, while he is not discussing 
morality in the broadest sense, but only a part of it; that part, what we owe to each 
other, is ‘broader than justice, which has to do particularly with social institution’.14 
This implies that justice and social institutions do fall within his remit. Also, Scanlon 
believes that his contract theory can provide concrete ground for various social and 
political rights.  
Claims about rights, like other claims about what we owe to each other, are claims about the 
constraints on individual action, and on social institutions, that people can reasonably insist on. 
In order to decide what rights people have, we need to consider both the costs of being 
constrained in certain ways and what things would be like in the absence of such constraints, 
and we need to ask what objections people could reasonably raise on either of these grounds.15  
This reveals the ‘political’ dimension of Scanlon’s contract theory. Like moral 
principles, political principles can justify coercing people, but this depends on 
whether these principles represent agreements that no one could reasonably reject.16  
Therefore, in this chapter, I will take Scanlon’s contract theory to be the main 
representative of Kantian contractarianism, and treat Barry’s contract theory as a 
supplementary example. This chapter falls into three parts. The first part presents a 
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brief sketch of Kantian contractarianism and explains why it satisfies the condition of 
generality. In the second part I argue that, since Kantian contractarianism 
underestimates the importance of rationality, it fails to fulfil the condition of priority. 
Unlike Hobbesian contractarianism, which tends to reduce reasonableness to a 
preference, Kantian contractarianism acknowledges that rationality has an 
independent status, but it is always subject to the authority of reasonableness. 
However, rationality is actually a conception of practical reason that has the same 
importance as reasonableness, so it is unrealistic to assume that the latter can always 
override the former. I then examine different defences of the priority of 
reasonableness which are provided by Kantian contractarians, three from Scanlon 
and one from Barry. I finally conclude that, insofar as all of these defences fail, 
Kantian contractarianism cannot avoid failing to fulfil the condition of priority.  
5.2 Kantian contractarianism: an elaboration 
In the last chapter, we saw how Hobbesian contractarians develop a contractarian 
theory from the assumption of rationality. Unlike Hobbesian contractarianism, 
Kantian contractarianism relies on an assumption that the most primary aspect of 
practical reason is reasonableness, not rationality. This section will discuss what kind 
of contractarian theory can be developed on the basis of this assumption.  
5.2.1 Characteristics of hypothetical contractors 
While rationality is a formal process that simply requires people to satisfy their self-
regarding preferences effectively, reasonableness is a formal process that 
presupposes an other-regarding aim of ‘living with others who are also 
reasonable’. 17  Kantian contractarians believe that reasonableness constitutes the 
structure of practical reason of actual people and defines what actual people ought to 
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do. Based on this conception of practical reason, justified political principles should 
be principles which could be reasonably justified. These principles can be specified 
by a hypothetical agreement that would be made by contractors who were wholly 
reasonable. 18  In general, the characteristics of hypothetical contractors can be 
described under three aspects: their motivation, their qualification, and their 
knowledge. 
The motivation of contractor 
The account of the motivation of contractors is based on a Kantian understanding of 
human nature. By contrast with Gauthier, who assumes that hypothetical contractors 
are merely ‘animals with preferences’, Scanlon assumes that hypothetical contractors 
have the capacity for ‘legislating’, that is, they could control their desires within a 
limit that could be justifiable to others.19 According to Scanlon, a human being is ‘a 
reasoning creature—one that has the capacity to recognize, assess, and be moved by 
reasons’.20 He or she can give reasons to justify acts and understand reasons given by 
others. Since hypothetical contractors are the representatives of actual people, they 
also possess this distinctive capacity. Because of this capacity, contractors respect 
each other as creatures that are capable of asking for justification, ‘a nonderivative 
source of reason’.21 Therefore, when contractors participate in a scheme of social 
cooperation, they would not simply take this scheme as a means to pursue their own 
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interests. Rather, contractors share a common aim of ‘living with others who are also 
reasonable’ and seek a scheme that can fulfil this aim.22 This aim is the origin of 
motivations that move reasonable contractors to seek principles to which everyone 
would agree.   
When we say, in the course of an attempt to reach some collective decision, that a person is 
being unreasonable, what we often mean is that he or she is refusing to take other people’s 
interests into account. What we are claiming is that there is a reason to take these interests into 
account given the supposed aim of reaching agreement or finding a course of action that 
everyone will happy with.23  
Because of this shared aim, contractors would constrain the pursuit of their interests 
within the ‘constraint of justifiability,’ that is, the pursuit of interests should be given 
up if these interests could not be justifiable to other reasonable people. Violating this 
constraint is the same as harming the relationship of mutual respect, which is ‘the 
fundamental contractualist moral relation’.24 Hence, compared with the motivation of 
pursuing interests, contractors have strong ‘standing intentions to regulate their 
behaviours in certain ways’.25 
The qualification of contractors 
The scope of the Kantian contract is much larger than that of the Hobbesian contract, 
for in the Hobbesian contract, moral standing is determined by bargaining power, but 
in the Kantian contract, moral standing is determined by the capacity for assessing 
reason. ‘The scope of [Kantian contractarianism] will include those beings to whom 
we have good reason to want our actions to be justifiable’.26 That is to say, those 
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severely handicapped can also be included in the scope of contract provided that they 
are conscious of asking for justification. This boundary seems to exclude children 
and future generations, but actually they are still included since they ‘will’ have the 
capacity for reason-assessing. 27  However, animals are not included, for human 
beings are the only beings who possess the distinctive capacity for reason-assessing 
and this capacity distinguishes human beings from other animals. ‘This reflective 
capacity sets us apart from creatures who, although they can act 
purposefully…cannot raise or answer question whether a given propose provides 
adequate reason for action’.28 Hence, a relationship formed between a human being 
and an animal is different from a relationship formed between two human beings. In 
a relationship between a human being and an animal, the human being need not 
worry about whether his or her action could be justifiable to that animal.29  
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The knowledge of contractors 
Similar to Gauthier, Scanlon is dissatisfied with Rawls’ assumption of the veil of 
ignorance. Although Scanlon agrees that particular information is relevant when 
contractors decide what contract should be made, he argues that the veil of ignorance 
is unnecessary.30 After Rawls shows that principles of justice would be chosen by 
rational individuals behind the veil of ignorance, he then has to further explain why 
actual people have to accept the decision which is made in the absence of particular 
information. This makes the so-called veil redundant, because the reasons why actual 
people would accept the decisions taken behind the veil would simply be the reasons 
for directly choosing the principles of justice. Hence, Scanlon suggests that the veil 
of ignorance ‘is not necessary…since the requirement of justifiability (or of 
nonrejectability) already requires one to take these others into account’. 31  All 
hypothetical contractors are familiar with their particular information, so the 
agreement is an agreement which would be made by people who were fully informed. 
Scanlon believes that this kind of agreement can capture the strength of social 
contract theory, while avoiding the problem of irrelevance cause by the veil of 
ignorance. 
5.2.2 The state of nature: the reason-exchanging conversation  
These three characteristics constitute the hypothetical contractors in Scanlon’s 
theory—well-informed reasonable persons who respect one another as reason-
assessing beings and follow the constraint of justifiability. Scanlon believes that the 
choices of these contractors represent the choices that actual people would make 
when they were fully reasonable and not affected any irrelevant factors. Then 
Scanlon further asks: what political principles will be agreed among these 
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hypothetical contractors? For the sake of reaching a consensus, these people go into 
conversations with one another.32  
In their conversations, hypothetical contractors will propose different principles. 
Moreover, they do not simply suggest principles. They need to give generic reasons 
to justify their suggestions, for every hypothetical contractor is reason-assessing 
creature. Generic reasons are ‘reasons that we can see that people have in virtue of 
their situation, characterized by general terms, and such things as their aims and 
capacities and the conditions in which they are placed’.33 Generic reasons refer to 
reasons which are generally acceptable from various points of view.34 They are based 
on ‘commonly available information about what people have reason to want,’ rather 
than being based on ‘the particular aims, preferences, and other characteristics of 
specific individuals’. 35  Since the latter reasons are only acceptable to particular 
people, they cannot be used as general justifications for political principles. Only 
generic reasons can be used as currency of reason-exchanging. The whole 
conversation is an exchange of generic reasons among people. A hypothetical 
contractor has to weigh up the reasons to accept or reject principles against the 
reasons of others. If there are some other contractors who have stronger reasons to 
reject a proposed principle, then it will not be reasonable for them to insist on this 
principle. Contractors who have a weaker reason should give way to contractors who 
have a stronger reason.  
However, how can we measure the strength of a generic reason? Scanlon suggests 
that ‘we need to first form an idea of burdens that would be imposed on some people 
[if the principle in question were rejected/accepted]’.36 For example, suppose that a 
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principle is supported by a generic reason but, at the same time, is rejected by a 
generic reason. If this principle became the fundamental political principle, then 
person A would have to suffer a burden. On the other hand, if that principle were 
rejected, then person B would have to suffer a burden. Suppose that, compared with 
the burden which B would have to suffer if the principle were rejected, the burden 
which A would have to suffer if the principle were accepted were merely 
insignificant. Then the principle should be accepted, for the generic reason which 
supports the principle is stronger than the generic reason which rejects the principle. 
Therefore, the strength of a generic reason depends upon the burden which would be 
imposed on someone if this generic reason were rejected.37 The larger the burden is, 
the stronger the generic reason is. Through this evaluative standard, contractors can 
compare different principles and finally arrive at principles that are supported by the 
strongest generic reason.  
5.2.3 The hypothetical contract: principles which no one could reasonably 
reject 
According to Scanlon, the content of the hypothetical contract should be principles 
which were supported by the strongest generic reason, that is, the agreement which 
‘is least unacceptable to the person to whom it is most unacceptable’.38  Finally, 
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people would come up with a principle which was supported by the strongest generic 
reason, which would be a ‘principle which no one would reasonably reject’.39 
This seems to be quite similar to the ‘principle of minimax relative concession’ 
proposed by Gauthier, which is also the least unacceptable outcome after contractors 
bargain in Hobbesian’s initial situation. ‘Since one’s ground of complaint can be 
measured by one’s relative concession, minimizing maximum relative concession 
minimizes the grounds of complaint’. 40  Nevertheless, the idea of burden in 
Gauthier’s contract is more restrictive than that in Scanlon’s. To Gauthier, only the 
loss in utility is a burden. Hence, the principle of minimax relative concession is a 
principle whereby the loss of the worst-off in utility is minimized. But Scanlon’s 
definition of burden is more complex. It is ‘an ethically significant, objective notion’ 
which does not only include subjective preferences.41 Although he acknowledges that 
‘gains or losses in well-being (relief from suffering, for example) are clearly the most 
relevant factors in determining whether a principle could or could not be reasonably 
rejected,’42 well-being (or utility) is not the unique concern in defining a burden.43 
Apart from well-being, many other considerations could also constitute a burden on a 
person. For example, people could suffer from a burden if they were treated 
unfairly, 44  or if their freedom or autonomy were undermined.45  Scanlon himself 
denies that it is possible to give ‘a clear specification of the possible grounds for 
reasonably rejecting a principle (whether this in terms of a conception of well-being 
or in some other way)’.46 Whether certain considerations are or are not relevant to the 
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reasonable rejectability of a principle depends on our ‘normative judgment’. 47 
Although the whole account of burden is a little vague, at least it is clear that well-
being is not the only concern when contractors reasonably reject certain principles.  
We can take religious freedom as an example, which is discussed by Barry when he 
talks about what political principles would not be reasonably rejected.48 In certain 
conditions, protecting freedom of religious worship is not a mutually advantageous 
practice. When one religious group is very strong and another is very weak, the cost 
for the former to force the latter to follow their religion would be negligible. 
However, the weaker religious group could suggest other generic reasons apart from 
utility, such as unfairness. Putting aside the difference in bargaining power first, the 
weaker religious group could ask a question ‘How would you like it if someone did 
that to you?’ While the strong religious group also takes its religion seriously, it 
should also understand the importance of religious worship. It does not prefer a state 
in which religious worship would be prohibited. Hence, this means that the stronger 
religious group is depriving the weaker of something of which they also understand 
the importance. The weaker could then claim that the rejection of religious freedom 
is unfair because the stronger ‘wouldn’t want others to do it to him’.49 This appeal to 
fairness is a strong generic reason that can override the loss in utility and can provide 
powerful support for the proposal of equal religious freedom. From this example we 
can see that, although both of them talk about burdens, because of Kantian 
contractarians’ more complex definition of burden, they will reject some principles 
that Hobbesian contractarians would not.   
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Therefore, from this hypothetical contract, we can see what (relatively clear) political 
principles can be derived from a vague assumption of reasonableness. Scanlon 
begins with an assumption of reasonableness. He then defines the hypothetical 
contractors for the sake of making this feature of practical reason salient. Through a 
reason-exchanging conversation, these contractors agree upon principles which no 
one could reasonably reject, that is, principles which would impose the least burden 
on the worst-off people.  
5.3 Kantian contractarianism and the condition of generality  
Scanlon presents a hypothetical contract which justifies certain political principles 
through the conception of reasonableness. However, is this conception generally 
acceptable? Why should actual people care about the decision of these hypothetical 
contractors? If contractarians fail to show that the practical reasoning of hypothetical 
contractors is generally acceptable, then the political principles are merely coercive. 
The purpose of this section is to show that, similar to Hobbesian contractarianism, 
Kantian contractarianism can also satisfy the condition of generality; and this can be 
shown by considering some common psychological emotions.  
5.3.1 The conception of reasonableness and the sense of guilt 
Some critics argue that Scanlon does not clearly show the relationship between his 
hypothetical contract and the real world. Therefore he ‘must explain why 
[reasonableness] has a deep motivational place in our lives’.50 However, Scanlon 
does not think it is a problem, for he thinks that the aim of ‘living with other 
reasonable people,’ which is the aim presupposed in the conception of 
reasonableness, is widely shared to the extent that it gives all of us a direct reason for 
action. This aim explains why people always have a motivation to be reasonable.  
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According to the version of contractualism that I am advancing here our thinking about right 
and wrong is structured by a different kind of motivation, namely the aim of finding principles 
that others, insofar as they too have this aim, could not reasonably reject. This gives us a direct 
reason to be concerned with other people’s point of view: not because we might, for all we 
know, actually be them, or because we might occupy their position in other possible worlds, 
but in order to find principles that they, as well as we, have reason to accept.51  
Furthermore, Scanlon offers a phenomenological argument and shows that the 
conception of reasonableness is widely adopted by people.52 He argues that actual 
people generally take reasonableness as the primary aspect of practical reason which 
has an absolute priority over other considerations, such as rational interests. The 
priority of reasonableness can be seen from how people value the relationship of 
mutual recognition, that is, an interpersonal relationship by which human beings 
recognize the distinctive features of one another and respect each other as reason-
assessing creatures. According to Scanlon, this relationship ‘is seen as playing a 
fundamental role in our moral thinking’. 53  People generally think that this 
relationship is appealing in itself: 
The contractualist ideal of acting in accord with principles that others (similarly motivated) 
could not reasonably reject is meant to characterize the relation with others the value and 
appeal of which underlies our reasons to do what morality requires…Standing in this 
relationship to others is appealing in itself—worth seeking for its own sake. A moral person 
will refrain from lying to others, cheating, harming, or exploiting them, ‘because these things 
are wrong’. But for such a person these requirements are not just formal imperatives; they are 
aspects of the positive value of a way of living with others.54 
This relationship is appealing because it represents an ideal moral community where 
the value of human beings is respected. In Scanlon’s words, it is a ‘Kingdom of ends 
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on the cheap’.55 In this ideal moral community, the distinctive capacities of human 
beings are recognized and therefore all are respected as an ends-in-themselves. 
Scanlon believes that the attractiveness of this moral ideal is apparent and its 
attractiveness gives us a strong reason to think that the relationship of mutual 
recognition is exceedingly important.  
I do find the idea of moral community very appealing. So I try to develop a notion of morality 
which simply takes as basic that notion of moral community. When you ask ‘why be moral?’, I 
think we can just describe the appeal of that kind of community and the disappeal of its 
alternative. 56 
The fact that actual people generally value the relationship of mutual recognition can 
also be proved by the sense of guilt. Scanlon argues that, if actual people fail to stand 
in a relationship of mutual recognition with one another, actual people will suffer 
from a strong sense of guilt. ‘Feeling guilty for something one has done is plausibly 
understood as feeling that it has impaired one’s relationship with certain people. In 
my experience there is nothing weak or mild about such a feeling’.57 This sense of 
guilt is so great that ‘most people are willing to go to considerable lengths, involving 
quite heavy sacrifices, in order to avoid admitting the unjustifiability of their 
actions’.58 The power of guilt indirectly reveals the positive value of the relationship 
of mutual recognition; it ‘testifies…to the value people set on the belief that their 
lives and institutions are justifiable to others’.59 
According to the account I am offering, the pain of guilt involves, at base, a feeling of 
estrangement, of having violated the requirements of a valuable relation with others. So 
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understood, this familiar negative aspect of morality corresponds to a positive ‘pull’: the 
positive value of living with others on terms that they could not reasonably reject.60 
From the strength of the sense of guilt, we can further understand how important the 
relation of mutual recognition is in our practical reasoning. Due to the importance of 
this relationship, reasonableness can have absolute priority over other values, 
including rational interest. Scanlon argues that nearly no reasons can override the 
consideration of reasonableness. ‘The fact that an action would be wrong constitutes 
sufficient reason not to do it (almost) no matter what other considerations there might 
be in its favor’. 61  Therefore, if rational interests conflict with the constraint of 
justifiability, they ought to put their rational interests aside. If they refuse to do so, 
then it is merely because they ignore the weight of mutual respect in their practical 
reason. The key to practical reason is to guarantee that the reason for an action can be 
justified to others, rather than to pursue interests effectively. That is why Scanlon 
says, 
[Thinking about what principle is justified is] not about what would be most likely to advance 
their interests or to produce agreement in their actual circumstances or in any more idealized 
situation, but rather a judgment about the suitability of certain principles to serve as a basis of 
mutual recognition and accommodation.62 
5.3.2 Is the conception of reasonableness neutral? 
Critics might doubt that these phenomenological descriptions are enough to prove the 
generality of the conception of reasonableness. They might accept Scanlon’s 
phenomenological description, but doubt how general this description is.  As Scanlon 
acknowledges, reasonableness as a conception of practical reason, is not wholly 
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neutral since it presupposes an aim of ‘living with other reasonable people’.63  It 
means that if a person does not share this aim, then he or she has no reason to take 
the constraint of justifiability seriously. The phenomenological description does not 
apply to those who do not share this aim. 
Thus critics may argue that the conception of reasonableness is less acceptable than 
the conception of rationality, for this conception presupposes a shared goal, but the 
conception of rationality does not.64 Unlike the conception of rationality, which is 
always misunderstood as presupposing egoism or hedonism, it is hard to deny that 
reasonableness presupposes something, since reasonableness represents a process to 
test the public justifiability of a desire. If a person lacked any interest in public 
justifiability, then this process would be meaningless. However, this point should not 
be exaggerated because even if this point is correct, it does not mean that the 
conception of reasonableness is not widely accepted. Although the conception of 
reasonableness presupposes a concern with justifiability, this concern is an 
uncontroversial concern that people naturally accept. It seems so natural that, if one 
wants to cooperate with another, then one has to care about the claim of the other and 
cannot ignore the justifiability of one’s actions.65 Since cooperating with one another 
is unavoidable, a concern with justifiability is unavoidable. Moreover, the 
phenomenological stance that Scanlon arrives at is also sound to most people. It is 
hard to deny that a sense of guilt would rise if we found that we had done something 
unjustifiable to others. Since this phenomenon is common, this suggests that 
reasonableness is a widely shared conception of practical reason even though it 
presupposes a goal.  
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5.3.3 The empirical evidence of general acceptability  
The generality of the conception of reasonableness can be further proved by 
neuroscientific experiments. In such experiments, psychologists show that people 
naturally care about their behaviours being justifiable to others.66 When people find 
that their behaviour would be unjustified to others, they usually refrain from doing it. 
But this inclination is sometimes inexplicit only because it is ‘diluted’ by the distance 
between perpetrators and victims. It will become more explicit when one is facing 
those to whom one needs to justify oneself in an ‘up-close-and-personal’ manner.  
For example, if people receive an advertisement from an international aid 
organization, they will not care so much even if they know that ignoring this 
advertisement may not be justifiable to those poor people in other parts of the world. 
However, if people encounter a bleeding stranger face to face when they are driving, 
then they will probably feel bad if they leave this stranger alone. People are less 
sensitive to the unjustifiability of their actions in the former case. That is why 
sometimes we wrongly think that justifiability does not occupy an important role in 
our decision-making. But in the latter example, most of the people would be 
uncomfortable with their actions if they passed by, and will therefore not ignore the 
sufferer. This inclination is actually so common that it can hardly be seen as a 
cultural product. No matter which culture one was born in to, one is still concerned 
that one’s actions are justifiable to others. These empirical experiments show that the 
conception of reasonableness is a conception of practical reason generally accepted 
by the majority of people.  
In conclusion, Scanlon believes that the conception of reasonableness is widely 
acceptable to actual people because actual people usually take reasonableness as 
overridingly important when engaged in practical reasoning. The absolute priority of 
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reasonableness can be seen in the strong sense of guilt from which people suffer 
when they harm the relationship of mutual recognition. In order to keep this valuable 
relationship, actual people always ‘press for the advancement of their conception of 
the good within reasonable limits’.67 Hence the Kantian contractarian model based 
on the conception of reasonableness can satisfy the condition of generality. In the 
next section, however I will show that the conception of rationality actually plays an 
important role in our practical reason too, and Kantian contractarianism fails to fulfil 
the condition of priority because it overlooks the importance of rationality.  
5.4 Rational rejectability of Kantian contractarianism 
In the last chapter, we found that the normative force of Hobbesian contractarianism 
is inadequate because it overlooks the fact that, apart from rationality, reasonableness 
is also one of the aspects of practical reason. Kantian contractarianism is better at this 
point since it does not overlook the existence of rationality, yet it doubts whether 
rationality occupies any crucial role in the justification of political principles. This 
section is an attempt to show that Kantian contractarianism underestimates the 
importance of rationality. In fact, reasonableness could not enjoy such an absolute 
priority in practical reason. The importance of rationality casts doubt on how Kantian 
contractarianism could fulfil the condition of priority.   
5.4.1 The conception of rationality in Kantian contractarianism 
It should first be noted that Scanlon uses the term ‘rationality’ in a different sense 
from the ordinary usage. Throughout this dissertation, the term ‘rationality’ usually 
refers to the instrumental conception of rationality, which is taken to mean what 
most conduces to the fulfilment of the agent’s aims (and lies at the core of the 
conception of practical reason of Hobbesian contractarianism). Scanlon believes that 
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‘this conception of rationality is mistaken’. 68  He defines rationality, instead, by 
arguing that being rational is to do ‘what we have most reason to do’.69 In the context 
of his discussion, rationality refers to standing in a relationship of mutual recognition, 
for the great value of this relationship constitutes the (near) strongest reason for 
people to act. Therefore, to Scanlon, both rationality and reasonableness demand that 
people be motivated by the strongest reason. The only difference is that the former is 
harsher than the latter. Rationality requires people to think thoroughly, get as much 
information as possible, and ensure that they choose the strongest reason. 
Reasonableness, however, merely requires people to choose in ‘relative to a specific 
body or information and a specific range of reasons, both of which may be less than 
complete’. 70  ‘In between the minimum standards marked out by the idea of 
irrationality and the ideal of what it would be the (most) rational to believe or do, 
there are the notions of what is reasonable and unreasonable’.71 Under this definition 
of rationality, undoubtedly there are no conflicts between rationality and 
reasonableness, since both of them appeal to the same criteria. The problem with 
Scanlon’s definition of rationality will be discussed in Section 5.5.2. I would like 
only to point out that, at least when rationality is understood in an instrumental sense, 
Scanlon would not deny that there may be conflicts between rationality and 
reasonableness. 72  But when these conflicts arise, Scanlon believes that 
reasonableness is undoubtedly more important than rationality.73  
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As W. M. Sibley argues, the distinction between rationality and reasonableness is not 
only a technical matter, but also a familiar distinction in ordinary language. 74 
Rationality usually means that people have some considered ends and have a rational 
plan for realizing these ends in order to maximize their utility, whereas 
reasonableness usually refers to following principles which could be agreed in a 
situation in which everyone would respect the constraint of justifiability. The 
conflicts between these two standards are common and obvious, since the most 
effective way to pursue one’s own ends usually involves acts that could not be 
justifiable to others. When these two standards conflict, Scanlon requires people to 
sacrifice their rational plans for the sake of behaving reasonably. In general, people 
have two ways of doing so. Firstly, persons keep the considered ends of their rational 
plans, but achieve them by means which are compatible within the constraint of 
justifiability. Another way is to give up the considered ends of their rational plan and 
pursue some other ends which are compatible within the constraint of justifiability. 
However, both of these two ways go against rationality: one is asking people to be 
ineffective, and the other is asking people to be self-contradictory. I would like to 
argue that either of these two ways would create a sense of loss which is not weaker 
than the sense of guilt from which people would suffer in an unreasonable situation.  
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5.4.2 Why Kantian contractarianism is to be rationally rejected? (1): the 
ineffectiveness critique 
In the first way, Scanlon might argue that our rational plan consists of ends of life 
and the most effective means to achieve these ends. People should keep their desired 
ends but pursue them by means which are compatible within the constraint of 
justifiability. 75  Nevertheless, I doubt that this way works. This is because this 
requirement underestimates our inclination to behave effectively. Effectiveness is 
one of the fundamental criteria in rationality. It means that, given that we have 
certain ends, we are warranted in adopting the means which can fulfil the ends to the 
fullest possible extent with the least expenditure. Its binding power is unconditional. 
As G. H. von Wright said, ‘its binding nature stems from the fact that its conclusion 
declares the intention which an agent is logically bound to have within the 
teleological frame which in the premises he acknowledges for his prospective 
action’.76 Suppose that I want to be a football player, I should train hard and look for 
chances to play in top football clubs. The principle of effectiveness is uncontroversial 
because it represents an internal consistency in rational deliberation. As we value our 
ends highly, we surely prefer taking the shortest route to realizing them. If we take an 
alternative, a longer route, then this action contradicts our desire to realize certain 
ends and we act in an inconsistent way.  
If we find that we have used an ineffective means, we normally think that we did a 
silly thing. A sense of loss might arise, since we have behaved incoherently. We 
intend to give up that ineffective means immediately and rectify the error. From this 
sense of loss one can see the weight of effectiveness in our practical reason. Scanlon 
might respond that, although failing to be effective causes a sense of loss, this sense 
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of loss is not that strong because most people reason irrationally on many simple 
tasks.77 For example, we do not always go from store to store to find the cheapest 
price. Even if we find that our purchase is sold cheaper elsewhere, we do not always 
think of it as important. But it does not mean that effectiveness does not play an 
important role in our practical reason. We do not care about effectiveness in this 
instance simply because it is too minor. If the end is something fundamentally 
important in our life after we have thoroughly reflected upon it, then we usually want 
to pursue it as effectively as we can.  
The sense of loss which we suffer from when we are forced to give up effective 
means of achieving our ends in life is so strong that sometimes we may even prefer 
being unreasonable for the sake of avoiding this sense of loss. Suppose people 
clearly know their ends of life and how to achieve them effectively, but then are 
forced to take a longer and less effective route to realize them. That is to say, they are 
forced to act incoherently on a matter which is most important to them. The sense of 
dissatisfaction created may be difficult to overcome. Even though harming the 
relationship of mutual recognition may bring a strong sense of guilt, this sense of 
guilt does not necessarily override the sense of loss caused by behaving ineffectively. 
As Marcia Baron points out, it is not uncommon and incomprehensible for people to 
behave unjustifiably to others for the sake of protecting something important in their 
life. ‘We think well of them for being tempted to do so’.78 Therefore, while Scanlon 
argues that we should always give reasonableness priority over other considerations 
because by doing so we can avoid the sense of guilt, we should not ignore the fact 
that a sense of loss, which is similarly strong, will also be created if people are forced 
to behave ineffectively in pursuing their ends of life.  
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5.4.3 Why Kantian contractarianism is to be rationally rejected? (2): the self-
contradiction critique 
In light of the importance of effectiveness in our rationality, the first way is unlikely 
to work. Nevertheless, Scanlon might argue that people should make concessions in 
a second way, that is, they should give up their desirable ends and pursue some 
others which are compatible with reasonableness. Reasonableness presupposes an 
end of ‘living with others who are also reasonable’. When the rational plans of 
people conflict with reasonableness, people should recognize the weight of this and 
give up other ends which are incompatible. If not, we will no longer stand in a 
relation of mutual recognition with one another, which is a highly desirable 
relationship.  
However, what is the reason for people to give up their existing ends for the sake of 
‘living with others who are also reasonable’? It must presuppose that people prefer 
the end of ‘living with others who are also reasonable’ to their existing ends. In the 
last chapter, we saw that rational people reflect thoroughly upon their ends and rank 
their ends in terms of utility. The ends that they want to achieve more have higher 
utility, while the ends that they want to achieve less have lower utility.79  Given that 
time and resources are limited, a rational person prefers pursuing choices with higher 
utility to choices with lower utility. If one believes that she prefers A to B but still 
gives up A for the sake of B, then his behaviour becomes self-contradictory. This is 
because, on one hand, she desires A more than B, but, on the other hand, she pursues 
B instead of A. His belief is then contradictory to his action.  
But it is unlikely that the end of ‘living with others who are also reasonable’ is 
always preferable to other ends. Rationality merely requires people to reflect upon 
their ends in order to ensure that they are considered and coherent. But there is no 
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guarantee that their considered and coherent ends must include the end of ‘living 
with others who are also reasonable’ (or ends compatible with this end). After 
reflection, people find ends which are most valuable to them, and these ends may be 
incompatible with the end of ‘living with others who are also reasonable’. These 
ends give meaning to one’s life to the extent that one may feel one’s life has nothing 
left if one is deprived of these ends. Compared with losing these ends of life, I cannot 
see that damaging the relationship of mutual recognition can bring the same degree 
of suffering. As Jay Wallace argues, ‘how, we may wonder, can the abstract goods 
realized by compliance with moral principles possibly prevail in competition with the 
contingent ambitions and relationships that give meaning and texture to our lives?’80 
The relationship of mutual recognition is important. We value it and we would feel 
guilty if this relationship were harmed. Nevertheless, it is usually only one of the 
desirable things in our life. It cannot be compared with our considered ends of life, 
which are of irreplaceably valuable.81  
If people choose to behave reasonably instead of rationally pursuing their considered 
ends, then they act in a way that runs counter to what they believe. Since the pursuit 
of ends of life is one of the most important matters in one’s life, one can hardly 
accept self-contradiction in this issue. If Scanlon justifies the priority of 
reasonableness by the pain of guilt that is aroused when we harm the relationship of 
mutual recognition, then this justification is unpersuasive because we feel far more 
pain when we give up our ends of life. Asking one to change one’s ends of life for 
the sake of being reasonable is less acceptable than Scanlon thinks, because it 
requires one to act in a contradictory fashion in something which is the most 
significant in one’s life. 
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In these two sections, I discussed two cases where people are forced to act 
irrationally for the sake of reasonableness. First, people may have to give up their 
ends of life for the sake of being reasonable, but then they would act in a self-
contradictory manner. Secondly, people may have to use a less effective means to 
pursue their ends of life, but then they would act ineffectively. In both cases, a strong 
sense of loss is aroused. Since the strength of this sense of loss is not weaker than the 
sense of guilt created by unreasonableness, Scanlon could no longer argue that one 
should always give reasonableness absolute priority in order to avoid guilt. This 
strong sense of loss also shows that reasonableness does not, as Scanlon argues, have 
an overriding status over rationality. In practical reasoning, rationality is not any less 
important than reasonableness. While reasonableness justifies obligations to behave 
in a way which are justifiable to each other, rationality justifies obligations to pursue 
ends in the most effective way. People have no necessity of taking the former 
obligations as more important than the later obligations.  
Given the equal importance of rationality and reasonableness, Kantian 
contractarianism, which is based on the conception of reasonableness only, fails to 
satisfy the condition of priority. The problem of Kantian contractarianism is that it 
underestimates the importance of rationality in practical reason. Although Scanlon 
shows that his contractarian principles are reasonably justified, he does not show that 
they are rationally justified as well. Rationality may justify obligations that are 
incompatible with these contractarian principles. Thus people who are governed by 
these principles will have two conflicting obligations, neither of which can override 
the other. Kantian contractarianism fails to justify political principles which have an 
overriding authority. It should not overlook the fact that, while people naturally want 
to be reasonable, they naturally want to be rational as well. 
5.5 Should reasonableness be considered prior? (1): two arguments 
The last section shows that the absolute priority of reasonableness implies that 
people are forced either to be ineffective or to be self-contradictory, which are both 
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irrational behaviours. In order to satisfy the condition of priority, Scanlon has to 
explain why people should concern themselves about reasonableness over rationality. 
Scanlon might acknowledge that people should pursue ends rationally but argues that 
people should choose proper ends. 82  It is rational for people to give up those 
desirable values that conflict with reasonableness and choose other values to pursue. 
So Scanlon has to explain why people have to prefer being reasonable to pursuing 
those values that they highly desire in their lives even after reflection. He has a 
‘three-part’ strategy to defend this thesis. ‘It can make sense, if we recognize values 
other than [reasonableness] and take them seriously, to claim that reasons of [being 
reasonable] have priority over all the rest’.83  
The first is to argue that insofar as these are things that people have reason to pursue and to 
value, these reasons will be among those that can make it reasonable to reject some principles. 
Therefore there will be pressure within the morality of right and wrong to make room for these 
values. But there will of course be limits, and the second part of the strategy (which divides 
into two subparts) is to argue that when these limits are reached we have good reason to give 
priority to the demands of right and wrong. This can be done in part by appealing to the great 
importance of justifiability to others and to the particular interests that moral principles protect, 
and in part by arguing that the other values, properly understood, have a built-in sensitivity to 
the demands of right and wrong.84 
I will discuss the first two strategies in section 5.5 and discuss the third strategy in 
section 5.6. 
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5.5.1 The leave-room argument 
The first strategy which Scanlon suggests is to justify the priority of reasonableness 
by showing that, since reasonableness does leave enough room for other values, 
those other values should give way to reasonableness, should they conflict. 
Reasonableness leaves room for these values because ‘insofar as these values are 
things that people have reason to pursue and to value, these reasons will be among 
those that can make it reasonable to reject some principles’.85 That is to say, these 
values have already been taken into account when we consider whether a principle 
could be reasonably rejected. ‘An individual will thus have a [generic reason] for 
wanting to reject a principle if the results of its general acceptance would be very bad 
from the point of view of that person’s conception of substantive good’.86 If political 
principles always require people to make sacrifices in their rational pursuits of 
values, then this principle could be reasonably rejected. Hence, justified political 
principles have already provided ‘an acceptable distribution of control over 
important factors in our lives’.87  
On the other hand, if some values are eventually rejected by a reasonable agreement 
even after considering those generic reasons, we cannot oppose the demand of 
reasonableness in the name of these values. The importance of these values has its 
limits. This is only one of the generic reasons, and it can be overridden by other 
generic reasons. If the rational pursuit of some values would impose severe burdens 
on other people, then this would be unjustifiable to other people. In this situation, 
these values should be given up since they could be reasonably rejected. 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that people have no values to pursue, for apart from 
those values that conflict with reasonableness, they could still choose many other 
values as their ends, insofar as these values could not be reasonably rejected. In 
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short, Scanlon argues that reasonableness does give adequate attention to the 
importance of rationality. The constraint of justifiability already allows plenty of 
values for people to rationally pursue. They are then justified in prohibiting others 
from pursuing them.  
To me, this argument wrongly conceives the nature of values that are taken as ends 
of life in rational plans after thorough reflection. It seems to take rationally planned 
values to be something which could easily be replaced by other values. For example, 
I want to buy an apple and there are no apples in the supermarket, but there is still a 
wide variety of other fruits; perhaps I should by an orange.  However, the importance 
of an apple cannot be comparable to the importance of these values. Suppose that my 
dream is to be a football player, I would not give up my plan to be a football player 
simply because there are many other careers available. These values are usually 
nearly unique to the extent that they are difficult to replace, and this is why they are 
taken as ends of life. They are closely connected to people’s lives to the extent that 
the meaningfulness of their life would be diminished if they gave up their values. 
Although there are many other values available, these values are nothing more than 
irrelevant choices. Scanlon is right that people have a wide variety of choices, but 
most of these choices may not interest them. People will not give up their rational 
plans of life simply for the reason that other rational plans would still be available if 
they gave up their plan.  
In fact, this argument is misleading in the justification for the priority of 
reasonableness. The point in question should be whether the aim of ‘living with 
others who are also reasonable’, which is the aim presupposed in reasonableness, can 
override the other values in people’s rational plan of life. Only when the former can 
override the latter, would people have reason to take the conception of 
reasonableness as having the highest priority and would therefore arguably give up 
other values that conflict with it. This ought to be what Scanlon has to prove. Merely 
showing that the conception of reasonableness already takes other values into 
account and leaves plenty of values for people to choose is not enough. For even if 
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this proves true, provided that people take other values as being more important than 
the aim of ‘living with others who are also reasonable’, they still have no reason to 
prefer behaving reasonably over pursuing other values. Hence, in the question of 
whether reasonableness can override rationality, the key point is the comparison 
between the aim of ‘living with others who are also reasonable’ and ‘other’ values. 
The ‘leave-room’ argument simply avoids this key point.  
5.5.2 The proper-understanding argument 
So we can move to Scanlon’s second strategy; the proper-understanding argument. 
Scanlon could argue that the conflict between rationality and reasonableness is based 
on a wrong understanding of rationality. As I noted, Scanlon has his own definition 
of rationality. He disagrees with the instrumental conception of rationality and 
defines it in a more substantial way. 88  In his definition, rationality and 
reasonableness are nearly the same criteria. They are only different to the extent that 
the former requires people to think with a full set of information, but the latter 
merely requires people to think with ‘a specific body of information…less than 
complete’.89 Both require people to pursue ends that are supported by good reasons 
which could also be recognized by others, only that ‘reasonableness uses the idea of 
the most rational thing to do or think in a more realistic sense’.90 If others could 
suggest stronger reasons (such as the value of the relationship of mutual recognition, 
which is the (nearly) strongest reason) which can explain why certain ends should be 
rejected, then this rational person should give up these ends. Hence, Scanlon could 
argue that if we understand rationality properly, we would find that rationality and 
reasonableness both demand we act according to strong reasons, and there would 
therefore be no conflict.  
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Whether people always think the value of the relationship of mutual recognition is 
the strongest reason, will be discussed in the next section. I would like to discuss 
here whether the conflict between rationality and reasonableness can be avoided by 
reinterpreting the conception of rationality. Scanlon’s reinterpretation of rationality is 
problematic since it goes against our ordinary understanding of rationality.91 In our 
ordinary understanding, rationality and reasonableness are usually two separate 
norms of practical reason which are distinctively different from each other. 
Rationality is more about ‘interest’ and how to pursue these interests effectively, 
whereas reasonableness is more about ‘constraint’ and whether the pursuit of 
interests violates equal relationships among people. Reasonableness is more seen as a 
social virtue. It involves ‘a willingness to listen to the reasons offered by others 
amounts to an openness to their perspectives and interests. 92  But rationality is 
‘essentially an intellectual virtue,’ which merely requires people to ascertain their 
preferred ends, and to reach these ends by the best means.93 Hence, we usually think 
that a rational person can be unreasonable. 94  For example, a killer constructs a 
murderous plan very rationally, but what this killer is doing is unreasonable. The 
reinterpretation of Scanlon seems to go against this intuition.  
A more serious problem with this strategy is that Scanlon in the end does not explain 
why his interpretation is a better interpretation of rationality. While Scanlon can 
interpret rationality in a way that is compatible with reasonableness, it is always open 
to opponents to offer alternative interpretations in order to show that rationality 
indeed conflicts with reasonableness. So why ought Scanlon’s interpretation to be 
accepted over other alternatives? Scanlon might insist that other interpretations 
would be proved wrong if a ‘proper understanding’ were reached. Yet this is merely 
begging the question, since he does not explain clearly why his interpretation is 
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‘proper’. If an interpretation is ‘proper’ only when it is compatible with the priority 
of reasonableness, then the proper-understanding argument is circular. Scanlon 
cannot escape from the responsibility for explaining and providing evidence in 
support of the claim that his interpretation is more ‘proper’. 
5.6 Should reasonableness be considered prior? (2): the great-value 
argument 
The last argument which Scanlon could use to justify the priority of reasonableness is 
the ‘great-value’ argument, which justifies the priority of reasonableness by the great 
value of reasonableness in our life and explains why we should consider 
reasonableness before other values. This argument is the strongest in Scanlon’s 
‘three-part’ strategy because it explains why the end of ‘living with others who are 
also reasonable’ which is the aim presupposes in reasonableness, can override other 
valuable ends.95 In light of Scanlon’s externalist view of reason, achieving this end 
means that people can enjoy certain valuable relationships while satisfying certain 
interests. A person can make her life more valuable ‘by making herself a morally 
better person’.96 Hence, no matter what ends people value, reasonableness can still 
override these ends. In section 5.6, I will explain why this argument cannot hold, 
and, although reasonableness is valuable, it does not necessarily mean that actual 
people should give up their desirable ends of life for the sake of reasonableness.  
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5.6.1 The great-value argument  
According to Scanlon, the valuableness of reasonableness is explained by two 
reasons: one is the ‘great importance of justifiability to others’, the other is the 
‘particular interests that moral principles protect’.97 The importance of justifiability 
comes from the importance of the relation of mutual recognition, which is a 
relationship ‘appealing in itself—worth seeking for its own sake’.98 The relationship 
represents a desirable moral ideal, a ‘Kingdom of Ends on the cheap’.99 Living in 
such a moral community is a state of affairs that is desired by everyone. The value of 
this relationship can also be understood in a negative way, that is, in a way which 
shows the feeling of being unwelcome and guilt that appears when we harm this 
relationship. Scanlon argues that, if one finds that one’s action is unjustifiable to 
others, then a sense of guilt is aroused. This sense of guilt comes from our 
recognition of the fact that we have violated a valuable relationship with others. 
Since this sense of guilt is quite strong, it implies that mutual recognition occupies an 
important role in our practical reasoning.  
Apart from the desirability of the relation of mutual recognition, Scanlon also thinks 
that being reasonable can bring us pleasure and satisfy some of our particular 
preferences, although this point seldom appears in his writings. Scanlon argues that, 
apart from the sense of guilt which appears when we behave unreasonably, there is 
also a loss of pleasure, which ‘is not merely a matter of feeling guilty or distressed at 
the thought that one’s life and institutions do not measure up to one’s moral goals’.100 
Hence, 
one cannot take the same pleasure in one’s cooperative relations with others as members of the 
same firm or university, say, if one comes to believe that they are being asked to participate on 
                                                 
97
 Scanlon (1998: 166). 
98
 Scanlon (1998: 162). 
99
 Scanlon (1998: 162). Scanlon (2009: 189-190). 
100
 Scanlon (1998: 163). 
Chapter 5 Kantian Contractarianism 
 202
terms they could reasonably reject, and the meaning of one’s own successes and 
accomplishments is undermined by the thought that they were attained on terms that were 
basically unfair.101 
Accordingly, reasonableness is valuable in two dimensions: one concerns relations 
and the other well-being. The first is the value of the relation of mutual recognition. 
This relation is valuable because it represents a ‘Kingdom of ends on the cheap’, 
which is an appealing state of affairs. The second one is the pleasure that they can 
enjoy as long as they participate in fair terms of cooperation with others. Although 
Scanlon does not explain in detail where the pleasure comes from, he seems to 
believe that participating in fair terms of cooperation with people around us 
represents a kind of success and accomplishment. This success and accomplishment 
brings satisfaction to the members of cooperation. By considering these two values, 
Scanlon contends that people will be willing to consider reasonableness prior to other 
values when they conflict with each other.  
5.6.2 Valuableness and priority  
Undoubtedly Scanlon’s account can explain why reasonableness is valuable and we 
should take this into account. However, his account is unable to explain why 
reasonableness has an absolute priority over any other values. I will show that, at the 
very least, Scanlon’s account cannot explain why people should always think that 
reasonableness is more valuable than other ends that they rationally desire. I will first 
discuss the value of the relation of mutual recognition. No one would deny that the 
‘Kingdom of ends on the cheap’ is a desirable moral ideal. As Scanlon argues, being 
a reasonable person makes a person’s life more valuable.102 However, this is only 
one of the many ways of improving one’s quality of life. A person may favour the 
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‘Kingdom of ends on the cheap,’ but not take it as the most desirable ideal even after 
thorough rational deliberation. There are other ideals that people may favour. In this 
instance, if they follow the demand of reasonableness, they have to change or drop 
those values that they rationally desire most. But why should they do so? Scanlon 
could answer this question by referring to the great value of the ‘Kingdom of ends on 
the cheap’ again. Yet this is not an adequate response, for, in the mind of these 
people, the ‘Kingdom of ends on the cheap’ is at most the second most desirable 
value. Why should they give up their most desirable value, for the sake of achieving 
the ‘Kingdom of ends on the cheap’?  Scanlon has to provide an alternative reason 
for explaining why the ‘Kingdom of ends on the cheap’ can justify the absolute 
priority of reasonableness. If not, he is begging the question. He cannot explain why 
one should give up the ideal which one values most and pursue the ‘Kingdom of ends 
on the cheap’ simply by referring to the great value of the ‘Kingdom of ends on the 
cheap’.  
This alternative reason could be the second dimension of the value of reasonableness, 
that is, one might gain pleasure from being in a fair scheme of cooperation. If this 
pleasure is a kind of summum bonum, the highest good which human beings always 
wants to achieve, then we can understand why people should always consider 
reasonableness prior to other things, for no other things can bring greater pleasure 
than reasonableness. Yet this is not so. We can easily find cases in which people 
achieve greater pleasure from activities apart from participating in a fair scheme of 
cooperation. Human beings differ in their understanding of pleasure. Some religious 
people may take salvation to be the highest good and, in order to achieve salvation, 
strictly follow their religious teachings. To these people, the pleasure achieved in 
participating in a fair scheme of cooperation is just not worth considering when 
compared with the pleasure they will enjoy in Heaven. So why should they sacrifice 
the pleasure of salvation for the pleasure of participating in a fair scheme of 
cooperation? This kind of case is not uncommon, for, in fact, people rarely take the 
pleasure which they could enjoy through participating in a fair scheme of 
cooperation as an overriding good in their life. Participating in a fair scheme of 
cooperation is merely one of the sources of pleasure in one’s life. Therefore, 
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although Scanlon is right that following the demand of reasonableness can bring us 
pleasure, it is doubtful that this reason is strong enough to push people to consider 
reasonableness to have priority over rationality.  
5.6.3 The externalist account and its costs 
Scanlon could further argue that the overriding value of reasonableness cannot be 
fully understood without referring to the ‘universality of reason judgments’. 103 
Unlike internalists, who believe the reasoning behind why people have reason to act, 
depends on what motivations they have, Scanlon holds an externalist account and 
believes that reason should have a more independent status. Given that two persons 
are in a similar situation, a reason which can move the first person should be also 
able to move the second person, no matter what motivations they both have: 
The universality of reason judgments is a formal consequence of the fact that taking something 
to be a reason for acting is not a mere pro-attitude toward some action, but rather a judgment 
that takes certain considerations as sufficient grounds for its conclusion. Whenever we make 
judgments about our own reasons, we are committed to claims about the reasons that other 
people have, or would have under certain circumstances.104 
Insofar as a reason has sufficient grounding, everyone should accept it regardless of 
what desirable ends it has. Based on this externalist account, Scanlon could argue 
that the value of reasonableness is actually an external reason, which could move 
actual people regardless of their motivations. Some people might wrongly estimate 
the real weight of this reason and therefore might wrongly think that other ends in 
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their life are more valuable than reasonableness.105  However, the fact that some 
people fail to be moved by this reason so much does not imply that this is not a 
strong reason. Rather, Scanlon believes that these people are merely exceptional 
cases. We should question why these people fail to recognize the weight of the 
reason, but not doubt the reason itself. At the end, even if people fail to recognize the 
overriding value of the relationship of mutual recognition, still, they should consider 
reasonableness prior, for the objective weight of this reason is not affected by their 
‘strength of subjective preferences’.106  
If [a conception] that I favour leaves you cold, you may not have reason to adopt it. But if it is 
a worthwhile conception then you do have reason not to scorn it and reason not to mock those 
who take it seriously. If you fail to see that you have such reasons, and would still fail to see 
this even after the most complete process of imaginative reflection you could manage, this 
indicates a kind of deficiency on your part—moral narrow-mindedness, we might call it.107  
Scanlon further uses the maltreatment of a wife as an example.108 He argues that a 
husband should be able to recognize the reason for not treating his wife badly. If he 
fails to see this reason, then it is his deficiency. His cruelty does not affect the 
strength of this reason. This externalist view of reason can explain why actual people 
should appreciate the valuableness of reasonableness and give it absolute priority.  
There are surely some people who take torturing others as nothing or endorse deeply 
repugnant views such as Nazi. Since these people are too rare, we usually think that 
these people are merely exceptional cases. Although their views may be 
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instrumentally rational, we may still take them as being mentally deficient and reject 
their views. However, these cases are in fact misleading examples because they are 
too uncontroversial. We should not confuse these extreme cases with the 
controversial case about the overriding value of reasonableness. To many people, the 
value of reasonableness is merely desirable, but not overridingly desirable. They may 
have other ideals or relationships that are much more valuable from their 
perspectives. Compared to the case of maltreating a wife, it is much more 
controversial for Scanlon to claim that everyone should take reasonablenss as an 
overriding value. As Gerald Dworkin argues, in many cases, Scanlon is too dogmatic 
in declaring that those who fail to be motivated as Scanlon describes are ‘deficient’:  
If there is no compelling argument against the view that [those who are not motivated 
appropriately in Scanlon’s sense] have no reason to act morally (because they do not share our 
ideal of reaching general agreement, and could not be brought to share it by any mode of 
reasoning or further experience), then we cannot say that such a person has a reason to not act 
immorally, only that they are deficient in not seeing that there is such a reason.109 
If Scanlon insists that the priority of reasonableness is based on external reasons that 
everyone should accept, then his theory will lose several virtues of contractarianism. 
One of the virtues of contractarianism is that it shows respect for the will and choices 
of rational individuals. A contractarian usually disagrees that a political principle 
should be an arbitrary authority imposed on people.110 A justified political principle 
should show that it represents a disposition of actual individual wills. This can be 
shown by demonstrating that, in certain ideal circumstances, people think 
deliberatively and would finally choose this principle. However, the externalist view 
of reason is inconsistent in this respect, since the externalist view proposes that 
something is impermissible no matter what the wills of actual people are.111  Even 
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when they disagree with the overriding value of reasonableness ‘after the most 
complete and careful process of reflection and deliberation,’112 the weight of this 
value is still unaffected. Their disagreement has no influence on the justifiability of 
the priority of reasonableness. It seems difficult to say that the externalist view takes 
will and choice seriously.113  
Moreover, contractarianism has another virtue: its justification for political principles 
does not rely on any peculiar, non-natural properties. Contractarians do not take any 
political authority to be self-evident. Rather, a political principle has authority only 
when it represents a ‘contract’; a product of subjective wills. However, the 
externalist view proposes that the authority of a reason is independent of subjective 
will. Hence, the priority of reasonableness is always justified, since its valuableness 
constitutes a strong, self-evident external reason. However, where does its authority 
come from? Scanlon has to explain how this authority can affect and bind people 
even if these people, after they thoroughly reflect, do not accept this authority. Surely 
he could justify this by an external, objective moral authority, such as natural, 
independent moral laws. Nevertheless, the cost of doing so is that Scanlon then could 
not avoid the burden of explaining how this external moral authority is compatible 
with the prevalent scientific, secular worldview. Contractarianism is an appealing 
method of justification because it takes subjective will as the starting point of 
political thinking and justifies principles in a way which is compatible with this 
                                                                                                                                          
determines its moral permissibility, no matter what people take this idea to be. Subjective will plays 
nearly no role in determining the moral permissibility of an action. Whether or not people take the 
idea that others are ends in themselves as giving them reasons for action is irrelevant to the question 
of whether their act is wrong. This is highly different from his beliefs in his early writings. Here, 
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worldview. Therefore, insofar as Scanlon proposes that a moral authority could be 
justified independent of subjective will, he deviates from contractarianism.  
This section shows the flaws of Scanlon’s ‘great-value’ argument. Scanlon could 
justify the priority of reasonableness by referring to the great value of reasonableness, 
but I have also raised important doubts about the idea that reasonableness is not only 
valuable but also the most valuable. Scanlon could further argue that the overriding 
value of reasonableness is an external reason, so the fact that someone does not 
accept it does not affect its weight. Nevertheless, given that there are many 
‘exceptional’ cases that do not take the value of reasonableness as overriding, and 
Scanlon’s theory will lose several virtues of contractarianism if he maintains this 
externalist view. In conclusion, Scanlon’s ‘three-part’ strategy fails to give a 
persuasive account of why, given that rationality is as important as reasonableness in 
practical reason, reasonableness should always be considered before rationality.  
5.7 Should reasonableness be considered prior? (3): the scepticism argument  
Given that Scanlon’s ’three-part’ strategy fails to show that Kantian contractarianism 
can satisfy the condition of priority, we should then broaden our discussion and 
consider alternative justifications provided by other Kantian contractarians. Barry 
suggests that reasonableness should be considered prior to rationality because the 
value of ends of life in our rational plan is uncertain. This section will discuss 
whether Barry’s argument can rescue Kantian contractarianism. 
Unlike Scanlon, Barry justifies the priority of reasonableness by a ‘sceptical thesis’. 
This affirms that disagreement exists among reasonable people on the question of 
which conceptions of the good are worthwhile and which are impoverished or 
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meaningless.114 Barry claims that it is never possible to know with certainty which 
conceptions of the good are better than others. His claim is grounded in the 
observation that, in spite of discussions about the good life that have taken place over 
several centuries, we are still nowhere near reaching consensus.115  
How can the case for scepticism be made out? I am inclined to think that there is a strong a 
priori argument for the inherent uncertainty of all conceptions of good. Any chain of reasoning 
of this sort is, however, open to objection by a dogmatist that it is too speculative to overcome 
his powerful sense of being privy to the truth.116 
According to the ‘sceptical thesis’, we should not take the values in our rational plan 
as undoubtedly meaningful. Failure to follow our rational plan of life is thus not a big 
problem, because we may find that it is wrong or meaningless in the future. 
Compared with being irrational, we are more certain that being unreasonable is the 
same as harming equal respect. Therefore, we should not insist on our rational plan 
as long as it could be reasonably rejected, for we may finally behave unreasonably 
for the sake of something which is actually wrong or meaningless.  
Barry is right that people cannot be sure that their values in a rational plan are 
meaningful. However, I am not sure that people are as strongly sceptical about the 
values in their rational plans as Barry asserts. The sceptical thesis requires that 
people should always remain doubtful about their values. Yet doubt cannot arise 
without evidence. One doubts something only when one has discovered some 
evidence which shows that that one’s thinking is questionable. If not, the sense of 
doubt would be so weak to the extent that it could not affect our decision-making. 
This sense of doubt is even less significant in the case of rational deliberation about 
the ends of life. As the values that people take as the ends of life are something they 
have rationally reflected upon thoroughly, they are products of their most careful 
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consideration and represent the most reliable ground of their thoughts. In this case, 
they will not easily give up their desired values because of a sense of doubt, without 
any adequate evidence. Unless they face some clear evidence which tells them that 
their values are problematic, they will not have a sense of doubt which is strong 
enough to undermine their belief that the current ends of life in their rational plan are 
meaningful. 
Even if the sceptical thesis is accepted, it does not mean that people would easily 
give up their values if they conflict with principles which could not be reasonably 
rejected. Barry argues that, as long as people admit that there are some uncertainties 
about these values, their values will become less valuable in their mind. However, I 
cannot see why this necessarily occurs. Although I may discover in the future that the 
values I took some years ago  are not as valuable as I think now, it does not mean 
that these values were not at one time of extreme importance. My sense of loss 
generated when I give up this value will not be any less even after I know that these 
values might be of little worth. No matter whether I accept the sceptical thesis, this 
sense of loss will still be as painful. If the sceptical thesis could not undermine the 
sense of loss caused by irrationality, then it would provide no reason for people to 
consider reasonableness prior to the rational pursuit of these ends.  
Furthermore, even if we accept the sceptical thesis, we need to know why it applies 
only to all judgments about the values in our rational plan, but not to judgments 
about the value of reasonableness. While we are uncertain about every value in our 
rational plan, we should also be uncertain about the value of reasonableness. Why 
assume that there is a distinction between the value of reasonableness (which can be 
known with certainty) and the values in a rational plan of life (which cannot)? The 
sceptical thesis does not state that we can resolve with certainty issues concerning the 
value of reasonableness, but not issues concerned with the values in our rational plan. 
It is compatible with a position which states that reasonableness is not so valuable as 
we think. If both the value of reasonableness and other values are subjected to the 
challenge of the sceptical thesis, then the value of reasonableness is not necessarily 
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more reliable than any other values. Therefore Barry has to provide an explanation; 
without it we have no reason to think that we should not insist on our ends of life if 
they could be reasonably rejected.  
In conclusion, although Barry suggests the sceptical thesis to justify the priority of 
reasonableness to other values, this sceptical thesis is problematic. Even if we are 
uncertain about the values in our rational plan, we would not think that these values 
are less important. Moreover, if the worth of all values is doubtful, then the value of 
reasonableness cannot be exempted as well.  
5.8 Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter has been to show that Kantian contractarianism 
overlooks the importance of rationality in our practical reason, thus fails to fulfil the 
condition of priority. Kantian contractarianism rightly observes the importance of 
reasonableness in our practical reason. Reasonableness, as a testing model, justifies 
only obligations that are compatible within the constraint of justifiability. Therefore 
they argue that justified political principles should represent a hypothetical 
agreement that would be made by reasonable contractors. However, as well as 
reasonableness, rationality is an aspect of practical reason. The conception of 
rationality justifies obligations to pursue interests effectively. Since both rationality 
and reasonableness occupy crucial roles in our practical reason, and the sense of loss 
caused by irrationality is as painful as the sense of guilt caused by unreasonableness, 
there is no reason for us to consider either one of them, but not the other, as having 
absolute priority. In short, since the conception of reasonableness is generally 
acceptable to actual people, Kantian contractarianism can satisfy the condition of 
generality. But since the conception of rationality, which is an equally important 
aspect of practical reason, is overlooked, Kantian contractarianism fails to satisfy the 
condition of priority.  
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In addition, I have examined Scanlon’s ‘three-part’ strategy. Scanlon’s ‘three-part’ 
strategy consists of the ‘leave-room’ argument, the ‘proper-understanding’ argument 
and the ‘great-value’ argument, and I have shown that none of them are compelling. 
In fact, the failure of these three arguments also sheds light on the relationship 
between rationality and reasonableness. The failure of the ‘proper-understanding’ 
argument shows that rationality and reasonableness are both distinctive conceptions 
of practical reason; the former cannot be reduced to the latter. The failure of the 
‘leave-room’ argument and the ‘great-value’ argument shows that rational interest 
holds the same importance as reasonableness in practical reason; the latter cannot 
override the former even though it is highly valuable or leaves enough room for the 
considerations of the former. The failure of the ‘three-part’ strategy reveals the flaws 
of t Kantian contractarianism as an inadequate account of practical reason.  
If we combine the study of Kantian contractarianism with the study of Hobbesian 
contractarianism in the last chapter, we arrive at an interesting conclusion. These two 
models fail to provide a satisfactory justification of political principles in two 
opposing ways. By the end of the last chapter, I showed that Hobbesian 
contractarianism, which relies on the conception of rationality, ignores the 
conception of reasonableness in practical reason. In other words, this model 
considers human beings as rational animals but ignores that human beings are not 
merely rational animals. On the other hand, Kantian contractarianism fails in an 
opposite way. Its political principles are justified solely by the conception of 
reasonableness, but it fails to explain why being reasonable is always more important 
than pursuing rational interests. In other words, this model considers human beings 
to be reasonable animals but ignores that human beings are not merely reasonable 
animals. In short, the Hobbesian contract should care more about the conception of 
reasonableness, while the Kantian contract should care more about the conception of 
rationality. It seems that each of them has an element that the other side lacks, and 
each should therefore be supplemented by the other. The failure of these two models 
indicates that a contractarian should give sufficient weight to both ideas of rationality 
and reasonableness. This kind of contract model would be the ‘hybrid contract model’ 
which is the ‘victim’ of the orthodox dichotomy in the contemporary discussion of 
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contractarianism. Can this kind of contract model provide a satisfactory justification 
of political principles? This is the central issue to which I turn in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Hybrid Contractarianism (1): the earlier Rawls 
6.1 Introduction 
In the last two chapters, I discussed two different contractarian models and showed 
their inadequacies. Hobbesian contractarianism is inadequate because it forsakes 
reasonableness; Kantian contractarianism is inadequate because it forsakes 
rationality. Since rationality and reasonableness are two aspects of practical reason, a 
satisfactory hypothetical contract has to be justified from both of these perspectives. 
Nevertheless, it is too early to claim the end of contractarianism, for there is still a 
third possible model which possesses the strengths of these two kinds of 
contractarianism—hybrid contractarianism.  
Unlike Hobbesian and Kantian contractarianism, hybrid contractarianism is based on 
a dual conception of practical reason which assumes that people are both rational and 
reasonable.1 Human beings would feel guilty if they did something which could not 
be justified to others, but they would also feel uncomfortable if they had to 
constantly sacrifice their rational ends. Therefore, a justified social agreement should 
be an agreement which is both rationally and reasonably justified. Compared with the 
other two kinds of contractarianism, hybrid contractarians are few in number. 
Rousseau is an early example. To Rousseau, citizens have two motivations; a sense 
of duty to treat others equally,2 but also a fundamental interest in their freedom and 
in maintaining their personal independence. 3  People’s allegiance to the social 
compact is based on these two motivations. Hence, the social contract not only 
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represents the principle of right in a civil society,4 but also represents the common 
good of citizens.5  
Apart from Rousseau, Rawls is also a hybrid contractarian; however his model was 
not hybrid from the very start. The earliest version of Rawls’ contractarian theory 
was a Hobbesian contractarian model. Like Gauthier, Rawls assumed that people 
were rationally self-interested parties that were uninterested in others. A justified 
social agreement should be a mutually advantageous agreement.6 Yet Rawls soon 
recognized the inadequacy of the instrumental conception of rationality. Thus Rawls 
and Gauthier at the end developed their contractarian models in different directions. 
Gauthier insisted on developing a contractarian model based on the instrumental 
conception of rationality, whereas Rawls gave up this project early and turned to 
adopt a dualistic conception of practical reason. This chapter will examine the hybrid 
contractarian model developed by Rawls and will discuss its strengths and 
weaknesses. 
I will first offer an interpretation of Rawls’ social contract that is different from the 
view accepted by most commentators. I will argue that Rawls’ social contract should 
be understood as a public agreement among free and equal persons in a well-ordered 
society, and this agreement is a hybrid model because it is based on a dualistic 
conception of practical reason. 7  Then I will examine Rawls’ account of the 
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congruence between rationality and reasonableness. Rawls argues that principles of 
justice do not simply make a ‘cold moral demand’, but also represent the most 
rational way to realize people’s fundamental goods. This can explain how hybrid 
contractarianism satisfies the condition of priority. However, I will go on to argue 
that the congruence between rationality and reasonableness is achieved at the cost of 
the condition of generality. Even if rationality and reasonableness justify the same 
principles, this can be done only under a substantial conception of rationality which 
is not generally acceptable.  
6.2 Hybrid contractarianism: an elaboration  
The revival of the social contract tradition is widely regarded as one of the most 
significant achievements of Rawls’ political philosophy.8  Nevertheless, his social 
contract has rarely been taken seriously. It is either treated as a redundant 
component,9  or taken as an incomplete theory which goes only part of the way 
towards achieving its aims.10 Yet the contribution of Rawls to social contract theory 
has long been underestimated and his contractarian model is worthy of more 
attention. In this section I offer an alternative interpretation of Rawls’ social contract, 
in order to show that his social contract is in fact a distinctive hybrid model.   
                                                                                                                                          
and assigns this conception a foundational role. Although he does not deny that his conception of the 
person is revisable on the basis of coherentist reasoning, Rawls is actually a constructivist who 
constructs his moral theory on the basis of a particular conception of the person. See Brink (1987: 72-
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6.2.1 The problem of the orthodox interpretation  
In the orthodox interpretation of Rawls’ social contract, commentators place too 
much importance on the Original Position. The Original Position is a hypothetical 
choice situation that represents an ‘appropriate, fair status quo’ in choosing 
principles of justice.11 Here, numerous restrictions are imposed on the hypothetical 
contractors, such as the veil of ignorance. These restrictions guarantee that irrelevant 
considerations are excluded when hypothetical contractors deliberate. For example, 
the veil of ignorance ensures that parties do not have the knowledge of all particular 
facts about themselves and their social and historical circumstances, including their 
particular conceptions of the good.12 The purpose of this veil of ignorance is apparent. 
It ensures that parties in the Original Position will not be biased by knowledge of 
themselves and will choose fairly and impartially.13 ‘[W]hatever a person’s temporal 
position, each is forced to choose for all’.14 
Nevertheless, the disadvantage that comes with these restrictions is also obvious. 
Since hypothetical contractors act as the deputies of actual people, the practical 
reasoning of hypothetical contractors should be similar to that of actual people, so 
that actual people can understand why hypothetical contractors would make certain 
choices. However, because of the restrictions, actual people hardly think that the 
choices of hypothetical contractors are their choices. For example, behind the veil of 
ignorance, parties choose without knowing who they are. But in the real world, 
people are not similarly ignorant. Why should they agree with the choices of 
contractors? To them, the choice of hypothetical contractors is merely the choice that 
they would make if they lacked certain kinds of information. But this reasoning is 
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completely different from what they do in the real world. As Brown observes, ‘it is 
hard to see why an engagement that…allowed very limited information should 
continue to be acceptable or to be binding upon that person when he and all others 
like him have been greatly changed and are altogether better informed’.15  
Because of the gap between hypothetical contractors and actual people, Rawls is 
caught in a dilemma. If he does not explain why actual people should accept the 
choice of hypothetical contractors, then it is unclear why actual people should take 
the choice of hypothetical contractors seriously. If he gives an explanation, then the 
Original Position becomes redundant, for, at that time, people comply with principles 
of justice because of this independent reason, but not because these principles would 
be chosen in the Original Position.16 This dilemma can explain why many other 
contemporary contractarians, while they adopt Rawls’ contractarian methodology, 
disagree with the imposition of the veil of ignorance.17 For the sake of shortening the 
distance between hypothetical contractors and actual people, all claim that their 
social contract is made in a ‘well-informed’ manner and believe that the veil of 
ignorance undermines the importance of the ‘contractarian element’ in the whole 
theory. 
6.2.2 A re-interpretation of Rawlsian hypothetical contractors: free and equal 
persons 
I suggest that Rawls’ social contract should be interpreted in an alternative way. As I 
showed in Chapter 3, a contractarian theory has three components: a conception of 
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practical reason, hypothetical contractors and a hypothetical agreement. The latter 
two elements in Rawls’ theory are usually thought to be mutually disinterested 
parties behind the veil of ignorance and the hypothetical contract in the Original 
Position. I disagree with this interpretation and argue that these two elements should 
be seen as referring to two other ideas. Instead of parties behind the veil of ignorance, 
the hypothetical contractors are actually free and equal persons with two moral 
powers. 18  Instead of the agreement in the Original Position, the hypothetical 
agreement is actually the public agreement of persons in the well-ordered society. 
The reason we should follow two principles of justice is that they represent fair terms 
of social cooperation among free and equal persons, not (merely) because they would 
be chosen by parties behind the veil of ignorance.19  
This is a better reading because the dual conception of practical reason in Rawls’ 
contractarianism is made more explicit. Though ‘Rawls is not terribly explicit about 
his conception of reason’,20 his contractarianism is no doubt ‘based essentially on 
practical reason’.21  Rawls recognizes that both rationality and reasonableness are 
dimensions of practical reason and neither can be reduced to the other. 22 So neither a 
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rational contract nor a reasonable contract is adequate. This is why Rawls adopts a 
dual conception of practical reason. Based on this conception, the characteristics of 
free and equal persons are defined and these characteristics can be shown in the 
following three aspects: their motivation, their knowledge, and their qualification.  
The motivation of contractors 
According to Rawls, free and equal persons have two moral powers:  
(i) One such power is the capacity for a sense of justice: it is the capacity to understand, to apply, 
and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of political justice that 
specify the fair terms of social cooperation. 
(ii) The other moral power is the capacity for a conception of the good: it is the capacity to have, 
to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good. Such a conception is an ordered 
family of final ends and aims which specify a person’s conception of what is of value in 
human life or, alternatively, of what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life.23  
These two moral powers correspond to the two aspects of practical reason: the first 
power corresponds to reasonableness, while the second corresponds to rationality.24 
They determine what motivations free and equal persons would have. Insofar as they 
possess the first capacity, free and equal persons have ‘a strong sense of justice, an 
effective desire to comply with [principles of justice] and to give one another that to 
which they are entitled’.25 Rawls sometimes says that the sense of justice exists in ‘a 
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purely formal sense’.26 Nevertheless, it does not mean that the sense of justice is an 
empty sense of duty which can be related to any political principle. In fact, it refers 
specifically to the motivation to embrace principles that represent fair terms of social 
cooperation that would be justified to each participant.27 Free and equal persons have 
a motivation to participate in ‘terms each participant may reasonably be expected to 
accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them’.28 Hence, the sense of 
justice can be seen as ‘express[ing] a willingness…to act in relation to others on 
terms that they also can publicly endorse’.29 Free and equal persons are willing to 
regulate themselves to act in a way justifiable to each other.30 As Freeman explains,  
[The sense of justice] means that, independent of our fellow-feeling and desires to advance 
human interests, we have a desire for fairness, that is, a desire to see that human interests are 
advanced in ways that are fair, or (what comes to the same thing in Rawls’ account) in ways 
that are acceptable to all from a position that is reasonable and fair between them.31 
Apart from this motivation, free and equal persons also have a motivation to realize 
their rational plans, which comes from their second capacity. According to Rawls, 
‘the rational plan for a person is the one…which he would choose with deliberative 
rationality’.32 Persons form plans that are made in accordance with several principles 
of rational choice, for example, the relative intensity of various desires having 
examined them carefully, and all desires arranged in a coherent plan.33 A person’s 
good is related to the successful realization of these rational plans. ‘Our good is 
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determined by the plan of life that we would adopt with full deliberative rationality if 
the future were accurately foreseen and adequately realized in the imagination’.34  
Rawls further argues that free and equal persons have rational highest-order interests 
in realizing their two moral capacities. The formal principles of rational choice do 
not tell us anything about the rationality of ends: ‘we cannot derive from the 
definition of rational plans alone what sorts of ends these plans are likely to 
encourage’.35 Hence Rawls introduces the Aristotelian Principle. The Aristotelian 
Principle is a general psychological principle: ‘other things equal, human beings 
enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and 
this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its 
complexity’.36 The role of the Aristotelian Principle is to account for the motivations 
of human beings and establish that it is intrinsic to a human being’s good to realize 
their nature. It can explain why we prefer to do some things and not others, because 
some things can help us train our capacities and we take more pleasure in doing some 
things as our capacities become more fully realised. 
Moreover, Rawls offers a Kantian interpretation of human nature: persons seen as 
moral agents are by their nature free and equal moral persons.37 Since the nature of 
free and equal persons is constituted by the two moral powers, these powers are more 
important than other capacities that we may realize, such as the aesthetic or 
mathematical capacity. Without aesthetic or mathematical capacities, one can still 
determine one’s conceptions of the good, be responsible for one’s actions and 
participate in social cooperation with other moral persons. However, people without 
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two moral powers are not able to be free and responsible agents who are capable of 
mastering their wants and answering for their actions.38  
The Aristotelian Principle and the Kantian interpretation of human nature together 
explain that realizing these two moral powers is the highest-order interest of human 
beings. According to the Kantian interpretation, the two moral powers constitute 
human nature. Then, ‘from the Aristotelian Principle it follows that the expression of 
[human beings’] nature is a fundamental element of their good’. 39  Therefore, 
realizing and exercising the two moral powers are the ‘highest-order interests’ of 
human beings. Compared with other interests, these highest-order interests are 
‘supremely regulative as well as effective’. 40  This implies that, ‘whenever 
circumstances are relevant to their fulfilment, these interests govern deliberation and 
conduct’.41 As some commentators point out, this motivation plays a crucial role in 
explaining why people should comply with principles of justice, even more than the 
sense of justice.42 
In short, free and equal people generally have two motivations, which come from 
their two moral capacities respectively. The first is the motivation to regulate 
behaviour to embrace principles that can be justified to others, which comes from the 
capacity for a sense of justice. The second is the motivation to realize rational life 
plans, which comes from the capacity for a conception of the good. Their rational 
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plans of life consist of two parts: the ends of their plans are the highest-order 
interests of realizing two moral capacities, while the means of their plans are 
determined by the formal principles of rational choice. The former is concerned with 
behaving rightly, while the latter is concerned with pursuing the good.  
The knowledge of contractors 
Many people take the hypothetical contractors in Rawls’ social contract to be the 
parties behind the veil of ignorance, and thus object that there is a huge knowledge 
gap between these parties and actual people. That is why both Gauthier and Scanlon 
assume that their hypothetical contractors are well-informed. However, this problem 
can be avoided if we take Rawls’ social contract to mean the public agreement 
among free and equal persons. Free and equal persons know their particular facts 
which are screened out by the veil of ignorance. ‘In practical affairs an individual 
does have the knowledge of his situation and he can, if he wishes, exploit 
contingencies to his advantage’.43 Nevertheless, they do not do so because of the two 
motivations that I mentioned above. Even though he is well-informed, these 
motivations still ‘move him to act on principles of right that would be adopted in the 
Original Position’.44 Hence, in this interpretation, hypothetical contractors do not 
make their decision in the absence of particular information. Rather, they choose to 
embrace principles of justice with full information. This greatly shortens the distance 
between actual people and hypothetical contractors. Actual people can no longer use 
the knowledge gap as an excuse for failing to identify themselves with hypothetical 
contractors.  
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The qualification of contractors 
Since free and equal persons are characterized by two moral powers, it means that 
any actual person who has these two moral powers is included in the contract. A 
person who has these two moral powers can be seen as a free and equal person who 
is capable of being ‘engaged in social cooperation’. 45  Having the two moral powers 
is ‘the sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice’.46 But how common are 
these two moral powers? There seems no doubt that nearly every person has the 
capacity for a conception of the good. Actual people are generally willing to plan and 
are capable of planning their lives rationally. Apart from this capacity, the capacity 
for a sense of justice is also a common feature of human beings. Many human 
sentiments, such as guilt, are connected with a sense of justice.47 The sense of justice 
is also a presupposition of many fundamental sentiments, such as love, trust, 
friendship and affection.48 Hence, the sense of justice is much more common than 
many people think. ‘It seems almost certain that at least the vast majority of mankind 
have a capacity for a sense of justice and that, for all practical purposes, one may 
safely assume that all men originally possess it’.49 
Given that most of the people can satisfy this minimum standard, we can infer that 
nearly all persons are obligated to principles of justice. In fact, it seems that this is 
also the ambition of the earlier Rawls.50 He suggests that the two capacities are a part 
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of humanity and have a history that may even be given an evolutionary 
explanation.51  Also, he believes that principles of justice are objective since the 
conception of the free and equal person represents a common standpoint that human 
beings in general could endorse.  
This standpoint is objective and expresses our autonomy…Thus to see our place in society 
from the perspective of this position is to see it sub species aeternitatis: it is to regard the 
human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of view. The 
perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place beyond the world, not the point 
of view of a transcendent being; rather it is a certain form of thought and feeling that rational 
persons can adopt within the world. And having done so, they can, whatever their generation, 
bring together into one scheme all individual perspectives and arrive together at regulative 
principles that can be affirmed by everyone as he lives by them, each from his own 
standpoint.52 
Some might object that the severely handicapped who do not have the two moral 
powers would be excluded from the social contract.53 If this is true, then Rawls’ 
contractarianism is also vulnerable to the problem of Hobbesian contractarianism. 
Yet this worry is based on a misinterpretation of Rawls. Some people might not 
possess these two moral powers, but it is merely because they have encountered ‘the 
consequence of unjust and impoverished social circumstances, or fortuitous 
contingencies’.54 However, they still have ‘a potentiality that is ordinarily realized in 
due course. It is this potentiality which brings the claims of justice into play’.55 
Hence, the scope of Rawls’ social contract includes all people who have the potential 
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to realize their two moral powers, even includes those who actually do not have these 
powers.56 In short, Rawls’ social contract is a social cooperative scheme among well-
informed free and equal persons who have (or have the potential to realize) the two 
moral capacities.  
6.2.3 The hypothetical contract: justice as fairness  
To Rawls, a legitimate political order among these free and equal persons should be a 
well-ordered society, that is, ‘a society in which everyone accepts and knows that the 
others accept the same principles of justice, and the basic social institutions satisfy 
and are known to satisfy these principles’.57 Principles of justice should be able to 
attain public acknowledgement and to give justification to each person’s reason.58 So 
the next question for Rawls is: What principles of justice would be publicly agreed 
by these free and equal persons? 
The answer is obvious. Justice as fairness is the solution for free and equal persons, 
from the perspectives of both rationality and reasonableness. Justice as fairness is 
reasonably justified because it represents an agreement which specifies fair terms of 
social cooperation. Free and equal persons have a sense of justice, which can be seen 
as a willingness to behave in a way justifiable to others. Rawls argues that this 
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willingness is a motivation to remain in a relationship in which everyone respects 
others as a free and equal moral person.59 The Original Position can elucidate what 
principles would be accepted among citizens who have such a relationship with one 
another: ‘since the Original Position situates free and equal moral persons fairly with 
respect to one another, any conception of justice they adopt is likewise fair’.60 
Through the Original Position, free and equal persons know that justice as fairness is 
the conception of justice that can protect the relationship of mutual respect. The 
sense of justice motivates free and equal persons to act upon the principles of justice, 
which are principles that could be reasonably accepted.61 
Justice as fairness is also rationally justified, for it is compatible with a person’s good. 
Free and equal persons should choose justice as fairness because it can guarantee ‘the 
adequate development and full exercise of the moral powers’, which is their highest-
order interest.62 The first principle of justice is the principle of equal basic liberties, 
which guarantees that people have equal political liberty, freedom of speech and 
assembly, liberty of conscience and the freedom of thought.63 These basic liberties 
are crucial in the development of two moral powers. According to Rawls, political 
liberty and freedom of thought are necessary for developing the capacity for a sense 
of justice, and liberty of conscience and freedom of association are necessary for 
developing the capacity for a conception of the good.64 If these basic liberties are not 
protected, two moral powers cannot be developed adequately. This is why free and 
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equal persons should choose principles of justice which give the highest priority to 
these basic liberties, so that they can fully exercise their two moral powers. Therefore, 
‘the principles of right and justice are collectively rational; and it is in the interests of 
each that everyone should comply with just arrangements’.65 A just society ‘enables 
a good that is otherwise unattainable’.66 
Hence free and equal persons have two reasons to follow principles of justice in the 
well-ordered society. One is a consideration of reasonableness and another is of 
rationality. Both rationality and reasonableness are independent aspects of practical 
reason, but both of them demand that people embrace principles of justice.  
The desire to act justly and the desire to express our nature as free and equal moral persons 
turn out to specify what is practically speaking the same desire. When someone has true beliefs 
and a correct understanding of the theory of justice, these two desires move him in the same 
way. They are both dispositions to act from precisely the same principles: namely, those that 
would be chosen in the original position.67  
By embracing principles of justice people can achieve the ‘essential unity’ of self’.68 
Rationality and reasonableness will not make incompatible demands and thus self-
contradiction can be avoided. People can give unity to their lives by accomplishing 
this ‘congruence of rationality and reasonableness’.  
Now the unity is manifest in the coherence of his plan, this unity being founded on the higher-
order desire to follow, in ways consistent with his sense of right and justice, the principles of 
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rational choice…in ways that justice allows, he is able to formulate and to follow a plan of life 
and thereby to fashion his own unity.69  
In light of why free and equal persons choose principles of justice, one should also 
be clear about the real function of the Original Position. The Original Position is 
usually regarded as a hypothetical contract that models the agreement among actual 
people. Yet this interpretation gives rise to a dilemma. Either the Original Position is 
irrelevant because the relationship between the Original Position and actual people is 
unclear, or it is redundant because actual people follow principles of justice for other 
independent reasons. However, these critiques of the Original Position are based on a 
misunderstanding of its function. In fact, in Rawls’ contractarian model, the 
hypothetical contract that models the agreement among actual people is the public 
agreement among free and equal persons in the well-ordered society, but not the 
agreement made in the Original Position.  In the well-ordered society, free and equal 
persons discuss with others and try to come to a public agreement. Since all people 
are free and equal, they all engage in practical reasoning when they participate in 
public discussion in similar ways. Despite their different ethical, religious and 
cultural concerns, their deliberations are framed in terms of the same frame of mind. 
The Original Position is a device to make this shared frame of mind explicit. The real 
function of the Original Position is ‘a device of representation [for free and equal 
persons], or alternatively, a thought experiment for the purpose of public- and self-
clarification’.70 Hence the Original Position should be seen as a heuristic device that 
models the shared way of reasoning of contractors in the hypothetical contract, but 
not the hypothetical contract itself.  
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If Rawls’ contractarian theory is correctly understood, then we can understand that 
the Original Position is neither irrelevant nor redundant. It is relevant because the 
conception of a free and equal person explains the relationship between the Original 
Position and actual people. Since most actual people have two moral powers, they 
are willing to identify themselves as free and equal persons. Given that the Original 
Position is used for making the reasoning of free and equal persons explicit, actual 
people should also be able to enter into this thought experiment for the sake of 
clarifying the political principles that they should embrace. Thus Rawls describes the 
Original Position as a thought experiment that actual people can enter into at any 
time.  
It may be helpful to observe that one or more persons can at any time enter this position, or 
perhaps better simulate the deliberations of this hypothetical situation, simply by reasoning in 
accordance with the appropriate restrictions…To say that a certain conception of justice would 
be chosen in the original position is equivalent to saying that rational deliberation satisfying 
certain conditions and restrictions would reach a certain conclusion.71 
Another reason the Original Position is not redundant is because actual people have 
to use this device to understand what free and equal people would agree. This device 
represents what restrictions these free and equal persons would affirm when they 
deliberate about political principles. It can effectively represent and unify the 
characteristics of rational and reasonable deliberations in a manageable and vivid 
way. Through this device, principles that are both rationally and reasonably justified 
can be made explicit. As Rawls argues, the Original Position is a ‘procedural 
interpretation’ that clarifies practical reasoning of free and equal moral being.72 
Without this heuristic device, actual people would only know that they were free and 
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equal but would not be clear about the normative implications of this conception of 
the person.  
In conclusion, Rawls’ contractarianism is a hybrid theory because it is based on a 
dualistic conception of practical reason. He recognizes the importance of rational 
interests in justification,73 but he believes that reasonableness is crucial as well.74 
Thus hypothetical contractors should be both rational and reasonable in order to 
represent the complete practical reasoning of actual people. These two aspects of 
practical reason are represented respectively by the two moral capacities of free and 
equal persons, who are the hypothetical contractors in Rawls’ theory. By showing 
that free and equal persons choose justice as fairness as their political principles, 
Rawls can show that justice as fairness is both rationally and reasonably justified. It 
is reasonably justified because it characterizes a relationship of mutually respect for 
one another as a free and equal person. It is rationally justified because acting upon it 
could help one advance one’s highest-order interests. This dual character of hybrid 
contractarianism makes it distinctively different from Hobbesian and Kantian 
contractarianism. In the next sections, we will consider the strengths and weaknesses 
of this hybrid form.  
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6.3 Hybrid contractarianism and the condition of priority  
In the previous two chapters, I showed that the problem of Hobbesian and Kantian 
contractarianism is that their conceptions of practical reason are one-sided. Thus they 
fail to satisfy the condition of priority. Unlike these two models, hybrid 
contractarianism relies on a more comprehensive conception of practical reason that 
takes both rationality and reasonableness into account. In this section, I will show 
that hybrid contractarianism, based on a dualistic conception of practical reason, can 
also satisfy the condition of priority. 
6.3.1 The priority of justice as fairness 
The condition of priority requires that, in a contractarian theory, all aspects of 
practical reason be included in the conception of practical reason. The hypothetical 
contractors should not capture only a part of practical reasoning. If a contractarian 
theory satisfies this condition, then the political principles justified by this theory can 
have an overriding priority over other social norms. In fact, this problem of priority 
is emphasized by Rawls as well, but Rawls calls it ‘the problem of stability’. In 
Rawls’ theory, stability has a special meaning. It does not mean social peace or a 
mere avoidance of conflicts.75 Rather, it refers specifically to whether a conception 
of justice is both rationally and reasonably justified, whether rationality and 
reasonableness can be congruent with each other.76 If principles of justice are not 
rationally justified, then people would always be attracted by a rational motivation to 
go against these principles. Also, these principles would always be vulnerable to the 
challenge that they severely threaten the rational plan of life of people. Hence, a 
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conception of justice must prove its stability. People who live under this scheme 
would always endorse it and would not be tempted by opposing motivations. 
Whether [rationality and reasonableness] are congruent is likely to be a crucial factor in 
determining stability…The problem is whether the regulative desire to adopt the standpoint of 
justice belongs to a person’s own good when viewed in the light of the thin theory with no 
restriction on information. We should like to know that this desire is indeed rational; being 
rational for one, it is rational for all, and therefore no tendencies to instability exist.77  
As Paul Weithman observes, the stability of a just society is ‘one of Rawls’ most 
pressing concerns’.78 In light of the importance of the problem of priority, we can 
understand why Rawls assumes that the hypothetical contractors are both rational 
and reasonable.  
I will now explain how the political principles chosen by these hypothetical 
contractors can satisfy the condition of priority. There are two possibilities where a 
political principle fails to satisfy the condition of priority. First, people think that this 
political principle is unjustified because other social norms are more important, so 
they violate this political principle because of other social norms. Secondly, people 
think that this political principle is rationally (or reasonably) justified, but think that 
it is reasonably (or rationally) unjustified as well. Hybrid contractarianism can avoid 
these two cases and ensure that political principles have an overriding authority. 
For the first case, people cannot use social norms as reasons for rejecting these 
political principles. There are various social norms in people’s lives, such as 
religious disciplines and cultural customs. As I discussed in Chapter 2, rationality 
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and reasonableness do not have the same status as these social norms. Rationality 
and reasonableness govern the a priori structure of our practical reasoning and guide 
our thoughts, whereas social norms are only elements that we consider during 
practical reasoning. When people engage in practical reasoning and think about what 
political principles they should choose, they consider these social norms because 
these are things that occupy crucial positions in their lives. Under the guidance of 
rationality and reasonableness, they look for a balance between different norms as 
they also evaluate these norms. Eventually their practical reasoning arrives at the 
conclusion whereby their society should be governed by principles of justice which 
have a priority over other social norms. As long as this conclusion is reached, they 
are unjustified in rejecting this order of priority by referring to the importance of 
other social norms, since the importance of these social norms has already been taken 
into account in practical reasoning and has been outweighed by other considerations. 
Thus these norms no longer constitute a reason for overthrowing the conclusion. If 
people refuse to acknowledge the priority of principles of justice, then they are 
simply ignoring the fact that no reason can justify their action. 
For example, suppose that, in a society governed by principles of justice, the places 
of secondary school are fairly allocated by the government (principles of fair equality 
of opportunity). Now there is a man who is the government officer responsible for 
this allocation and he has a chance to secretly privilege his child to enter into a high-
ranking secondary school. As a parent, he has an obligation to give his child the best 
possible start. But is this familial obligation a reason for action? From the reasonable 
perspective, privileging his child is unjustified since other candidate students would 
be unfairly situated. From the rational perspective, it is unjustified as well because 
the benefits gained from doing this is outweighed by the good constituted by the 
highest-order interest in developing the capacity for a sense of justice. In both of 
these two aspects of practical reason, the familial obligation is superseded by some 
other considerations. Given that a consideration can be justified as a reason for action 
only when it is either rationally justified or reasonably justified, the familial 
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obligation fails to count as a reason for action, even though it has a great weight in 
people’s lives.  
Hybrid contractarianism can avoid the second case too because political principles 
chosen by the hypothetical contractors are both rationally and reasonably justified; 
justice represents the congruence of rationality and reasonableness. Its strength can 
be made explicit by comparing the hybrid contractarian model with Hobbesian and 
Kantian contractarianism, both of which fail to avoid the second case. Hobbesian and 
Kantian contractarianism are flawed because their conceptions of practical reason are 
incomplete; Hobbesian contractarianism justifies political principles merely by 
rationality, whereas Kantian contractarianism justifies political principles merely by 
reasonableness. The choice of their hypothetical contractors overlooks reasons 
justified by another aspect of practical reason. For actual people, they have a reason 
to follow the political principles justified by these two models, but they have a reason 
to reject these political principles as well. Insofar as neither reason is conclusive, 
either embracing these political principles or rejecting them is justifiable.  
Unlike Hobbesian and Kantian contractarianism, hybrid contractarianism has a more 
complete conception of practical reason and discusses both rational and reasonable 
deliberation. From the reasonable perspective, principles of justice are justified 
because they respect each person as a free and equal being and govern in a way 
which can be publicly justified.  From the rational perspective, principles of justice 
are justified because following them would be the most effective way to realize 
people’s two highest-order interests. Rationality and reasonableness are congruent 
with each other and both of them justify the loyalty to principles of justice. Insofar as 
there are no other aspects of practical reason except rationality and reasonableness, 
principles of justice represent the outcome of the complete process of practical 
reasoning. So actual people no longer have reason to reject these principles because 
all reasons are justified by either rationality or reasonableness, and these two aspects 
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of practical reason both demand that they should embrace these principles. Hence, 
given that social norms cannot challenge principles of justice and principles of 
justice represent a common requirement of rationality and reasonableness, these 
principles can achieve an overriding political authority.  
6.3.2 The conflict between two highest-order interests 
However, I believe that Rawls is too optimistic that the two highest-order interests 
always lead to the same disposition. According to Rawls, free and equal persons have 
two highest-ordered interests, one is to realize the capacity for a conception of the 
good, and the other is to realize the capacity for a sense of justice. Even if we assume 
that these two interests are really the highest-order interests, they may still conflict 
with each other, and Rawls seems to overlook this possibility. I will focus on the 
capacity for a conception of the good and argue that embracing principles of justice 
may not be the best way to develop this capacity.  
In Rawls’ definition, the capacity for a conception of the good is not only a capacity 
to pursue a conception of the good, but also a capacity to revise a conception of the 
good, in order to ensure that one’s current conception of the good is the one most 
preferred. 79  People who are interested in realizing this capacity do not view 
themselves as inevitably tied to the pursuit of any particular conception of the good. 
In order to realize this capacity, free and equal persons choose to act upon principles 
of justice that guarantee an adequate quantity of primary goods. The difference 
principle provides an ideal circumstance for people to pursue the interest of realizing 
the capacity for a conception of the good, because it guarantees that even the least 
advantaged in society can still possess an adequate quantity of primary goods. These 
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primary goods would allow one to have enough all-purpose means to choose a 
conception of the good from a variety of possibilities.  
Nevertheless, if one really aims at pursuing this highest-order interest, then one 
should not be satisfied with the distribution of primary goods which is determined by 
the difference principle. From the definition of the capacity for a conception of the 
good, we can say that this capacity is more realized if people are able to revise their 
conception of the good more thoroughly. When people revise their conception of the 
good, they cannot look only at their current conceptions. On the contrary, they need 
to compare their current conceptions with others, so that they can know whether the 
current conceptions of the good are the ideals that they most prefer. This means that 
if the choices of alternative conceptions of the good are limited, then the revision of 
their conceptions is also limited, for their current conception is not open to too many 
challenges by other conceptions of the good. Hence, the more conceptions of the 
good people can choose and compare, the deeper these people can revise their 
conceptions.  
On the other hand, if one has more primary goods, more conceptions of the good are 
available for one to choose. Some conceptions of the good, such as musician, artist or 
traveller, require plenty of primary goods to realize. These conceptions of the good 
are impossible for a person to realize if they do not have enough primary goods. 
Moreover, if one has more primary goods, then one is better able to acquire more 
knowledge. As long as one can gain more knowledge, one has more resources to 
reflect upon one’s conception of the good. People can hardly say that they have 
reflected upon their conceptions of the good thoroughly if they lack a rich knowledge 
of their own conceptions, and other conceptions. This rich knowledge depends on 
abundant primary goods. All these facts imply that the more primary goods one has, 
the more conceptions of the good from which one is able to choose.  
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Now we can see that there is a relationship between the quantity of primary goods 
and the freedom of a person. One is freer if one can reflect upon one’s conception of 
the good more thoroughly, because people are free if they are capable of standing 
apart from their conceptions and reflecting, and are freer if this capacity is more 
developed. This capacity is more developed and the conception of the good of a 
person can be revised more deeply if that person has more conceptions of the good to 
choose from and to compare. Therefore, the value of developing this moral capacity 
can also be explained by freedom. The more primary goods one has, the further the 
capacity for a conception of the good one can realize, the freer one is.  
If this is true, the interest of realizing the capacity for a conception of the good may 
conflict with the interest of realizing the capacity for a sense of justice. The capacity 
for a sense of justice is ‘the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from…the 
principles of justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation’.80 Since this 
capacity can be realized only by living in a well-ordered society, the interest in 
developing the capacity for a sense of justice motivates people to comply with 
principles of justice unconditionally.81 Unlike this capacity, the development of the 
capacity for a conception of the good depends on how many primary goods one 
possesses. Suppose one could get more primary goods by violating the difference 
principle, then one should go ahead for the sake of realizing one’s capacity for a 
conception of the good further. So the interest in realizing the capacity for a 
conception of the good can become a motivation to violate principles of justice in 
certain cases. According to Rawls, these two highest-order interests have the same 
status.82 Since both of these two interests are the highest-order interests, pursuing 
either of them are rational to people. Some rational people may choose to realize the 
capacity for a conception of the good but not the capacity for a sense of justice. 
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Hence, on certain occasions, although it is reasonable for people to comply with 
principles of justice, it is rational for people to violate them for the sake of getting 
more primary goods. Rationality and reasonableness fail to be congruent with each 
other.  
6.3.3 The maximizing nature of the highest-order interest 
Perhaps Rawls might respond that the interest in realizing the capacity for a 
conception of the good cannot be ‘maximized’. In fact, in Political Liberalism, 
Rawls denies that the pursuit of these interests is a kind of maximization. The two 
moral powers cannot be maximized. ‘A coherent notion of what is to be maximized 
is lacking. People cannot maximize the development and exercise of two moral 
powers at once’.83 Even if maximizing the development of these two moral powers is 
possible, people have no intention to maximize. Rather, they are interested only in 
realizing the two moral powers to an adequate extent ‘as long as their powers and 
abilities suffice for them to be normal cooperating members of society’.84 Once this 
condition is met, they have no interest in developing the two moral powers. 
Therefore, their highest-order interests would be satisfied if their two moral powers 
were adequately developed.  
Rawls’ description may be correct for the capacity for a sense of justice. It is 
impossible to maximize the development of this capacity since this ability cannot be 
improved anymore after one possesses it. All people can be separated into two kinds: 
those who have a sense of justice, and those who do not. However, I do not see why 
the development of the capacity for a conception of the good cannot be maximized. 
                                                 
83
 Rawls (1993: 333).  
84
 Rawls (2001: 60). 
Chapter 6 Hybrid Contractarianism (1) 
242 
 
The capacity for a conception of the good is clearly different from the capacity for a 
sense of justice, because this can be developed further after one possesses it. 
Different people can have different degrees of maturity in their capacity for a 
conception of the good. People’s capacity for a conception of the good is more 
mature if they can reflect upon their conception of the good more thoroughly.  For 
example, if they have more freedom, wealth and knowledge, then they can compare 
their conceptions of the good with differing conceptions across diverse areas.  
Given that the pursuit of the highest-order interests is a fundamental good of human 
beings, one should have an intention to maximize the development of the capacity 
for a conception of the good, and not be satisfied with merely an adequate level of 
development.  According to the definition of highest-order interests, they are 
‘supremely regulative as well as effective’. 85  If these highest-order interests are 
really so important, then why should people be satisfied and stop pursuing them after 
pursuing them to a certain degree? This can also explain why parties in the Original 
Position adopt an instrumental conception of rationality, preferring ‘more primary 
social goods rather than less’. 86  For more primary goods can secure further 
development of the capacity for a conception of the good.  
Rawls might respond that they would be satisfied with the adequate development of 
the two moral powers because developing these capacities is merely for the sake of 
taking part in social cooperation. 87  These capacities are means to advance their 
conceptions of the good only. But if this is true, then acting upon principles of justice 
becomes a ‘necessary evil’ to join the social cooperative scheme and realize one’s 
own conception of the good, but not an intrinsic good for a person. This contradicts 
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what Rawls says about the rational good of being just. According to Rawls, the 
realization of the two moral capacities is intrinsically good insofar as ‘it is rational 
for persons to want in themselves and in one another as things appreciated for their 
own sake’. 88  That is why free and equal persons are willing to revise their 
conceptions of the good if these conceptions are incompatible with the two highest-
order interests. If the two moral powers are merely a means to take part in social 
cooperation, then the most rational strategy of people should be pretending to be 
people who possess the two moral powers, keeping their conception of the good 
unchanged and waiting for chances to break the rules. This is no doubt not the 
strategy proposed by Rawls.  
Nevertheless, this problem can be avoided as long as Rawls adds an assumption of 
priority between the two interests. Rawls could say that human nature is constituted 
only by the capacity for a sense of justice. In this new interpretation, people take the 
capacity for a sense of justice as more important than the capacity for a conception of 
the good. Even though reflection on the conception of the good is crucial, it can only 
be done within limits and persons can only revise their conceptions of the good by a 
fair share of primary goods in their hands. Suppose that this priority is justified, the 
interest in realizing the capacity for a sense of justice would become the only 
highest-order interest, while the interest in realizing the capacity for a conception of 
the good would become at most the second highest-order interest. Now the rational 
disposition of individuals would be to comply with the principles of justice in order 
to realize their sense of justice, which would not be incompatible with principles of 
justice that could be reasonably justified. This additional assumption can rescue the 
congruence between rationality and reasonableness and the condition of priority can 
be satisfied.  
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In this section I discussed whether or not Rawls’ ambition to fulfil the condition of 
priority is successful. Rawls aims at satisfying the condition of priority by showing 
that both rationality and reasonableness justify principles of justice. Provided that all 
reasons are justified by either rationality or reasonableness, people have no reason 
for rejecting principles that are both rationally and reasonably justified. But Rawls 
overlooks the fact that the interest in realizing the capacity for a conception of the 
good, which is one of the rational highest-order interest, may conflict with principles 
of justice. This conflict harms the congruence of rationality and reasonableness. 
However, I also argue that this problem can be solved by adding a further assumption 
of priority between two highest-order interests. By assuming that the interest in 
realizing the capacity for a sense of justice can outweigh the interest in realizing the 
capacity for a conception of the good, the rational choice of people can be guaranteed 
to be compatible with reasonableness. Thus, we can see that Rawls’ ambition can be 
satisfied, provided an extra assumption is added. In the next section, however, we 
will see the cost of this ambition is that Rawls’ theory fails to fulfil the condition of 
generality, and the extra assumption would make his theory more controversial.  
6.4 The cost of satisfying the condition of priority  
Hybrid contractarianism is better than Hobbesian and Kantian contractarianism since 
it can fulfil the condition of priority that the other two kinds of contractarianism fail 
to satisfy. However, the condition of priority is not satisfied without any cost. The 
congruence between rationality and reasonableness is based on a substantial 
conception of rationality. Since this substantial conception of rationality is a part of 
the conception of practical reason of Rawls’ theory, this undermines the possibility 
of Rawls’ theory satisfying the condition of generality since this conception of 
rationality is not a weak assumption that is generally acceptable. In this section, we 
can see that although the substantial interpretation is the key to achieve the condition 
of priority, it is also the cause of failing to achieve the condition of generality.  
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6.4.1 The problem of generality  
The strength of Hobbesian contractarianism is that it is based on a weak, 
uncontroversial conception of rationality. This strength allows it to satisfy the 
condition of generality, yet it also renders it unable to satisfy the condition of priority. 
In order to satisfy the condition of priority and achieve the congruence between 
rationality and reasonableness, Rawls adopts a more substantial conception of 
rationality. This raises the question of whether this conception can satisfy the 
condition of generality, that is, it may not be generally accepted by actual people 
who are bound by principles of justice.89 His conception of rationality consists of 
three components: the formal principles of rational choice, the Aristotelian Principle 
and the Kantian interpretation of human nature. For the first component, we have 
seen in Chapter 4 that the formal principles of rational choice are generally accepted 
as guiding principles of practical reason. The second component is also not a 
problem. Rawls is confident that the Aristotelian Principle is psychologically self-
evident: ‘We need not explain here why the Aristotelian Principle is true’.90 
But someone might cast doubt on the acceptability of the Kantian interpretation. 
Rawls supposes that, if people were brought up in a well-ordered society, then they 
would identify themselves as free and equal persons who would accept the Kantian 
interpretation. They would take the two moral capacities as the two most 
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fundamental capacities that constitute their nature.91 However, why is it rational for 
people to accept this understanding of human nature when there are countless 
interpretations of human nature? Even if actual people live in a well-ordered society, 
they may still develop highly different understandings of human nature. Some people 
may adopt a Christian interpretation of human nature, and take the spiritual capacity 
as the most important. Some people may adopt a romantic interpretation of human 
nature, and take the artistic and imaginative capacity as the most important. There is 
no single rational answer to this question. People have no specific reasons for 
adopting the Kantian interpretation of human nature. If this is so, then realizing the 
two moral capacities is not their highest-order interests as well. They may be more 
interested in realizing other capacities and thus their most rational choice is not to 
embrace principles of justice. Hence, it seems too optimistic to take it for granted 
that the Kantian interpretation would be widely accepted by actual people after 
rational deliberation.  
Moreover, according to my discussion in the last section, we can see that if the 
condition of priority has to be satisfied, then Rawls has to add a further assumption 
of priority between two highest-order interests in the Kantian interpretation. This 
additional assumption would further undermine the acceptability of the conception of 
rationality. In this new interpretation of human nature, it is rational for people to take 
the capacity for a sense of justice as their most fundamental capacity that constitutes 
their nature; hence the highest-order interest is to realize this capacity. However, this 
new interpretation is more unacceptable than the original Kantian interpretation of 
human nature. Although it is also controversial, the Kantian interpretation is at the 
least appealing because it emphasizes freedom as a part of human nature. As Rawls 
notes, the capacity for a conception of the good shows the freedom of a person, 
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because this person ‘views [himself] as independent from and not identified with any 
particular conception of the good, or scheme of final ends’.92 He is not determined by 
these contingent elements but be able to ‘free’ himself from them to determine what 
he is. However, in the new interpretation, this capacity is excluded from human 
nature. The new interpretation takes the capacity for a sense of justice to be the most 
fundamental capacity. Hence people are by nature ‘just’ or ‘reasonable’, but not 
‘free’. This goes against the ordinary thinking of many people, since many people 
usually think that freedom is the distinctive characteristic of human beings. 
Therefore, although assuming the capacity for a sense of justice as the most 
fundamental capacity can secure the congruence between rationality and 
reasonableness, the cost of making this assumption is that the conception of 
rationality would become less appealing. The cost of satisfying the condition of 
priority is much larger than Rawls expects.  
From this we can see the congruence between rationality and reasonableness 
presupposes a narrow definition of rationality. People not only have to agree on the 
Kantian interpretation of human nature, but also on the priority between two highest-
order interests. Given that in a well-ordered society citizens enjoy freedom of 
thought and conscience, citizens would develop their own understanding of human 
nature. A conception of rationality that relies on a Kantian interpretation of human 
nature can hardly prevail in a well-ordered society. To those people who do not share 
Rawls’ conception of rationality, the rational choice of the hypothetical contractors 
in hybrid contractarianism is strange to them. They would fail to identify themselves 
with hypothetical contractors and thus would not think principles of justice have 
normative force. That is why Rawls no longer holds this substantial conception of 
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rationality in his later writings, since he also recognizes that this conception 
undermines the acceptability of his social contract.93  
6.4.2 Defence (1): Kantian interpretation as a fact 
The negative effect of abandoning this substantial conception of rationality will be 
discussed at the end of this chapter. However, before I move on to discuss how 
Rawls modifies his social contract in his later writings, I believe that the earlier 
version of his social contract needs fuller examination. I argued earlier that Rawls’ 
conception of rationality is controversial because it presupposes a specific 
interpretation of human nature. To this problem Rawls has two possible responses. 
First, he could state that human nature is a fact, so whether people reach a consensus 
on it does not matter. Secondly, Rawls could argue that the two moral capacities are 
the necessary condition for pursuing any worthwhile way of life, so that all rational 
persons should take the two moral capacities as more fundamental human capacities. 
I will examine these two possible responses in this and the next sections.  
First, Rawls might simply bite the bullet and argue that the assumption of human 
nature is not a belief that people can choose not to hold, but rather a fact that awaits 
discovery. People are by nature free and equal not because they should understand 
themselves as such a being, but rather because they are in fact such a being. What 
they need to do is merely recognize this fact and take realizing this nature as their 
highest-order interest. Actually, this seems to be Rawls’ attitude in his earlier 
writings.94 He does not bother too much with the question of why people should 
accept this interpretation, but simply states that this interpretation is one of the 
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‘premises [that] are the elementary facts about person’.95 As he says, the self as a free 
and equal person is like our ‘noumenal self’. 
The description of the original position resembles the point of view of noumenal selves, of 
what it means to be a free and equal rational being. Our nature as such beings is displayed 
when we act from the principles we would choose when this nature is reflected in the 
conditions determining the choice.96  
Hence, a supporter of the earlier Rawls might argue that the later Rawls gives up the 
Kantian interpretation too quickly. The later Rawls wrongly thinks that human nature 
is something that is chosen. Actually, this is a general fact and we can only 
acknowledge it.  
However, claiming that certain interpretations of human nature as a fact simply 
avoids the question, for no matter whether or not this interpretation is a fact, it is still 
generally unacceptable to many people. The problem of generality is not whether this 
interpretation is true, but why actual people should take it as true. If actual people do 
not share this interpretation, then they will have an alternative conception of 
rationality. They will not think that justice as fairness is rationally justified to them. 
So they will still question the normativity of hypothetical contract. The problem of 
failing to fulfil the condition of generality still exists.  
Moreover, this response would make Rawls’ social contract lose an important virtue 
of contractarianism. One of the virtues of contractarianism is that it emphasizes a 
respect for the individual’s will. A contractarian political principle should be based 
                                                 
95
 Rawls (1999a: 226). Similar point is also reflected in Rawls’ interpretation of Kant, that Kant 
simply takes the conception of free and equal person for granted and does not justify it. See Rawls 
(1989a: 513-514).  
96
 Rawls (1999a: 225).  
Chapter 6 Hybrid Contractarianism (1) 
250 
 
on a premise that is mutually recognized.97  However, in this response, a certain 
interpretation of human nature is presupposed to be true, regardless of what actual 
people really think. Even if actual people do not appreciate the rational goods 
assumed by Rawls after the most careful reflection and deliberation, they will still be 
bound by principles of justice. The rational justifiability of principles of justice will 
be unaffected by the strong disagreement of many people. In this case, it seems hard 
to say that principles of justice take the will of people seriously. Taking a certain 
interpretation of human nature as objectively true would serve only to cast an 
authoritarian shadow on Rawls’ contractarianism.  
6.4.3 Defence (2): the necessity of two moral capacities 
The failure of the first response shows that Rawls must give a reason to justify why 
people should accept his interpretation of human nature. This leads to the second 
possible response to my critique. Although Rawls does not explain why people 
should accept the Kantian interpretation of human nature explicitly, his student, 
Samuel Freeman, tries to take up the task. According to Freeman, these two moral 
capacities are the necessary conditions for people to pursue any worthwhile way of 
life.98 Since humans are social beings, they can only pursue their way of life in the 
context of social cooperation. But those who are capable of taking part in social 
cooperation must have two moral capacities, so that they are ‘free and responsible 
agents capable of controlling their wants and answering for their actions’.99  The 
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capacity for a conception of the good guarantees that people are capable of being 
responsible for the projects that belong to them.100 The capacity for a sense of justice 
guarantees that people are capable of respecting one another and taking part in fair 
terms of social cooperation. These two moral powers are the necessary conditions for 
being a member of society. ‘A person without these capacities is not recognized by 
others as answerable for his or her acts or ends (morally or legally) or deemed 
capable of taking an active part in social cooperation’.101  
[D]evelopment of the sense of justice (along with the capacity for a conception of the good) is 
a condition of individuals being rational moral agents who are capable of assuming 
responsibility for their actions and taking part in, and benefiting from, social life. People who 
do not develop their capacities for music or sports, while they may miss out on worthwhile 
activities, can nonetheless lead good lives engaged in other pursuits. But those whose moral 
capacities for justice (and the capacity to be rational) remain undeveloped are not capable of 
social life. They are not then in a position to achieve the benefits of society and will be hard 
pressed to learn and pursue most any worthwhile way of life.102  
In light of Freeman’s argument, we can see why it is rational for people to take the 
two moral capacities as constituting their nature. It is true that, after rational 
deliberation, people may develop different self-understandings. However, no matter 
how they understand themselves and what they believe, they still have to live within 
a society. From the practical perspective, they have to be free and equal persons who 
can participate in social cooperation first, and then becoming the kind of persons 
they want to be. Although Freeman’s argument still fails to solve the conflict 
between two highest-order interests, at least it shows that it is always rational to take 
realizing the two moral capacities as the highest-order interests.  
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However, even if we ignore the conflict between two highest-order interests, 
Freeman’s argument can at most prove that people have an instrumental reason to 
develop the two moral capacities; yet they do not have an intrinsic reason to do so. 
Realizing the two moral powers is the precondition of participating in social 
cooperation. But this means that if people want to enjoy the benefits of society, they 
should realize these two moral capacities. People can agree that they have to realize 
the two moral capacities, but still refuse to treat these capacities as central to their 
‘nature’. They can take other capacities, such as the aesthetic capacity, as the most 
important capacity that constitutes their nature, and then take the two moral 
capacities as their means to realize the aesthetic capacity. So, according to the 
Aristotelian Principle, their highest-order interest would come when realizing the 
aesthetic capacity. The two moral capacities are only effective means for them to 
participate in social cooperation in order to develop their aesthetic capacity.  
This also means that, if there is a chance that people could violate the principles of 
justice without being known by others, then they have no reason not to do so. To 
them, following principles of justice is necessary because their aesthetic capacity 
could be fully realized in a context of social cooperation. However, if they violated 
the principles of justice, they could get more primary goods to realize their aesthetic 
capacity. But at the same time, they could also stay in the well-ordered society and 
enjoy the benefits of that society. From a rational perspective, they should break the 
rules and free-ride off of others’ efforts as long as this would go unnoticed, even 
though this implies that the realization of their two moral capacities would be harmed. 
We can see the flaw in Freeman’s argument here. Freeman only proves that the two 
moral powers are the necessary condition for participating in social cooperation. Yet 
it does not necessarily mean that the two moral powers constitute the ‘nature’ of 
people. It is possible that people think very differently: not that the value of other 
capacities depends on the two moral capacities, but rather, the value of the two moral 
capacities depends on other capacities.  
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The failure of Freeman’s argument sheds light on the fundamental problem of the 
Kantian interpretation. The problem with this interpretation is not that it is a 
mistaken understanding of human nature, but rather that this understanding itself is 
something beyond rationality. Given that actual people have freedom of thought and 
conscience in the well-ordered society, they can have different views on human 
nature after rational deliberation. These views on human nature will then determine 
different attitudes towards the two moral capacities. This implies that there will be no 
unified views on the question of human nature and highest-order interests. Through 
understanding the controversy over the question of human nature, we can understand 
why Rawls gives up on the Kantian interpretation in his later writings, since 
assuming the Kantian interpretation implies assuming an impossible consensus in the 
well-ordered society.  
Therefore, although Rawls’ hybrid contractarianism can satisfy the condition of 
priority, this is done at the cost of the condition of generality. In the last section, I 
showed that the congruence between rationality and reasonableness must presuppose 
a Kantian interpretation of human nature and an additional assumption of priority 
between two highest-order interests. The purpose of this section is to examine 
whether or not the conception of practical reason which includes these two 
presuppositions is generally acceptable. Since the truth of the Kantian interpretation 
of human nature is something that cannot be rationally justified, this interpretation is 
too controversial, and many actual people may refuse to adopt it in the well-ordered 
society. The conception of practical reason which presupposes the Kantian 
interpretation fails to fulfil the condition of generality, let alone the assumption that 
further presupposes the assumption of priority between two highest-order interests. 
When too many controversial assumptions are built into the conception of practical 
reason, this greatly undermines the possibility that actual people would identify with 
the hypothetical contractors.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. The first purpose is to show the first attempt 
of Rawls to construct a hybrid contractarian model. In the previous two chapters, I 
showed that both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarianism fail to satisfy the 
condition of priority because they overlook one of the aspects of practical reason. 
Only hybrid contractarianism can avoid their weakness because it adopts a dualistic 
conception of practical reason. By showing the congruence of rationality and 
reasonableness, the condition of priority can be satisfied. Nevertheless, the 
congruence of rationality and reasonableness also creates a new problem for hybrid 
contractarianism, and considering this is the second purpose of this chapter. The 
congruence relies heavily on a substantial conception of rationality. This conception 
is more substantial than Rawls himself expects, for the congruence is possible only 
when a further assumption of priority is added. However, if the conception of 
rationality is so substantial, then it will also be highly controversial. Hobbesian 
contractarianism can satisfy the condition of generality because its formal conception 
of rationality is generally acceptable. But Rawls’ conception of rationality is more 
substantial, since it presupposes the Kantian interpretation of human nature. Hence it 
faces a bigger difficulty in fulfilling the condition of generality.  
In fact, Rawls also acknowledge this problem in Political Liberalism. A well-ordered 
society is characterized by ‘reasonable pluralism’.103 In this society, insofar as people 
have freedom of thought and conscience, it is unrealistic to expect that they will all 
agree in their religious, philosophical or ethical beliefs.104 Given that the Kantian 
interpretation of human nature is only one of these ethical beliefs, actual people may 
hold, alternative beliefs and their highest-order interests may not express their nature 
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as free, equal and moral beings. So it is ‘unrealistic’ to expect that the Kantian 
interpretation would be widely accepted by actual people.105  This is why Rawls no 
longer appeals to this interpretation when he talks about the rational good of justice 
as fairness in his later writings.106 
However, dropping the Kantian interpretation would create other negative effects. 
Without the Kantian interpretation of human nature, Rawls can depend only on the 
Aristotelian Principle, arguing that justice is a good because it helps us to realize our 
two moral powers and that human beings can always gain enjoyment from realized 
capacities. 107  But now the two moral powers are only two of the many human 
capacities. They are not necessarily more important than other human capacities. So 
why should people choose the good of justice but not the other goods which they 
could enjoy if they realized other human capacities? Rawls can at most argue that 
acting upon principles of justice can satisfy particular interests, but fails to show why 
these particular interests are ‘highest-ordered interests’. The condition of priority 
fails again, for now rationality and reasonableness leads to a different conclusion. 
Rawls is caught in a dilemma here: if the conception of rationality incorporates the 
Kantian interpretation of human nature, then Rawls’ contractarianism fails to satisfy 
the condition of generality; but if the conception of rationality excludes the Kantian 
interpretations of human nature, then Rawls’ contractarianism fails to satisfy the 
condition of priority. 
Rawls’ strategy is to find the third way, and it is also one of his main tasks in his 
later writings. In Political Liberalism, he abandons the Kantian interpretation of 
human nature, though he maintains that principles of justice have priority over other 
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considerations. But now the priority argument relies on a freestanding political 
conception of free and equal citizens. Rawls turns to argue that, in a more restricted 
‘political’ realm, reasonableness can be congruent with rationality, and these two 
conceptions of practical reason are still generally accepted. In the next chapter, we 
will consider whether or not the strategy of the later Rawls is successful. 
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Chapter 7 Hybrid Contractarianism (2): the later Rawls 
7.1 Introduction 
As a hybrid contractarian, Rawls adopts a dual conception of practical reason and 
argues that principles of justice as fairness are justified from both rational and 
reasonable perspectives. Embracing principles of justice represents a way of treating 
others reasonably, as well as a way of realizing one’s highest-order interests 
rationally. Through embracing principles of justice, practical reason can be unified, 
since rationality can be congruent with reasonableness. However, this congruence 
between rationality and reasonableness presupposes a substantial conception of 
rationality, which assumes that the realization of two moral powers is the highest-
order interest of everyone. This substantial conception of rationality is highly 
controversial and seriously threatens the general acceptability of hybrid 
contractarianism even in a well-ordered society.  
Rawls recognizes this problem and acknowledges in Political Liberalism that his 
original account of the congruence between rationality and reasonableness ‘is not 
consistent with [A Theory of Justice] as a whole’.1 The reason is that, given that 
freedom of thought and conscience are guaranteed, reasonable pluralism would 
occur.2 Citizens would develop ‘a diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines’.3 It is a natural result of the exercise of human 
reason within the framework of the liberal democratic society. ‘No one of these 
doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally’. 4  Hence, the Kantian comprehensive 
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doctrine, which is only one of these many comprehensive doctrines, is unlikely to be 
generally accepted unless the government uses oppressive measures. 5  Rawls’ 
conception of rationality, which relies heavily on the Kantian interpretation of human 
nature, must be revised.  
However, Rawls does not give up the ambition of proving the congruence between 
rationality and reasonableness, and now takes it even more seriously.6  His later 
writings are mainly concerned with this question: How to maintain the congruence 
between rationality and reasonableness without relying on a controversial conception 
of practical reason? The strategy of the later Rawls is to define several ‘political 
conceptions’, which represent a specific context of applying principles of rationality 
and reasonableness.7  Rationality and reasonableness can be congruent with each 
other in this particular context. He no longer assumes that people are by nature free 
and equal and principles of justice are the most effective way to realize human 
nature. Rather, he argues that these political conceptions, which are the ground of the 
congruence argument, are only freestanding conceptions which are compatible with a 
wide range of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Thus principles of justice, which 
are justified by these political conceptions, become the focus of an overlapping 
consensus in a reasonably pluralistic society. Hence, instead of arguing that justice as 
fairness represents a fundamental human good, the later Rawls rather chooses to 
emphasize the ‘freestanding’ character of political conceptions.  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss whether or not this new strategy can rescue 
Rawls’ hybrid contractarianism. First I will briefly discuss the changes made by the 
later Rawls. Then I will show that, although the later Rawls gives up the Kantian 
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interpretation, the political conceptions are still highly controversial even in a well-
ordered society. Although Rawls believes that citizens in the well-ordered society 
would generally accept political conceptions, I argue that, with the free exercise of 
human reason, citizens would also be likely to question the idea that political 
conceptions should be the sole basis of the justification of political principles. After 
that I will examine several possible defences from Rawls and conclude by showing 
that the later Rawls still cannot avoid a dilemma between generality and priority. The 
scope of his contract is actually much more limited than Rawls himself anticipates. 
Although Rawls’ hybrid contractarianism can satisfy the condition of priority, the 
cost of doing so is the failure to fulfil the condition of generality.  
7.2 The revision of hybrid contractarianism: overlapping consensus 
It is commonly accepted that Rawls makes a ‘political turn’ in his later writings. He 
tries to get rid of the Kantian comprehensive doctrine presupposed in his earlier 
writings and emphasizes that his contractarian theory is in fact based on political 
conceptions that are widely shared among members of the liberal democratic 
societies. Although members have different reasonable comprehensive doctrines, 
they still share certain political conceptions which are used for the common ground 
of public justification. The stability of a well-ordered society is guaranteed by this 
‘overlapping consensus’. In this section, I will discuss how this ‘political turn’ 
affects the contractarian theory of the later Rawls.  
7.2.1 The change of hypothetical contractors: scope and motivation 
In general, the contractarian theory of the later Rawls has changed in two aspects; 
one concerning the scope of contract and the other concerning the motivation of 
contractors. First, he acknowledges that justice as fairness is a set of political 
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principles only for liberal democratic societies. Secondly, the motivations of 
contractors are now based on some political conceptions, particularly the political 
conception of free and equal citizenship, which is widely shared among members of 
liberal democratic societies. I will illustrate these two changes in turn in this section.  
The scope of contractors 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls is ambitious in proposing that principles of justice can 
hold for all human beings. Since two moral capacities are the general characteristics 
of human beings, principles of justice should be able to be applied in all societies. 
However, in Political Liberalism, Rawls gives up this ambition and argues that 
principles of justice can only be justifiably enforced in liberal democratic societies.8 
It does not mean that Rawls no longer thinks that justice as fairness is a universal 
value and every society in the world ought to strive to become a liberal democratic 
society.9 However, he acknowledges that justice as fairness presupposes a public 
political culture which does not exist in non-liberal-democratic societies.  
As we saw in the last chapter, justice as fairness is based on a conception of free and 
equal persons who possess two moral capacities. Rawls initially thought that this 
conception represents the nature of human beings, but then he recognized that the 
interpretation of human nature is a controversial issue and that everyone would have 
their own answer after rational deliberation. Not all people understand themselves in 
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this Kantian way. Therefore, in his later writings, Rawls gives up the claim that 
people are by nature free and equal persons. Rather, he argues that members of a 
liberal democratic society share several political conceptions, such as ‘the idea of 
citizens as free and equal persons’ and ‘the idea of a well-ordered society as a society 
effectively regulated by a political conception of justice’.10  Rawls believes that, 
provided that a person grew up under the public political culture of a liberal 
democratic society, he would acquire these political conceptions. These political 
conceptions represent a common perspective shared by the members of liberal 
democratic society.  
However, those who live in non-liberal-democratic society have a different public 
political culture, hence they might share different conceptions of the person as well. 
Because of this difference, political conceptions may not be generally acceptable in 
these kinds of society. In light of the relationship between conceptions of the person 
and public political culture, the later Rawls recognizes that his social contract has a 
limited scope and would only be generally accepted in societies in which a specific 
kind of public political culture exists.  
The motivation of contractors  
After limiting the scope of the contract within a liberal democratic society, Rawls 
argues that the political conceptions represent a way of practical reasoning publicly 
shared among the members in this kind of society. The purpose of Rawls’ 
hypothetical contract is to discuss what principles would be agreed insofar as all 
people reason in this particular way. The hypothetical contractors have two moral 
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capacities: the capacity for a conception of the good and the capacity for a sense of 
justice, which correspond to the two aspects of practical reason respectively.11 
For the sense of justice, Rawls does not make any change of definition but only 
emphasizes that this desire is compatible with different views of human nature. The 
sense of justice is ‘the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public 
conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation’.12 
According to Rawls, this is the desire to embrace principles which would be selected 
in the Original Position, since the situation represents the agreement that would be 
made when all parties were fairly situated. In A Theory of Justice, the sense of justice 
seems to require people to consider one another free and equal persons. This 
assumption guarantees everyone’s equal moral status.13 However, this metaphysical 
assumption of human nature disappears in Political Liberalism; now the sense of 
justice requires people to take everyone as free and equal only in a political sense. It 
is as if they play the roles of free and equal persons. They can have different views of 
human nature, but in the political domain they have to act as free and equal citizens 
and respect one another as such. Being a free and equal citizen is only ‘acting a part 
in a play, say of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth’.14 
For the conception of the good, Rawls also gives up the view that the desires to 
realize the two moral capacities are the ‘highest-order’ interests. In A Theory of 
Justice, because of the Kantian interpretation of human nature, the two moral 
capacities characterize the fundamental nature of human beings, so realizing them is 
to the highest intrinsic good of everyone. However, in Political Liberalism, Rawls 
merely defines the capacity for a conception of the good as ‘the capacity to form, to 
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revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational advantage or good’.15 
Free and equal citizens could form different conceptions of the good, given that these 
conceptions were formed in light of formal principles of rational choice.16 In these 
conceptions of the good, the desires to realize the two moral capacities are not 
necessarily the highest-order interests. In fact, in his later writings, Rawls changes 
the name of these desires to ‘higher-order’ interests or ‘fundamental’ interests, but 
not ‘highest-order’ interests.17 This is not only a change in name, but also represents 
a change in the status of these desires. The later Rawls acknowledges that some free 
and equal citizens might take the realization of two moral capacities as only 
instrumentally good.18 They might not, as the earlier Rawls expected, take this as the 
highest intrinsic good in their life. But still, these interests are fundamental since 
people could only take part in social cooperation after they realize these two 
capacities.  
In short, except for some minor differences, the characteristics of free and equal 
citizens are highly similar to those of free and equal persons in the earlier Rawls’ 
writings. The sense of justice no longer presupposes a Kantian interpretation of 
human nature, whereas the conception of the good no longer presupposes that people 
have the highest-order interests in realizing the two moral powers. However, one 
should not easily overlook these minor differences. The presuppositions that Rawls 
gives up belong to the Kantian comprehensive doctrine, which is controversial even 
in the liberal democratic societies.  
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7.2.2 Hybrid contractarianism and the condition of priority  
Despite minor differences, free and equal citizens would also choose principles of 
justice as fairness, as would free and equal persons. But can these principles fulfil the 
conditions of priority and generality? I will discuss how they satisfy the condition of 
priority in this section.  
Similar to the earlier Rawls, the later Rawls achieves the condition of priority by 
showing the congruence between rationality and reasonableness. However, Rawls 
does not intend to prove this congruence in all contexts.19 Rather, he aims only to 
show that rationality and reasonableness are congruent with each other in a particular 
context characterized by political conceptions. As Rawls argues,  
Just as the principles of logic, inference, and judgment would not be used were there no 
persons who could think, infer, and judge, the principles of practical reason are expressed in 
the thought and judgment of reasonable and rational persons and applied by them in their social 
and political practice. Those principles do not apply themselves, but are used by us in forming 
our intentions and actions, and plans and decisions, in our relations with other persons. This 
being so, we may call the conception of society and person ‘conceptions of practical reason’: 
they characterize the agents who reason and they specify the context for the problems and 
questions to which principle of practical reason apply.20 
Hence, political conceptions represent the context to which the rules that govern 
practical reason apply. Rationality and reasonableness have different implications in 
different contexts. For example, the rational choice in a religious context is different 
from a rational choice in a family context. As a Catholic, the most rational choice is 
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to seek for salvation; as a father, the most rational choice is to protect your family 
members and give them a good life. Rawls limits his ambition and merely consider 
what principles of justice would be rationally and reasonably justified in the context 
characterized by political conceptions. This context is about the use of coercive 
power in the basic structure; people are characterized by certain features and 
relationships in this domain. For example, in this context, a person ‘is seen as a free 
and equal citizen, the political person of a modern democracy with the political rights 
and duties of citizenship, and standing in a political relation with other citizens’.21 
All citizens understand that the basic structure possesses political power, which is 
‘always coercive power backed by the state’s machinery for enforcing its laws’.22  
Rawls then discusses which principles would be rationally and reasonably agreed and 
become an overlapping consensus insofar as all people adopt this common 
perspective, and he uses the hypothetical contract as the heuristic device. By 
identifying themselves as free and equal citizens, actual people should understand 
that they have reasons to honour principles of justice as have an overriding authority 
in the political domain, no matter what attitudes people have to principles of justice 
in other domains.23 Since his argument for priority is similar to the argument that he 
used in his earlier writings, I will only briefly discuss it here. The later Rawls 
continues to adopt a dual conception of practical reason and thus defines free and 
equal citizens as having two moral capacities. By studying the choices of these 
citizens, actual people can know why principles of justice are both rationally and 
reasonably justified. 
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From the reasonable perspective, principles of justice represent principles that could 
be publicly justified to each citizen. The later Rawls continues to use the Original 
Position to explain the reasonable justifiability of principles of justice. In the Original 
Position, the influence of arbitrary contingencies were excluded and each of the 
parties was treated fairly, so principles chosen in this situation would be principles 
that specify fair terms of social cooperation. As Rawls argues, these principles form 
‘a basis of mutual respect’ and reasonable citizens who desire a relationship of 
mutual respect, should be motivated to embrace them.24 ‘When they believe that 
institutions or social practices are just, or fair (as specified, say, by principles they 
would themselves, when fairly represented, be prepared to propose or to 
acknowledge), citizens are ready and willing to do their part in those arrangements 
provided they have sufficient assurance that others will also do theirs’.25 
From the rational perspective, principles of justice are justified also because they can 
protect fundamental interests that are highly valued by free and equal citizens. 
Although Rawls no longer proposes that the interests in realizing the two moral 
powers are the highest-order interest, these interests are still fundamentally important 
with respect to participating in social cooperation. Hence, from the perspective of 
free and equal citizens, everyone should choose principles of justice because these 
principles can guarantee that these fundamental interests are adequately satisfied.  
Hence, in the political domain, free and equal citizens have reason to endorse 
principles of justice as fairness from both rational and reasonable perspectives. As I 
discussed in the last chapter, the key to satisfying the condition of priority is to 
incorporate both rationality and reasonableness into the conception of practical 
reason. Since Rawls preserves the dual conception of practical reason in his latter 
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writings, his latter contractarian theory still possesses the virtue of fulfilling the 
condition of priority. Insofar as there are no other aspects of practical reason except 
rationality and reasonableness, free and equal citizens can be seen as fully modelling 
the practical reasoning of actual people in the political context. Given that actual 
people conceive of themselves as free and equal citizens in the political context and 
principles of justice are both rationally and reasonably justified to free and equal 
citizens, actual people have no reason to object to these principles.  
7.2.3 Hybrid contractarianism and the condition of generality  
Rawls believes that, by making the ‘political turn’, his contractarian theory can 
satisfy the condition of priority without sacrificing the condition of generality. After 
showing that rationality and reasonableness are congruent in the context 
characterized by political conceptions, Rawls further shows that these political 
conceptions are generally acceptable. Compared with Hobbesian and Kantian 
contractarianism, Rawls’ assumption is much less general since he aims only to 
provide a social contract for liberal democratic society. However, Rawls argues that 
actual people in the liberal democratic society are generally willing to deliberate in 
terms of political conceptions. Rawls gives two reasons to explain the general 
acceptance of these political conceptions.  
First, political conceptions are implicit in the public political culture of the liberal 
democratic society, thus actual people who live under this culture are all familiar 
with them. Although people belong to different associations and families and have 
different comprehensive doctrines, they all acquire these conceptions from the public 
culture. These political conceptions act as a shared approach to engaging in practical 
reasoning in public discussion. No matter what comprehensive doctrines people 
have, they are all able to use these conceptions as the ‘basic units of thought’ in the 
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political domain.26  As Rawls argues, the public political culture is ‘the shared fund 
of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles’.27 
The public culture comprises the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public 
traditions of their interpretation (including those of judiciary), as well as historical texts and 
documents that are common knowledge…In a democratic society there is a tradition of 
democratic thought, the content of which is at least familiar and intelligible to the educated 
common sense of citizens generally. Society’s main institutions, and their accepted forms of 
interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and principles.28 
Secondly, these political conceptions are freestanding in that they are compatible 
with a wide range of comprehensive doctrines. Freestandingness means that a 
conception does not presuppose any comprehensive doctrine. Comprehensive 
doctrines, such as utilitarianism and the Kantianism that the earlier Rawls adopted, 
are doctrines that include ‘concepts of what is of value in life and gives life its 
meaning’.29 ‘It covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human 
life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner’. 30  In contrast to these 
comprehensive doctrines, a political conception is one ‘that formulates its values 
independent of non-political values and of any specific relationship to them’.31 The 
political conceptions merely represent a particular approach of practical reasoning 
and this approach is not derived from any specific comprehensive doctrines. They are 
‘presented as freestanding and expounded apart from, or without reference to, any 
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wide background’. 32  Because of their independence, most of the comprehensive 
doctrines are compatible with these ideas. Rawls writes, 
A distinguishing feature of a political conception is that it is presented as freestanding and 
expounded apart from, or without reference to, any such wider background. To use a current 
phase, the political conception is a module, an essential constituent part, that fits into and can 
be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society 
regulated by it.33 
Moreover, Rawls reminds us that most of the comprehensive doctrines are not fully 
comprehensive. They usually have ‘a certain looseness’.34 Because of this looseness, 
there are many ways for the freestanding political conceptions ‘to cohere loosely 
with those (partially) comprehensive views’.35  People would accommodate these 
political conceptions into their comprehensive doctrines in different ways. Taking the 
political conception of free and equal citizens as an example, religious 
comprehensive doctrines would accept this political conception of person because 
principles of justice derived from this political conception can ‘lead to a principle of 
toleration and underwrite the fundamental liberties of a constitutional regime’.36 This 
political conception of the person can also be derived from the ideal of autonomy in 
Kantian and Millian comprehensive liberal doctrine.37 Although the approaches of 
justification are different, all citizens can find reasons to accept the political 
conception of the person from their own comprehensive doctrines.  
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In conclusion, the contractarian theory based on political conceptions overcomes the 
problem of generality that troubled the earlier Rawls. According to the later Rawls, 
the earlier version of justice as fairness is a set of principles that could not hope to 
order society without oppressive state action.38 So he emphasizes that his assumption 
in his later theory is ‘political’ but not ‘comprehensive’. The political conceptions are 
generally accepted for two reasons. First, they are latent ideas implicit in the public 
culture that everyone has a chance to acquire. Secondly, they are freestanding 
conceptions that would not conflict with most of the comprehensive doctrines. Thus, 
principles of justice justified by these conceptions can act as the focus of an 
overlapping consensus among free and equal citizens who have conflicting 
comprehensive doctrines. Rawls is confident these political conceptions can be ‘an 
open and public basis of justification for citizens as free and equal’ within the liberal 
democratic society.39  At least in a liberal democratic society, justice as fairness 
represents a social contract which can satisfy both the condition of priority and the 
condition of generality. 
7.3 The problem of generality revisited  
The ‘political’ turn seems to help Rawls’ hybrid contractarianism justify political 
principles which are both general and overriding. Rawls no longer presupposes the 
Kantian comprehensive doctrine and argues that, as long as citizens live in a just 
society, the freestanding, non-comprehensive political conceptions can be easily built 
into their comprehensive doctrines. However, I would like to argue that Rawls is still 
too optimistic about the general acceptability of political conceptions. Rawls expects 
that all citizens will use political conceptions as the only approach to engaging in 
practical reasoning in the political domain, but I believe that, even in a well-ordered 
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society, citizens are still ambivalent about the role that political conceptions should 
play in practical reasoning. Only a limited number of citizens will embrace principles 
of justice wholeheartedly as Rawls describes.  
7.3.1 The limit of scope: from the world to liberal democratic societies  
Strictly speaking, the later Rawls’ social contract fails to fulfil the condition of 
generality since its assumptions could, at best, be generally acceptable only to 
members of liberal democratic society. Rawls bites the bullet and acknowledges that 
his conception of practical reason cannot be universally accepted. In this sense, 
Rawls’ contractarianism is less general than Hobbesian and Kantian 
contractarianism. Hobbesian and Kantian contractarians expect their conceptions of 
practical reason can be applied to all human beings, regardless of their culture and 
society. Given that one is a human being, one is able to assess rationality or 
reasonableness. However, Rawls believes that his political conception of free and 
equal citizen represents a specific way of applying rationality and reasonableness in a 
certain context.40 This specific way of reasoning can be acquired only by living in a 
liberal culture. For example, if some people are not members of liberal democratic 
society, then they might simply have no interest in rationally realizing their two 
moral capacities.  
Because of its limited applicability, Rawls’ hybrid contractarianism becomes less 
appealing. It loses one of the virtues of contractarianism. In Chapter 2, I showed that 
one of the virtues of contractarianism is that it can justify the authority of political 
principles even in a highly diversified society. A modern society is usually 
characterized by a plurality of perspectives on political arrangements. It is unlike the 
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kind of small, consolidated community which has a substantial political consensus. 
Different people have different views and these views inevitably conflict with one 
another. Thus contractarians rely on some uncontroversial conceptions of practical 
reason, such as the instrumental conception of rationality adopted by Hobbesian 
contractarianism, to derive political principles which are substantial but still publicly 
justified.  
However, the later Rawls’ contractarianism can be applied only in a society that 
already has an antecedent agreement on several political conceptions. The conception 
of justice as fairness is a contingent, overlapping consensus among people with 
varying views. This undermines the significance of hybrid contractarianism, since its 
justification is directed to a specific group of people but not, like Hobbesian and 
Kantian contractarianism, directed to an indefinitely large circle. It must presuppose 
an antecedent agreement and only people who are in this agreement are the audience 
for justification. This means that Rawls’ contractarianism is helpless in a highly 
pluralistic society.  
One might argue that even though Rawls’ contractarianism can be applied only in a 
specific kind of society, it is already an impressive achievement in political 
philosophy.41 In fact, apart from Rawls, it is not uncommon for philosophers to think 
that the demands of rationality and reasonableness can only be compatible with each 
other under certain social conditions. For example, Thomas Nagel, who also cares 
about this conflict (in his terminology, this is the clash between morality and good 
life), argues that one of the possible approaches to avoid this conflict is to live under 
proper political institutions. ‘An important, perhaps the most important task of 
political thought and action is to arrange the world so that everyone can live a good 
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life without doing wrong, injuring others, benefiting unfairly from their misfortune, 
and so forth’.42 Similarly, Samuel Scheffler also argues that a good society shapes 
the psychological structure of citizens, so that citizens can avoid the conflict between 
rationality and reasonableness. Proper social institutions ‘nurture the psychological 
bases of effective moral motivation’ and ‘reduce the degree and frequency of conflict 
between moral requirements and the interest of the agent’.43 The conflict between 
rationality and reasonableness is so deep that it seems most philosophers would agree 
that it can only be avoided in a particular kind of society. Therefore, it is too 
demanding to think that Rawls’ contractarianism should be generally acceptable in 
all societies. Given the difficulty in reconciling rationality and reasonableness, we 
should appreciate Rawls’ accomplishment since he demonstrates that, at least in a 
liberal democratic society, justice as fairness represents a social agreement that is 
both rationally and reasonably justified.  
7.3.2 The limit of scope: from real liberal democratic societies to ideal well-
order society 
We can take a more sympathetic view of Rawls’ project and understand that Rawls’ 
social contract is limited only within the liberal democratic societies. Yet, I believe 
that Rawls is still too optimistic about the general acceptability of political 
conceptions. The congruence between rationality and reasonableness depends on 
freestanding political conceptions, which represent a specific, political way of 
engaging in practical reasoning. 44  By deliberating in terms of these political 
conceptions, rationality and reasonableness can be reconciled and the condition of 
priority can be fulfilled. Rawls then expects the political conceptions to be generally 
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acceptable to citizens and to act as a common ground for public justification. Rawls 
is no doubt correct that these political conceptions are more easily acceptable after 
being detached from the Kantian comprehensive doctrine. However, these political 
conceptions are still too exclusionary to be the basis of overlapping consensus among 
comprehensive doctrines in the liberal democratic society. 
For example, some comprehensive religious doctrines, such as the modern Roman 
Catholic doctrine, are clearly incompatible with these political conceptions.  This 
Catholic Church is in fact the largest church in the United States.45 The population 
that believes this comprehensive doctrine is large.46 The Catholic doctrine and the 
Rawlsian political conceptions have irresolvable epistemological disagreements; 
Rawls presupposes that free and equal citizens all accept the burdens of judgment. 
They should accept the fact that all people would answer some fundamental 
questions, such as questions of religion or truth, differently. Since they use their 
power of reason in different ways because of their life experience, they should arrive 
at different conclusions. The ultimate answers about religion and truth are hard to 
think through even under the best circumstances. However, the Roman Catholic 
doctrine obviously has a different understanding. For ‘a religious doctrine—as a 
purportedly authoritative guide to moral requirements and/or salvation—
characteristically presents itself as universally accessible to clear minds and open 
hearts’.47  It believes that, given that people could reason correctly, they should find 
that the Catholic doctrine is true. ‘Heresy and infidelity are due to worldly 
temptation, demonic intervention, divine predestination, and so on’. 48  From this 
example, we can see that even though Rawls believes that the political conceptions 
are freestanding enough, they would still conflict with some comprehensive religious 
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doctrines that are prevalent in the liberal democratic society. As George Klosko says, 
Rawls’ description of liberal democratic society beautifies the reality too much, since 
the existing liberal democratic societies are in fact unstable and full of conflicts.49 
This is also why Joseph Raz comments that ‘Rawls’ route seems barren in pluralistic 
societies…The degree of existing diversity is just too great’.50 
One might defend Rawls by arguing that the assumption of the burdens of judgment 
is merely a dispensable element in the political conceptions, and one that is 
incompatible with these comprehensive religious doctrines. The problem can be 
avoided by excluding the burdens of judgment from the political conceptions.51 But 
another more plausible response would be that Rawls’ contractarianism should not be 
misunderstood as arguing for political principles which ‘can be justifiable to all (or 
most) actual citizens in liberal democracies, even those people who do not accept 
certain basic liberal norms’.52 Rather, the aim of Rawls is to understand how political 
principles ‘can be publicly justified to the constituency of an ideal liberal democratic 
society’.53 Since Rawls’ social contract is an ideal theory, it is unfair to criticize it by 
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the unreasonable doctrines existing in the real world.54 Maybe it is true that, as some 
theorists suggest, because of the realistic political limits, we can at most expect a 
modus vivendi.55 However, the task of Rawls to show that if actual people lived in 
the perfect, ideal, well-ordered society presented by Rawls, then they would be 
possible to share political conceptions and attain a social contract that could be 
rationally and reasonably justified. Those critics who argue that political liberalism is 
inapplicable to the existing diversified world misunderstand the real ambition of 
Rawls.  
7.3.3 Weakly just citizens and strongly just citizens 
Although Rawls limits the scope of his social contract to the well-ordered society, I 
will argue in this section that such an ideal social circumstance is unsustainable and 
political liberalism would eventually fail to be publicly justified. First we have to 
understand the features of this ideal society. According to Rawls, a well-order 
society is, ‘first…a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else 
accepts, the very same principles of justice; and second, its basic structure…is 
publicly known, or with good reasons believed, to satisfy these principles. And third, 
its citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they generally comply 
with society’s basic institutions, which they regard as just.’ 56  Because of these 
special characteristics, the pluralism in this ideal society is ‘reasonable pluralism’, 
but not the normal pluralism that is commonly seen in the existing world. Pluralism 
is ‘simply a variety of doctrines and views, as one might expect from people’s 
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various interests and their tendency to focus on narrow points of view’.57 Reasonable 
pluralism is different from this, in that it is formed by ‘a diversity of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines’.58 Although citizens still hold doctrines which are different 
from one another, their doctrines are compatible with political conceptions and 
citizens have a shared commitment to give political conceptions priority in their 
practical reasoning.  
The well-ordered society is no doubt an idealized conception which does not refer to 
any society in the real world. Given such an ideal society, what kind of political 
principles would be publicly justified? What social contract could be formed among 
citizens in the well-order society? These are the questions that Rawls’ 
contractarianism aims at answering. Rawls argues that, despite the fact that citizens 
have different comprehensive doctrines in this society, principles of justice in 
political liberalism would still be rationally and reasonably justified to each citizens. 
These principles represent a public social contract that could be legitimately imposed 
in this society. Hence, political liberalism does not aspire to justify principles of 
justice to actual people in the real would. Rather, the group to which it offers 
justification is the hypothetical citizens in the well-ordered society, who already 
share the political conceptions and respect them as the common ground of public 
justification.59  
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However, it does not mean that political liberalism is merely a hypothetical contract 
irrelevant to the real world. Although political liberalism refers to a hypothetical 
contract in an ideal society, it is realistically possible (this is why Rawls calls this 
ideal society ‘realistic utopia’). Rawls explains that political liberalism could be 
realized given that a specific kind of citizens was created. Insofar as actual people 
were brought up in the well-ordered society, they could learn to be free and equal 
citizens and develop reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 60  This possibility is 
explained by the reasonable moral psychology. Rawls distinguishes the whole 
process of transformation into three stages.61 The first stage is called ‘the morality of 
authority’. Children should be brought up under the care of their parents. Lovingly 
cared for and nurtured by their parents, they are able to acquire new emotions. They 
gradually develop a loving attachment to their parents and this attachment is 
independent of their self-interest.62 The second stage is ‘the morality of association’. 
When the children grow up, they inevitably enter into different associations. 
Provided that these associations are just and other fellow associates ‘live up to their 
duties and obligations, [children] would develop friendly feelings toward them, 
together with feelings of trust and confidence’.63 These feelings for their fellows are 
also new feelings independent of people’s self-interests. People become free and 
equal citizens in the third stage when they come to embrace ‘the morality of 
principle’. They recognize the existence of principles of justice and ‘understand the 
value they secure and the way in which they are to everyone’s advantage’. 64 
Principles of justice make the families and associations that they value possible. 
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Because of this moral development, citizens can be developed into a specific kind of 
moral agent and the well-ordered society is sustainable.  
Even though citizens can acquire political conceptions through the three-stage 
process, I believe that Rawls is too optimistic that all the citizens in the well-ordered 
society will come to hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines. We should 
distinguish two kinds of citizens here: weakly just citizens and strongly just citizens. 
For weakly just citizens, their comprehensive doctrines include political conceptions. 
They know how to conceive of themselves and of society in this particular ‘political’ 
way. Political conceptions affect how they look at themselves and their society. But 
apart from having political conceptions, their political vision is also affected by other 
non-political conceptions. They think that they are not only free and equal citizens 
and society is not only shaped by fair terms of social cooperation. They still have 
other political ambitions and they will reject political principles when these 
principles overlook some non-political conceptions.65 Strongly just citizens will not 
only accept political conceptions, but also respect them as the sole ground in the 
justification of political principles. The perspective of free and equal citizens is the 
only perspective that they would use in the public domain. When they think about 
what political principles should be justified, they put other considerations in their 
comprehensive doctrines aside. In the public domain they consider justification 
merely in terms of political conceptions.  
Clearly the stability of the overlapping consensus that Rawls expected can only be 
maintained by strongly just citizens, since this kind of citizen generally accepts all 
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the assumptions of justice as fairness and is always willing to endorse justice as 
fairness, which is justified by political conceptions. Only the doctrines held by these 
citizens qualify as ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines’.66 Rawls also believes that, 
given that citizens live in a well-ordered society, they can become strongly just 
citizens.67 However, I believe that the ideal circumstances of a well-ordered society 
can cultivate only weakly just citizens. Hence the overlapping consensus is 
unsustainable.  
Suppose a person was raised in a well-ordered society. In this person’s experience of 
living with his family and various associations, he is loved and fairly treated by his 
family members and fellow associates. His development is similar to what Rawls 
describes. He starts to respect justice as fairness and acquire the political perspective 
of a free and equal citizen. But one day he passes a bookstore and finds Marx’s 
Kapital. He immediately becomes a follower of Marx, finding his theory highly 
appealing; a proletarian revolution should be brought about, the bourgeoisie should 
be overthrown and private property should be abolished.68 He takes a socialist world 
to be the most ideal world for it can lead all people to develop their nature freely in 
cooperative production without exploitation. Hence, quite apart from the perspective 
of the free and equal citizen, he acquires a new political vision. It does not mean that 
he finds that justice as fairness is unappealing and political conceptions should be 
rejected. He is different from the Catholics that we discussed before, who do not 
accept the political conceptions. Because of his past, he still values political 
conceptions, such as the idea of free and equal citizens and the idea of fair terms of 
social cooperation (supposing that he has some way to accommodate the conflicts 
between these schools). However, he now believes that these ideas are only part of 
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the things that should be considered in justifying political principles. As a socialist, 
he believes that justice as fairness is inadequate since citizens living in this society 
still cannot avoid the alienation of labour. Fully justified political principles should 
also be justified from a socialist perspective. Merely taking political conceptions into 
account is inadequate. 
This socialist is a kind of weakly just citizen. In fact, a socialist case like this is not 
uncommon in a well-ordered society. Under the protection of freedom of expression 
and freedom of association, citizens can exercise their reason in countless ways. 
Rawls surely acknowledges the diversity caused by the free exercise of human 
reason.69  But he also believes that, provided that citizens live in a well-ordered 
society, they will become strongly just citizens who would not be affected by these 
non-political values in the public domain. However, I believe that the result of the 
free exercise of human reason is more complex than Rawls suggests and, because of 
the free exercise of human reason, we can at most expect that people develop into 
weakly just citizens in the well-ordered society. Rawls is correct that, from the love 
and fair treatment of family and fellow associates, children would learn political 
conceptions and would become free and equal citizens. But they would also get in 
touch with different ideas and would develop different kinds of affective ties with 
other people. These ideas and affective ties would influence their comprehensive 
doctrines. All these comprehensive doctrines have their own ways of engaging in 
practical reasoning in the political domain, and these ways may not necessarily be 
compatible with justice as fairness. As Kukathas argues, insofar as a liberal 
government guarantees that people can exercise their reason freely, non-liberal 
citizens inevitably emerge.  
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Liberal political systems…accept within the polity people who would like to see that political 
system abandoned: anarchists, religious fundamentalists, communists, ethnic nationalists, and 
fascists among others. In liberal societies such people are free not only to hold to such views 
but also to proselytize: to argue against democracy and free speech, to discourage people from 
voting, to run for office on an anti-liberal ticket with the endorsement of an anti-liberal party, 
and even to write and publish books excoriating liberalism.70 
Hence, the three stage moral development only explains how these political 
conceptions are built into the doctrines, but does not explain why these political 
conceptions can have a special status in the justification of political principles. The 
citizens in a well-ordered society should have more than one approach for engaging 
in practical reasoning in the political domain. If political conceptions only represent 
one of these approaches, why must citizens take this approach as the only approach 
in the justification of political principles?  
In fact, this problem is more obvious when other perspectives of understanding 
politics are closely related to some fundamental commitment in citizens’ 
comprehensive doctrine. Rawls thinks that a comprehensive doctrine determines 
‘what is of value in human life and ideals of personal character’.71 These values and 
ideals give meaning to the lives of citizens. If these values and ideals imply certain 
approaches of engaging in practical reasoning in the political domain, giving up these 
approaches means that they have to betray their fundamental commitments. So why 
should citizens give up these approaches and deliberate in terms of political 
conceptions only?72 Taking the socialist as an example again: given that he firmly 
believes that some of his fellow members of society are being exploited and the 
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current state is an instrument of class domination, and his ultimate goal in life is to 
liberate his fellows from the government controlled by the capitalists, he has no 
reason to leave all these thoughts aside when he thinks about what political principles 
are justified.  
This shows the limit of Rawls’ reasonable moral psychology. Although children can 
develop into citizens who believe political conceptions, they may not accept that 
these conceptions are the sole considerations during the justification of political 
principles even they were brought up in the well-ordered society, since they may 
acquire other perspectives of understanding politics and treat political conceptions in 
different ways. There is no reason to believe that parental love and the fair treatment 
of associations has a larger effect on the lives of citizens than other influences. 
Citizens are possibly more affected by other influences and may develop 
comprehensive doctrines that do not take political conceptions as the only way of 
justifying political principles. Although Rawls recognizes the diversity caused by the 
free exercise of human reason, he still underestimates it. Rawls’ description of a 
reasonable moral psychology is not incorrect, though it is, in the end, only one of the 
possible ways in which citizens might develop in the well-ordered society.  
7.3.4 The tension between freestandingness and overridingness  
Rawls might respond that the idea of a weakly just citizen is misleading because 
when a citizen accepts a political conception without taking it as the sole ground of 
public justification at the same time, then he is unjust. The respect for political 
conceptions is related to the reasonable capacity of a free and equal citizen.73 One of 
the political conceptions that citizens learn in the course of their moral development 
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is the political conception of free and equal citizens. After the three-stage process of 
moral development, citizens should be able to conceive of themselves as free and 
equal citizens who are both rational and reasonable. If they are reasonable, they 
should understand the burdens of judgment and that political principles should be 
publicly justified to each person. They would not propose principles which allow 
using political power to apply certain religiously true or philosophically true 
policies.74  On the other hand, political conceptions are the only shared common 
ground among citizens in the well-ordered society. So if citizens want to justify 
political principles in a publicly acceptable way, then they can only use political 
conceptions and would need to put other ideas from their comprehensive doctrines 
aside. That is why political conceptions and the duty to respect these conceptions are 
inseparable.  
However, justifying this duty by invoking political conceptions simply begs the 
question. The problem is that other ideas and values in citizens’ comprehensive 
doctrines can also generate similar duties. These ideas and values can also justify a 
duty that citizens should consider other non-political conceptions during the 
justification of political principles and should not give public justifiability so much 
weight. For example, in the socialist’s mind, he has a lofty obligation to fight for a 
socialist utopia, and this commitment generates a duty to spread socialist ideas even 
in the public domain. So why should citizens give the duty to respect political 
conceptions a special status? Given that political conceptions are less crucial than 
some non-political conceptions in citizens’ comprehensive doctrines, citizens have 
no reason to give the duty generated by political conceptions—but not the duty 
generated by these non-political conceptions—a special status. In fact, if the duty to 
respect political conceptions comes from political conceptions themselves, it is hard 
to explain why political conceptions, which are merely some of the many ideas in 
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citizens’ comprehensive doctrines, can generate a duty which can outweigh other 
non-political conceptions that conflict with it.  
From this we can identify a tension in the definition of political conceptions. On the 
one hand, Rawls defines political conceptions as freestanding, such that they are not 
connected with any comprehensive doctrine. They have nothing to say about some 
fundamental philosophical questions in human life, such as what is truth and what 
the meaning of life might be. Although they are moral ideas, they do not have any 
strong and comprehensive ethical implications.75 On the other hand, Rawls says that 
political conceptions are able to establish a duty which is great enough to outweigh 
all the non-political conceptions.  No matter how important these non-political 
conceptions are in the lives of citizens, citizens should still be strongly just and not 
be affected by them (or only affected by them to a limited extent).76 
However, it is unclear how political conceptions, which are merely freestanding, 
intuitive ideas that do not have any strong philosophical and ethical implication, can 
create a duty which can outweigh citizens’ fundamental philosophical and ethical 
beliefs. Human beings usually have their own answers to fundamental philosophical 
and ethical questions. These philosophical or ethical beliefs, though non-political, 
provide accounts of meaning in life and affect how they understand the world. Since 
these beliefs are fundamentally important in people’s life, people’s actions which are 
caused by these beliefs would not be easily affected by other intuitive or fragmented 
beliefs. If people are willing to ignore these philosophical and ethical beliefs because 
of political conceptions, then these political conceptions inevitably must have 
something to say about the fundamental philosophical and ethical questions. But if 
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the political conceptions are really connected with certain liberal comprehensive 
doctrines, then they will no longer be as freestanding as Rawls presents. Political 
conceptions are no longer a relatively simple framework that can facilitate public 
discussion among citizens of diverse backgrounds and faiths. Hence, the assumption 
of strongly just citizens requires Rawls to assign to political conceptions a 
comprehensive role that is incompatible with the freestanding nature of political 
conceptions. Justifying the duty to respect political conceptions by political 
conceptions themselves merely undermines the general acceptability of political 
conceptions. 
In light of how rare strongly just citizens are, I believe that the scope of Rawls’ 
hybrid contractarianism is much more limited than Rawls imagines. Compared with 
the earlier Rawls’ contractarianism, the later Rawls’ contractarianism is surely 
compatible with more comprehensive doctrines. Free and equal citizens could hold 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines which include a wide range of possibilities, such 
as liberal Catholicism, liberal utilitarianism, Kantianism, Millianism, value 
pluralism, and so on. However, as Thomas Hill indicates, the change in Rawls is 
actually not so radical, for most of the things in A Theory of Justice are preserved.77 
If many comprehensive doctrines are incompatible with the Kantian comprehensive 
doctrines of A Theory of Justice, then most of them will remain incompatible with 
the political conceptions. Many comprehensive doctrines can embrace political 
conceptions but do not treat political conceptions as the sole basis for justifying 
political principles. These comprehensive doctrines can surely emerge in a well-
ordered society. As we saw before, the circumstances of a well-ordered society can at 
most guarantee that people become weakly just citizens, but cannot guarantee that 
they become strongly just citizens. The socialist doctrine is one of many possibilities 
that would appear in a well-ordered society. In the end, Rawls’ political conception 
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of justice would only be accepted among strongly just citizens, who are only some of 
the citizens in the well-ordered society.78  
It is worth noting that I am not criticizing the problem of partial compliance of 
Rawls’ contractarianism. I am not saying that in the real world many actual people 
would disagree with Rawls’ assumption or that modern society is so diversified that 
an overlapping consensus is unrealistic.79  From the example of Roman Catholic 
Church, we can see that these kinds of people are inevitable. Yet this question is 
neither Rawls’ concern nor mine. Since Rawls is proposing an ideal theory, he needs 
only to prove that, in the ideal social circumstances that he describes, it is 
realistically possible that citizens endorse justice as fairness.80  Because of many 
problems in the real world, maybe an overlapping consensus on justice as fairness 
will never come to exist, but this political ideal is still realistically possible.81 In a 
well-ordered society governed by justice as fairness, this political ideal is stable and 
sustainable. There are many actual people who disagree now only because the 
current social circumstance affects their growing experience. Rawls made a political 
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turn in his later writings because, even in an ideal well-ordered society, the Kantian 
comprehensive doctrine is still not generally accepted among citizens.82 
However, the critique I want to make is that, despite justice as fairness being less 
comprehensive, its assumptions are still too substantial in that it would not be widely 
adopted in a well-ordered society. Because of the free exercise of human reason and 
the free circulation of thought, it is not generally acceptable among people even in 
the most ideal circumstances. Weakly just citizens would emerge (and not in a 
minority) and would refuse to be one of the members of Rawls’ social contract. 
Hence the problem of realistic possibility still remains. Rawls believes that his earlier 
expectation that the Kantian comprehensive doctrine would be widely adopted in a 
well-ordered society is unrealistic, but it seems that it is not less unrealistic to expect 
that a particular way of treating political conceptions would be widely adopted 
without being questioned by citizens. 83  If Rawls takes the controversy over the 
Kantian interpretation of human nature as a critical problem in his earlier writings, 
then he would be unable to deny that the controversy over the importance of political 
conceptions is a critical problem as well, since the two problems have the same 
nature.  
One might defend for Rawls by arguing that this critique misunderstands Rawls’s 
ambition. He merely aims at showing that it is realistically possible to have a well-
ordered society in which his principles of justice could be publicly justified among 
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citizens. Even if the emergence of weakly just citizens is inevitable, Rawls’s theory 
is still coherent. For when weakly just citizens occur, the society is no longer well-
ordered, and it is not the kind of society with which Rawls is concerned.84 However, 
I am not sure whether Rawls would satisfy with this level of achievement.  As Rawls 
himself argues, a conception of justice is “seriously defective” if it fails to engender 
in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it.85 He does not only wants to show 
that a well-ordered society could possibly exist, but also wants to show that such a 
society is self-sustainable. The society can always produce the specific kind of 
citizens which is necessary for maintaining its existence. Citizens would not be 
tempted to be unjust and would support the just institutions continuously. Yet, as we 
saw before, Rawls overestimates the stability of a well-ordered society. Even in the 
ideal social circumstance of a well-ordered society, people would grow up in various 
ways and only some of them would become strongly just citizens. The conception of 
justice as fairness would be challenged by weakly just citizens and a well-ordered 
society would inevitably become unstable. Although Rawls’s social contract 
becomes more freestanding and widely acceptable, it still falls prey to the problem of 
instability.  
Interestingly, the philosophical problem that Rawls fails to solve also bothered 
Rousseau, who is another hybrid contractarian. In Emile, Rousseau argues that 
whether a civil city is stable depends on whether a particular kind of citizen can be 
created. Citizens can be educated properly insofar as they live in a society ruled by a 
Great Legislator. By acquiring correct knowledge, citizens will share the same 
communal selves and ‘believe [themselves] no longer one but a part of the unity and 
no longer feel except within the whole.’86 They will respect laws that can preserve 
their freedom and natural goodness. Thus a stable civil society can be created. In 
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Rawls’ terminology, these citizens share a conception of citizenship and always 
respect this public basis of justification.  
However, as Judith Skhlar argues, Rousseau’s project of creating citizens is 
problematic, because the emergence of individual selves is inevitable and these 
individual selves will conflict with the shared communal selves.87 When children 
grow up, they naturally develop inner lives of their own and this is a necessary 
consequence of the free exercise of reason. These individual selves play a far more 
crucial role in people’s lives than the communal selves do. Independence and self-
esteem can only flourish if one’s individual self is preserved. Insofar as the 
emergence of individual selves is natural, it is very difficult to create citizens who 
only have communal selves. This is why Rousseau is so deeply aware of the 
individuality of each person and argues that the Great Legislator should adopt a strict 
surveillance regime.88 But Rawls cannot propose the same measures since the first 
principle of justice as fairness guarantees that everyone has equal basic liberties, 
which include freedom of speech. Given that the conditions of generality and priority 
can be satisfied insofar as a particular kind of citizens is created, and the creation of 
citizens involves totalitarian measures that Rawls would not accept, Rawls is 
unavoidably caught in the contractarianism’s dilemma. The coercive measures 
proposed by Rousseau indicate that creating citizens is in fact not as easy as Rawls 
thinks.   
In conclusion, even after the political turn, Rawls still fails to achieve the condition 
of priority without sacrificing the condition of generality. Since he aims at achieving 
the condition of priority he must presuppose that citizens are all strongly just citizens 
in order to explain why they would always deliberate in terms of political 
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conceptions in the political domain. Yet, as with the Kantian interpretation of human 
nature, this presupposition undermines the general acceptability of Rawls’ 
contractarianism. It is not only that, in the real world, there are comprehensive 
doctrines like the Roman Catholic doctrine that are incompatible with political 
conceptions. Even in a well-ordered society in which every citizen was ‘properly’ 
brought up, they would only become weakly just citizens. Hybrid contractarianism is 
not prepared to deal with those citizens who are not reasonable enough: ‘Political 
Liberalism does not engage those who think in this [unreasonable] way’.89 However, 
the fact is that it is possible for many of these citizens who refuse to be members of 
Rawls’ social contract to appear even in a well-ordered society. 
7.4 Creating ideal citizens by education  
In the last section, I showed that the general acceptability of hybrid contractarianism 
is still unsatisfactory despite Rawls’ political turn. Rawls has two possible responses: 
one is about social circumstance and one is about philosophical reason. First, Rawls 
could emphasize the educational effect of the social circumstances of the well-
ordered society. Secondly, Rawls could give philosophical reasons to explain why 
citizens in the well-ordered society should develop reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines. In Section 7.4 and 7.5 I will examine these two responses respectively.  
7.4.1 Public political culture and background culture  
One of Rawls’ fundamental beliefs is that, when under proper social circumstances, 
children can be educated to become strongly just citizens in the well-ordered 
                                                 
89
 Rawls (1997: 574). 
Chapter 7 Hybrid Contractarianism (2) 
292 
 
society.90 Rawls emphasizes the educational influence of public political culture to 
citizens. Given that citizens live under a liberal democratic culture, they should be 
affected by this culture and should learn to be strongly just.91 As Rawls notes,  
If citizens of a well-ordered society are to recognize one another as free and equal, basic 
institutions must educate them to this conception of themselves, as well as publicly exhibit and 
encourage this ideal of political justice. This task of education belongs to what we may call the 
wide role of a political conception. In this role such a conception is part of the public political 
culture: its first principles are embodied in the institutions of the basic structure and appealed 
to in their interpretation. Acquaintance with and participation in that public culture is one way 
citizens learn to conceive of themselves as free and equal, a conception which, if left to their 
own reflections, they would most likely never form, much less accept and desire to realize.92 
However, the educational effect of the public political culture is too vague to the 
extent that it is unclear how influential it can be in the growth of citizens. As we saw 
previously, due to the free exercise of human reason, citizens can develop various 
kinds of comprehensive doctrines. They are also affected by different cultures during 
their growth, and public political culture is only one of the sources of influence.  
For example, as Rawls himself indicates, besides public political culture, a well-
ordered society also has a ‘background culture’, which consists of ‘the culture of 
churches and associations of all kinds, and institutions of learning at all levels, 
especially universities and professional schools, scientific and other societies’.93 In 
the background culture, citizens can spread their comprehensive doctrines and 
persuade others by non-political conceptions. They do not have the responsibilities of 
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limiting themselves to use political conceptions and to act as free and equal citizens. 
They can even criticize political conceptions and this distinction between public and 
private domain in the sphere of background culture.94 According to Rawls, the public 
political culture and the background culture are compatible with each other. Suppose 
Rawls’ description is true in a well-ordered society, yet how can Rawls be sure that, 
in the development of children, the influence of public political culture must be 
greater than that of their background culture?  From the public political culture, 
children learn to be free and equal citizens and understand society as embodying fair 
terms of social cooperation. However, they can also learn other conceptions of the 
person and other perspectives on society and politics from the background culture.95 
The assumption of the educational effect of the public political culture seems to 
overlook the fact that the background culture can have the same level of influence on 
citizens as well.  
7.4.2 Examining the influence of families and associations  
Apart from the public political culture, families and associations also contribute to 
the moral development of children. As Rawls indicates, although principles of justice 
are not applied within families and associations, they are applied to these groups.96 
Families and associations have an obligation to ensure that children are raised to 
become ideal citizens; for example, they must love and fairly treat their children. The 
education of children should include teaching them about political conceptions so 
that they know the history of these conceptions and the role of these conceptions in 
the public culture. ‘[Children’s] education should prepare them to be fully 
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cooperating members of society and enable them to be self-supporting; it should also 
encourage the political virtues so that they want to honour the fair terms of social 
cooperation in their relations with the rest of society’.97 
Rawls is quite vague on the obligations that families and associations must assume. 
These obligations seem to be quite loose in that families and associations still enjoy a 
lot of freedom in teaching their young members. Some things are clearly prohibited, 
such as the abuse and neglect of children and the failure to expose them to 
citizenship education in order to ensure that children are loved and fairly treated.98 
So children can develop as Rawls describes. However, provided that families and 
associations fulfil these obligations, it seems that they are free to teach non-political 
conceptions to children. For example, they have the freedom to tell them bedtime 
stories, take them to cultural activities during holidays and so on. Rawls intends to 
avoid imposing harsh restrictions on the educational activities of families and 
associations. ‘At some point society has to rely on the natural affection and goodwill 
of the mature family members’.99 Yet, if the obligations are really so loose, it is hard 
to guarantee that children will become the strongly just citizens that Rawls expects. 
Because of the freedom that just institutions allow families and associations, they can 
transmit non-political values, including perspectives on politics different from the 
political conceptions. These teachings may have an enormous influence on the 
development of children, even more than the influence of public citizenship 
education. Therefore, even though children are loved and fairly treated and they have 
chances to be exposed to citizenship education, it does not mean that they will 
necessarily become strongly just citizens. These conditions are only necessary 
conditions, but not sufficient conditions.  
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One might reply that the scenario presented above would only occur in a non-well-
ordered society. If the society is really well-arranged, then all families and 
associations should hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines which support 
principles of justice for right reason, that is, ‘all those who affirm the political 
conception start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the 
religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it provides’. 100  Given that they all 
endorse political conceptions, families and associations should have no reason to 
teach children something incompatible with political conceptions.  
In such ideal circumstances, children can avoid corruption and will not become 
anything but strongly just citizens. However, it seems to paint too rosy a picture of a 
well-ordered society. This picture is problematic since it assumes that all citizens in a 
well-ordered society are strongly just. In my discussion above, I showed that a well-
ordered society can only guarantee that all citizens are weakly just. Since these 
weakly just citizens have different comprehensive doctrines, they will have different 
approaches of teaching children. The diversity can be explained by the relationship 
between conscience and the education of children. The transmission of views to the 
next generation is in fact an important expression of conscience. The conscience of 
citizens is not only in their minds; they also want to exemplify it to their offspring 
and the young members of their associations.101 Citizens usually want to ensure that 
the conscientious views that they value most will not die out and can continue to be 
held by someone in the future.102 Thus most parents are highly concerned with how 
their children develop and whether they are influenced badly. Adult members of 
associations also want to transmit their comprehensive doctrines to their young 
members.  
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In light of the importance of the education of children, one should understand that 
weakly just citizens will not easily concede the right to educate children. They are 
not satisfied with transmitting only political values to their children and expect to 
further transmit other non-political values as well, in order to let their offspring know 
the political visions that they think are valuable. This disagreement on the teaching 
approach is an unavoidable outcome of the free exercise of reason. If citizens have 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines because of their liberty of conscience (as we 
saw in 7.3.3), then they should have conflicting understandings of approaches to 
teaching as well. As Kukathas argues, everyone agrees that children should be 
educated properly, but what is disputed is what a proper education is and a liberal 
government cannot simply presume something that is in dispute.103 It is unrealistic to 
expect that a consensus on teaching approaches can be achieved even in a well-
ordered society. Such a consensus may come to exist among strongly just citizens, 
but not among weakly just citizens.104 
Hence, if an overlapping consensus depends on the production of a particular kind of 
citizen, and this production depends on a consensus on teaching approaches, and no 
particular teaching approach can be generally accepted in the well-ordered society, 
then education is not a good answer to the problem of general acceptability of Rawls’ 
contractarianism. It is because the educational approach itself also cannot avoid 
controversy even in the well-ordered society.  
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Moreover, if the general acceptability of political conceptions presupposes so many 
educational procedures, then this general acceptability is still vulnerable to the 
problem of immigration. Rawls presupposes that the just society is ‘a closed society: 
that is, we are to regard it as self-contained and as having no relations with other 
societies’.105 Yet this assumption is unrealistic since immigration is inevitable in the 
modern world. Many people cross national boundaries and move to different 
countries. We can expect that there would be a large number of people trying to 
migrate to the well-ordered society that Rawls describes. These immigrants would 
not have received citizenship education before, so they would not be the strongly just 
citizens that Rawls expects. They may hold other unreasonable comprehensive 
doctrines and may not be willing to acknowledge the special status of political 
conceptions. Because of this lack of learning experience, the assumptions of justice 
as fairness would not be generally acceptable to them. They would be outside the 
scope of overlapping consensus. However, if the well-ordered society does not allow 
these immigrants to move in and sets a very high standard of immigration, then its 
migration policy would be unrealistic. This further shows the limit of hybrid 
contractarianism; if hybrid contractarianism can be applied only in a closed society 
which implements an extensive educational policy, then nearly no existing societies 
can fit this standard. 
In conclusion, Rawls overestimates the educational effect of the social circumstances 
of the well-ordered society. Undoubtedly the well-ordered society is a desirable 
environment in that it cultivates children to become strongly just citizens. However, 
even in such an ideal environment, the number of people who will become strongly 
just citizens is still limited.  
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7.5 The desirability of justice as fairness 
If the social circumstances cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the question of 
general acceptability, then Rawls might have to rely on philosophical arguments to 
explain why citizens should transform their comprehensive doctrines. As we saw in 
section 2, comprehensive doctrines are not fully comprehensive and rigid. They 
usually have some conceptual spaces and citizens can develop an independent 
allegiance to support political conceptions. But why would they develop this 
allegiance? Rawls explains that this allegiance can be attributed to their recognition 
of the benefits brought by justice as fairness. Surely Rawls does not overlook the 
possibility of the conflicts between political conceptions and other elements in the 
comprehensive doctrines. But he believes that, in light of the great desirability of 
justice as fairness, citizens in the well-ordered society would become strongly just 
citizens and would transform their doctrines into reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
after reflection. When they conflict with each other, political conceptions ‘normally 
outweigh whatever other values oppose them’.106 Rawls gives two answers to explain 
the desirability of a well-ordered society.107 This section considers whether these two 
reasons are enough to persuade citizens to transform their doctrines.  
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7.5.1 The collective-social-good argument 
The first reason relies on the collective social good of the well-ordered society. This 
argument first appears in A Theory of Justice,108 and Rawls continues to use it in 
Political Liberalism.109 Rawls first emphasizes the social nature of mankind. The 
power of a person is limited: ‘no one person can do everything he might do; nor a 
fortiori can he do everything that any other person can do. The potentialities of each 
individual are greater than those he can hope to realize.’110 Each person can only 
realize in himself one of the many possible lives that together make up human 
flourishing. This implies that if people choose to develop some of their talents, then 
they inevitably fail to enjoy the benefits which come from the development of other 
talents. But if people participate in social cooperation, they can benefit from the 
fruition of others’ developments. In a well-ordered society, principles of justice 
guarantee every member of society equal basic liberties and adequate primary goods. 
All members are given sufficient freedom and resources to realize their potentialities 
and participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of the others. These 
members together form a rich and diversified collective activity which would benefit 
every participant. Each citizen enjoys this social good ‘through citizens’ joint activity 
in mutual dependence on the appropriate actions being taken by others’.111 Rawls 
believes that this kind of social good which is based on cooperation should not be 
unfamiliar to people.  
That there should be such a political and social good is no more mysterious than that members 
of an orchestra, or players on a team, or even both teams in a game, should take pleasure and a 
certain (proper) pride in a good performance, or in a good play of the game, one that they will 
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want to remember. No doubt the requisite conditions become more difficult to satisfy as 
societies become larger and the social distance between citizens becomes greater, but these 
differences, as great and inhibiting as they may be, do not affect the psychological principle 
involves in realizing the good of justice in a well-ordered society.112 
A well-ordered society is a community of humankind in which its members are able 
to enjoy one another’s excellence and individuality. Given that no one can realize 
their conception of the good on their own without relying on others, everyone can 
benefit from this collective asset. That is why Rawls argues the well-ordered society 
is ‘a great social good and appreciated as such’.113 
However, this possible response overemphasizes the dependence of comprehensive 
doctrines on the well-ordered society. Suppose that some weakly just citizens belong 
to one group. If the size of this group is large enough, then they are able to sustain 
themselves. They can separate themselves from the society and refuse to give 
political conceptions special status. For example, as long as a religious community 
can sustain itself, why do its members have to accept the rule of a liberal state which 
may prohibit the realization of their religious goods? The ideal cooperative 
circumstance presented by Rawls can also be achieved by a group of citizens given 
that this group is large enough. Surely, one may argue that, through participating in 
social cooperation with other members, these particular associations can obtain more 
goods and enjoy the excellences of other members. Nevertheless, the benefit which 
comes from social cooperation may still fail to overcome the loss which they have to 
suffer when they make a concession to justice as fairness. Isolating themselves from 
the society may still be a better choice for them to realize their religious doctrines.  
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Even if we believe that the social good of a well-ordered society is a necessary 
condition of realizing the comprehensive conceptions of the good, it does not mean 
that everyone should act as free and equal citizens unconditionally. It seems that a 
more intelligent strategy is to act as free and equal citizens conditionally. Obviously, 
sometimes breaking principles of justice could help citizens to realize their 
conceptions of the good more effectively. On the other hand, we know that the whole 
social cooperative scheme will not vanish because of one or two rule-breaking 
behaviours. Therefore, instead of being a loyal follower of principles of justice, one 
should be a ‘sensible knave’, that is, acting as a free and equal citizen ordinarily, but 
waiting for chances to break the rules with impunity. In this way one can enjoy the 
fruit of social cooperation in the well-ordered society and also take advantage of 
others by breaking the rule as long as this will not affect one’s ability to remain with 
the well-ordered society. The fact that one can benefit from the citizens’ joint activity 
in mutual dependence can at most show that one should act upon principles of justice 
conditionally. It cannot explain why citizens should not insist on holding reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines if they can do it with impunity and still enjoy the collective 
good of a well-ordered society. In the end, although Rawls is correct that a well-
ordered society governed by justice as fairness is a ‘highly significant’ social 
good,114  he exaggerates the importance of this social good on the realization of 
comprehensive conceptions of the good.   
7.5.2 The self-respect argument 
The second reason that Rawls could give is that justice as fairness ‘secure[s] for 
citizens…the social bases of mutual respect’. 115  Rawls believe that self-respect, 
which is related to the exercise of two moral capacities, is ‘perhaps the most 
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important primary good’. 116  If people can exercise their two moral capacities 
adequately, then they achieve a moral ideal (free and equal citizenship) that is 
integral to their self-conceptions and may enjoy a certain kind of moral excellence. 
This achievement is important because it ‘provides a secure sense of our own value, 
a firm conviction that our determinate conception of the good is worth carrying out. 
Without self-respect nothing may seem worth doing, and if some things have value 
for us, we lack the will to pursue them’.117 If people fail to achieve this ideal, then 
they will suffer from a sense of shame, that is, ‘an injury to self-respect’.118 In order 
to protect self-respect and avoid shame, citizens will support justice as fairness and 
transform their doctrine into reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This is because 
justice as fairness can provide equal basic liberties and an adequate quantity of 
primary goods, which are essential for the development of two moral capacities. 
Given that these primary goods are guaranteed, the self-respect of citizens can be 
protected. ‘Only the two principles of justice guarantee the basic liberties, they are 
more effective than the other alternatives in encouraging and supporting the self-
respect of citizens as equal persons’.119 Hence, by living in a well-ordered society, 
each citizen can secure their fundamental need for self-respect and avoid suffering 
from shame.  
This reason explains the desirability of justice as fairness by the sense of worth that it 
protects. However, although a just institution can help citizens to secure self-respect, 
it can at most provide one of the ways of securing self-respect. Self-respect can be 
established in many alternative ways. Rawls defines self-respect in quite broadly way. 
He explains self-respect in terms of the achievement of the goals and ideals one 
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incorporates into one’s life plans.120 Rawls distinguishes two ways that self-respect 
can be harmed. First is the case of moral shame. Moral shame refers specifically to 
the failure to satisfy the desire to realize the ideal of free and equal citizen. As we 
saw before, although individuals treat the conception of free and equal citizen in 
different ways, all of them accept this ideal and take the realization of this ideal as an 
excellence. Hence, if citizens fail to realize this ideal, then it follows that they fail to 
do something that they ‘prize as excellences’,121  and fail to achieve an excellence 
that is publicly recognized by other fellow citizens. This creates in them a sense of 
moral shame and harms their self-respect. Apart from this, there is also another kind 
of shame - natural shame.  Natural shame refers to the failure to satisfy ‘our 
aspirations, what we try to do and with whom we wish to associate’.122 Its source is 
much broader than moral shame because it can come from the failure of satisfying 
any goal and ideal, provided that these goals and ideals play important roles in a plan 
of life. An athlete can be ashamed if he fails to win a championship. A student can be 
ashamed if he fails to become the kind of exemplary student that he expects to be.  
‘Given our plan of life, we tend to be ashamed of those defects in our person and 
failures in our actions that indicate a loss or absence of the excellences essential to 
our carrying out our more important associative aims’.123 
Given that there are two kinds of shame, embracing principle of justice might help 
citizens avoid moral shame, but it might cause citizens to suffer from natural shame. 
Citizens can avoid moral shame because they can become the free and equal citizens 
they want to be. But apart from this ideal, citizens also have many other ideals and 
goals in their comprehensive doctrines. These ideals and goals may conflict with 
justice as fairness. An athlete may want more primary goods, so that he can have 
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more resources to support his training. A religious believer may want to change 
political arrangements for the sake of attracting more people to believe in her 
religion. Failure to achieve these goals and realize these ideals may create a strong 
sense of natural shame. Moreover, it is hard to see that natural shame is any less 
painful than moral shame. Rawls does not explain why people would choose to avoid 
moral shame but not natural shame. If shame is a reason for citizens to support 
justice as fairness, then it seems it can be a reason for citizens to go against justice as 
fairness as well. Citizens who choose to support a just institution may have to suffer 
from natural shame even though they avoid moral shame. Their self-respect might 
still be harmed.  
Furthermore, this interpretation of self-respect is also controversial in the well-
ordered society. As John Deigh points out, Rawls’ account of self-respect is 
inadequate because it fails to explain certain expression of self-respect and shame.124 
Sometimes there is a loss of self-respect but we do not feel any shame (imagine a 
tennis player who tries his best but is still defeated by a much stronger opponent). 
Whether or not Deign’s critique is sound, it seems too quick to assume that Rawls’ 
interpretation of self-respect would be uncontroversial in a well-ordered society 
where every citizen can freely exercise their human reason. Given that citizens have 
different philosophical and religious doctrines, they should also have different 
understandings of self-respect. If Rawls simply assumes that his interpretation of 
self-respect is generally accepted in a well-ordered society, then it merely begs the 
question.  
In conclusion, these two explanations use the same strategy: a strategy of 
emphasizing the desirability of adopting a reasonable comprehensive doctrine and 
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living in a well-ordered society. The first explanation argues the desirability from a 
social perspective, while the second argues it from an individual perspective. 
However, this strategy is inadequate since it can at most show that justice as fairness 
is desirable, but it is not enough to explain why citizens should change their doctrines 
into reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Why must they be strongly just citizens? 
The desirability of justice as fairness is not irreplaceable. Citizens can enjoy other 
more desirable goods even though they are weakly just citizens. Therefore, although 
Rawls gives some reasons to explain why citizens should join his social contract, this 
is not enough to show that citizens would generally accept them even after reflection.  
7.6 Conclusion 
At the end of the last chapter we saw that Rawls faces a dilemma in choosing to meet 
the demands of generality and priority. Either he has to keep the Kantian 
interpretation of human nature and sacrifice generality, or he has to drop the Kantian 
interpretation and sacrifice priority. Thus the later Rawls chooses to drop the Kantian 
interpretation but suggest a new, more ‘political’ version of contractarianism which 
can satisfy both the condition of generality and the condition of priority. He first 
secures the condition of priority by defining several freestanding political 
conceptions implicit in the public political culture. These political conceptions 
represent a way of engaging in rational and reasonable thinking in the political 
domain. If rationality and reasonableness are understood in this particular context, 
then they would lead to the same set of principles: justice as fairness. By showing 
that these principles are both rationally and reasonably justified, Rawls’ hybrid 
contractarianism can satisfy the condition of priority. Rawls believes that this 
approach to satisfying the condition of priority can also avoid the problem of 
generality that troubles the earlier version of his contractarianism. He first 
acknowledges that his contractarianism can only be applied to liberal democratic 
societies. But he believes that, within these societies, the political conceptions are 
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generally acceptable.  Thus the conception of justice as fairness justified by these 
political conceptions is an overlapping consensus. Hence, by making a ‘political’ 
turn, Rawls’ hybrid contractarianism can satisfy the condition of priority without 
sacrificing the condition of generality.  
However, I believe that the dilemma is more serious than Rawls thinks. Even in the 
most idealist liberal democratic society that Rawls expects, that is, a well-ordered 
society governed by justice as fairness, political conceptions are still not generally 
accepted by citizens. In a well-ordered society, citizens have opportunities to learn 
political conceptions and undergo the three-stage moral development described by 
Rawls. However, it only means that political conceptions could be built into citizens’ 
comprehensive doctrines and they would become weakly just citizens. It is too much 
to assume that all citizens would become strongly just citizens who are willing to 
take these political conceptions as the sole ground of justification of political 
principles. Because of the free exercise of human reason, citizens are able to develop 
different comprehensive doctrines. Although political conceptions are widely shared 
among citizens, these conceptions are only part of their comprehensive doctrines. 
Why would this part, which is constituted by merely freestanding intuitive ideas, 
have any special status? If its special status is justified by political conceptions 
themselves, then this undermines the freestanding nature of political conceptions. If 
its special status is justified by other parts of comprehensive doctrines, then a lot of 
comprehensive doctrines do not acknowledge this special status. In the end, Rawls 
still fails to avoid the dilemma of having to choose between generality and priority. If 
his theory has to satisfy the condition of priority, then he must presuppose that every 
citizen gives a particular ‘political’ way of engaging in practical reasoning an 
overriding importance, yet this presupposition cannot be generally accepted even in 
the well-ordered society that Rawls expects.  
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The failure of the later Rawls indicates how difficult it is to satisfy both the condition 
of generality and the condition of priority. Rationality and reasonableness are the two 
aspects of practical reason, but they justify different conclusions when they are 
applied in different contexts. An artist can apply rationality and reasonableness in his 
own way, while a communist can apply them in another way. Therefore, when a 
contractarian wants to use practical reason as the source of the normative power of 
his contractarian theory, he can only define practical reason in a very formal way, for 
the sake of being compatible with different applications of practical reason. For 
example, Gauthier simply defines rationality as formal principles of rational choice. 
No matter what ends a person has, given that he applies this instrumental conception 
of rationality, he is subjected to the normativity of Hobbesian contractarianism. He 
makes this assumption to ensure that their assumptions are generally acceptable. 
However, since Rawls has to show that rationality and reasonableness can be 
reconciled with one another, he assumes a particular way of engaging in rational and 
reasonable thinking, which is a way used by ‘free and equal citizens’. Nevertheless, 
Rawls eventually fails to explain why it is generally acceptable that this particular 
way might enjoy a special status but other ways may not.125 While Rawls preserves 
the virtue of priority, he inevitably gives up the virtue of generality.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel famously said, ‘the Owl of Minerva 
begins its flight only with the onset of dusk’.1 This dictum can also be applied to the 
history of thought because a form of thought can only be fairly evaluated once 
developed maturely. Like the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the late twentieth 
century is another golden age of contractarianism and contractarians have employed 
this methodology in various ways since the 1960s. Today is nearly half a century 
after the rebirth of contractarianism and is an appropriate time to evaluate the 
achievement of this philosophical movement. The aim of this thesis is to be the Owl 
of Minerva which spreads its wings during the twilight of contemporary 
contractarianism. Now the flight is reaching its end. Before the end of this flight I 
want to discuss three things. First, I will briefly outline the argument of this thesis 
and explain the main contribution. Secondly, I will show why my analysis is better 
than, and can contribute to, existing approaches to evaluating contractarianism. 
Lastly, I will briefly discuss how, if my analysis is true, contractarianism might be 
developed in the future.  
8.1 The dilemma of contractarianism 
This thesis questions whether or not contractarianism is a good methodology for 
justifying political principles. By looking at different contemporary contractarian 
                                                 
1
 Hegel (1991: 23). In fact the original meaning of this sentence is that we can only grasp the 
rationality in history and politics by philosophy. Major historical transformations in political and 
social institutions were usually realized even though people did not fully understand the meanings of 
these transformations. Hence philosophers have to look back the history and evaluate these historical 
events after these events have been over. My usage here is a bit different from Hegel’s original usage 
because the objects of evaluation are theories in the history of political thought rather than political 
and social events in the history.  
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models, it is possible to see the strengths and weaknesses of contractarianism as a 
general methodology. Unlike classical contractarianism, contemporary 
contractarianism discards voluntarism and takes practical reason as the source of 
normativity. Based on different conceptions of practical reason, different 
contractarian models can be developed. However, not all models are the same good. 
Some can provide more convincing justifications, while some cannot. This depends 
on whether the model can satisfy two conditions: generality and priority. This thesis 
discusses different models and the result of my analysis can be presented in the 
following table: 
Table 5 Contractarianism’s Dilemma 
 Satisfies the condition of 
generality 
Does not satisfy the condition 
of generality   
Satisfies the 
condition of priority  
 Hybrid contractarianism 
(Rawls) 
Does not satisfy the 
condition of priority  
Hobbesian contractarianism 
(Gauthier), 
Kantian contractarianism 
(Scanlon, Barry) 
Utilitarian contractarianism 
(Harsanyi) 
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The first possible contractarian model is Utilitarian contractarianism, which is 
represented by Harsanyi and attempts to justify utilitarianism by a contractarian 
model. This model is based on an altruistic conception of rationality. However, since 
this conception is not a general pattern of practical reasoning, utilitarian 
contractarianism fails to be generally acceptable. Also, this conception is not 
inclusive because it ignores the conception of reasonableness, which is the other 
aspect of practical reason. Hence this model fails to satisfy either of the conditions of 
generality and priority.  
The second model is Hobbesian contractarianism which is indebted to Hobbes and 
represented by Gauthier. This model is based on an instrumental conception of 
rationality. Since this conception is merely a formal account, it is generally 
compatible with rational reasoning, but its flaw is that it overlooks another dimension 
of practical reason: reasonableness.  
Kantian contractarianism, the third model, also has a similar theoretical problem. It is 
represented by Scanlon and has an historical root that can be traced back to Locke 
and Kant. Contrary to Hobbesian contractarianism, its conception of practical reason 
is a conception of reasonableness that takes the constraint of justifiability as absolute. 
Our sense of guilt proves that this conception grasps a general feature of our practical 
reasoning. Nevertheless, it is one-sided and overlooks another aspect of practical 
reason: rationality. Hence, both Hobbesian and Kantian contractarianism share the 
same problem: they can satisfy the condition of generality, but fail to satisfy the 
condition of priority.  
The problem of these two models can be overcome in the fourth model: hybrid 
contractarianism. Like Rousseau’s, Rawls’ contractarian model has a hybrid 
character. Rawls’ conception of practical reason is a dual conception which consists 
of both rationality and reasonableness. Therefore his social contract is both rationally 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
312 
 
and reasonably justified. By embracing this social contract, rationality and 
reasonableness are congruent with each other. This model can satisfy the condition of 
priority because of its more comprehensive conception of practical reason. 
Nevertheless, since Rawls has to prove the congruence between rationality and 
reasonableness, he relies on some substantial conceptions of practical reason. While 
the earlier Rawls relied upon a conception of rationality incorporating the Kantian 
interpretation of human nature, the later Rawls assumes a political approach to 
engage in rational and reasonable thinking. These substantial conceptions of practical 
reason are not generally acceptable to people, even in the liberal democratic society 
to which the later Rawls restricts the application of his theory. Hence, hybrid 
contractarianism satisfies the condition of priority at the cost of losing generality.  
Through studying various contractarian models we can uncover the inherent dilemma 
of contemporary contractarianism, which is also the main contribution of this thesis. 
Although various contractarian models were developed, these models can satisfy 
either the condition of generality or the condition of priority. Insofar as contemporary 
contractarianism assumes practical reason as the source of normativity, this dilemma 
is unavoidable. This is because no conception of practical reason can develop a 
contractarian theory which can satisfy both the conditions of generality and priority. 
Practical reason has two aspects: rationality and reasonableness. The former is 
related to the idea of good, while the latter is related to the idea of right. The content 
of a conception of practical reason is largely determined by how it defines the 
relationship between these two aspects. Some contractarians are only concerned with 
one aspect. This aspect is the whole conception of practical reason and another 
aspect is only a part of this aspect. Yet political principles justified by only one of the 
two aspects cannot assume a supreme authority. Some contractarians understand 
these two aspects as being independent of one another and argue that they justify the 
same set of political principles. Yet these contractarians underestimate the tension 
between rationality and reasonableness within practical reason. Rationality and 
reasonableness always lead to different conclusions; it is usually rational to be 
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unreasonable as well as reasonable to be irrational. If contractarians want to argue for 
the congruence between rationality and reasonableness, then they cannot avoid 
assuming a controversial conception of rationality or reasonableness.  Thus, no 
matter how contractarians construct their theory, they still have to face the dilemma 
to choose between generality and priority.  
Because of this dilemma, contractarianism can at most justify principles which are 
general but not overriding, or principles which are overriding but not general. Since a 
political principle should be both general and overriding, contractarianism is bound 
to fail to provide a satisfactory justification for political principles. This also implies 
that the problems of Hobbesian, Kantian and hybrid contractarianism are due not to 
the poor application of the methodology, but, rather, to the dilemma inherent in this 
methodology. Once contractarians rely on this methodology to justify political 
principles, they are destined to be caught between the demands of generality and the 
demand of priority.2 
8.2 Contributions to the existing approaches  
This thesis does not only show the dilemma inherent in contractarianism, but also 
contributes to the existing discussions about this methodology by moving it to a 
deeper level. In Chapter 1, I mentioned that there are usually three approaches to 
evaluating this methodology. First, people may simply praise the strength of this 
                                                 
2
 However, one should not extend my argument to a critique to contractarian theories which aims at 
justifying moral principles. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the nature of political principle is different 
from that of moral principle. For example, moral principles need not be both general and overriding. 
Some moral theorists argue that ‘overridingness’ is not a necessary feature of morality (Scheffler 
1992: 56). So moral principles may only need to be general. Contractarianism may be a good 
methodology for justifying moral principles, but this function of contractarianism is not the object of 
my discussion. The purpose of my thesis is only to examine whether contractarianism can provide a 
good justification for political principles.  
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methodology.3 Secondly, people may criticize contractarianism as irrelevant because 
of the dubious relationship between the hypothetical contract and the real world.4 
Thirdly, people may only discuss and criticise particular contractarians.5  
My general discussion of contractarianism can provide a more comprehensive 
picture than any of these approaches and can also show what is inadequate in these 
approaches. With respect to the first approach, the three virtues of contractarianism 
that I laid out in Chapter 2 can explain why so many philosophers were attracted by 
this tradition. Nevertheless, contractarianism also has to face the dilemma to choose 
between generality and priority. This illustrates the limitations of this methodology. 
It is not as desirable as some philosophers expect.  
The second approach is a standard critique of contractarianism that a hypothetical 
contract cannot bind people since the source of normativity of contractarianism is 
unclear. This critique has the merit of pointing out a distinction between 
hypothetical, and actual consent. Although this distinction is correct, it is too quick to 
say that a hypothetical contract is irrelevant to the real world. Sympathetic critics 
acknowledge that some hypothetical contracts, such as Rawls’ and Gauthier’s 
contract, have normative force, but when they track the source of normativity of 
contractarianism, the results are either mistaken or vague. Some argue that 
contractarianism presupposes natural rights.6 Some find the source of normativity in 
the ‘rational will’ but do not go into detail.7  These critics rightly point out that 
hypothetical contract is a heuristic device, but they fail to indicate what it is heuristic 
for. In this thesis, I showed that the source of normativity of contractarianism is 
                                                 
3
 Gauthier (1991a) 
4
 Dworkin (1973), Brudney (1991) and Hampton (1993b). 
5
 Boucher and Kelly (1994a) and Vallentyne (1991a).  
6
 Dworkin (1973: 51-52). 
7
 Stark (2000: 333-334) 
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practical reason, which consists of rationality and reasonableness. Although practical 
reason has an unconditional and overriding normative force, people are unclear about 
what political principles can be justified by practical reason. Thus they have to rely 
on the hypothetical contract, which is a heuristic device used for deriving substantial 
political principles from a conception of practical reason. The hypothetical 
contractors represent how actual people would think if they could engage in practical 
reasoning correctly. By identifying themselves with hypothetical contractors, actual 
people can discover the correct political principles that they should legislate for 
themselves. The basic strategy of contractarianism is to make use of practical reason 
to explain why certain political principles have an unconditional and overriding 
normative force. 
My general analysis of contractarianism also discovers the real significances of 
critiques of particular contractarians in the third approach. For example, there are a 
number of critics who point out that Hobbesian contractarianism goes against some 
of our moral intuitions.8 Although these critiques are sound, they cannot constitute a 
strong criticism of Hobbesian contractarianism. Some Hobbesian contractarians, 
such as Gauthier, would simply bite the bullet and acknowledge that their 
contractarian principles go against some moral intuitions. However, from their 
perspective, what should be rejected are not their contractarian principles but rather 
these intuitions, since these intuitions are irrational, and thus unreliable. Rationality 
has a more crucial role in practical reasoning than these fragmentary intuitions do.9 
The strength of these critiques can be made more explicit if they are understood in 
the broader context provided in this thesis. As we have seen, these moral intuitions 
are not just fragmentary intuitions. Rather, they originate in reasonableness, which is 
another aspect of practical reason. Given that rationality and reasonableness are 
                                                 
8
 Hampton (1991: 48-49) and Barry (1995a: 42).  
9
 Gauthier (1986: 269).  
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equally important in practical reason, Hobbesian contractarians lose the ground for 
claiming that those moral intuitions are more dispensable. From this example we can 
see how this thesis can shed light on the existing critiques of particular 
contractarians. These critiques have never been scarce, but their real strength 
sometimes can only be seen when they are placed in a bigger picture.  
Through examining the inadequacies of these three existing approaches we can also 
see why a general analysis of contractarianism is necessary. All three approaches 
make a strong contribution to the critical study of contractarianism. Nevertheless, 
without a general analysis on contractarianism, these approaches are incomplete and 
their real significance remains obscure. The first approach ignores the weakness of 
this methodology. The second approach recognises the problem of the source of 
normativity, but does not go deeply enough into this problem. The third approach 
only focuses on particular contractarians and lacks a broad vision. The analyses of 
these three approaches can be further improved when they are understood in light of 
a more comprehensive and deeper analysis on contractarianism. Hence, a general 
analysis of contractarianism is not only necessary for evaluating the worth of 
contractarianism itself, but also necessary for evaluating the existing critiques of this 
methodology.  
8.3 The future of contractarianism? 
This thesis uncovers the dilemma of contractarianism, so a number of questions 
naturally arise: How can contractarians develop after recognizing this dilemma? 
What will the future of this school be? Contractarians could give up the ambition to 
justify general and overriding political principles and sacrifice either of these 
properties. However, as I argued in Chapter 1, both generality and priority are the 
necessary properties of political principles. Given that both of these two properties 
are necessary, but contractarianism cannot justify principles which have both 
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properties, does it indicate the end of the era of contractarianism in political 
philosophy?  
Contractarians who want to rescue this methodology might defend it by finding an 
objective source of normativity instead of practical reason. Justifying principles by 
practical reason belongs to the intersubjective approach. The normativity of principle 
is based on the capacities for practical reason shared among subjects. Provided that 
people are rational and reasonable, they are obligated to this principle. However, as 
we have seen, a principle justified by this approach cannot avoid the dilemma that 
arises when it becomes necessary to choose between generality and priority, since the 
tension between rationality and reasonableness is a common feature of practical 
reason. This implies that if contractarianism has to rid itself of this dilemma, it has to 
adopt another approach to explain the source of normativity.  
Suppose that contractarians turn to justify their social contract by an objective source 
of normativity. They describe the social contract as representing an ideal form of 
society that actual people ought to appreciate, no matter what actual people rationally 
or reasonably think. The normativity of this social contract is objective in the sense 
that people are obligated to it independent of subjective will. By arguing that the 
normativity is objective, this approach should be able to escape from the dilemma to 
choose between generality and priority. In this objective approach, contractarians 
could directly require that the social contract should be generally acceptable and 
overriding. These two properties of the social contract are justified by an objective 
moral authority (or an objectively desirable moral ideal) rather than being justified 
by the subjective will of people. Hence, if the social contract is not generally 
acceptable or overriding in the real world, then it is only because of the flaws and 
weaknesses of actual people. The general acceptability and the overridingness of the 
social contract are unaffected. Indeed, this inclination of ‘objectivization’ can also be 
seen in the latter writings of some contemporary contractarians. In Moral 
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Dimensions, Scanlon argues that the duty to his contractualist principles is 
independent of what ends people have and how they think about these principles.10 
Even if people disagree with these principles after careful deliberation, they still 
ought to follow these contractualist principles. It is unclear whether Scanlon makes 
this change because he recognizes the dilemma of contractarianism, but this dilemma 
can be avoided by adopting an objective approach to justification.  
Although the ‘objectivisation’ move can possibly rescue contractarianism from the 
dilemma, contractarianism will further lose the virtues that it originally possessed, 
especially the virtue of naturalism. As noted in Chapter 2, one of the reasons that 
contractarianism is so appealing to philosophers is that it is compatible with the 
secular, scientific worldview, which is prevalent in the modern world. Since it takes 
subjective capacities as the source of normativity, it does not need to presuppose any 
external, objective normative authority to justify principles. To contractarianism, a 
normative principle is something which is agreed among subjects in certain 
appropriate circumstances, but not something objectively existing ‘out-there’, 
waiting for people to recognize, and binding people unconditionally. This is an 
important virtue because, in a scientific worldview, it is difficult to prove the 
existence of an external normative authority and explain its relationship with other 
natural facts. However, if contractarianism made the ‘objectivization’ move, then its 
source of normativity would rely on an external, objective normative authority. Only 
when this external normative authority was assumed, could contractarians argue that 
the normativity of social contract is independent of the subjective capacities of 
people. But then contractarians would have to suffer from the cost of losing the 
virtue of naturalism. They would have to explain the metaphysical status of this 
external authority, how it is related to the natural world, and why it has normative 
force. Although this ‘objectivisation’ move can help contractarianism avoid facing 
                                                 
10
 Scanlon (2008: 99-100). 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
319 
 
the dilemma to choose between generality and priority, it leads to another serious 
problem.  
Moreover, if objectivisation is really the future direction of contractarianism, then it 
seems ironic, for in this process contractarianism would only be borrowing the cloak 
of the social contract to drape around a natural law theory. Natural law theorists, 
such as Thomas Aquinas, adopt an objective approach to explaining the source of 
normativity and argue that normative principles are objective, eternal laws. They 
justify the normativity of these principles by a kind of obligating authority external to 
subjects, such as God, for example. At the beginning, contractarianism originated as 
a reaction to the natural law school, which was dominant until the sixteenth 
century.11 Its dominant role was replaced by contractarianism for different reasons. 
One of these reasons was that, due to the emergence of modern science, the order of 
the world was more and more understood as mechanistic and naturalistic. External, 
independent natural laws seemed to be odd in this worldview. Hence the era of the 
natural law school ended, and contractarianism rose in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century. However, if the future of contractarianism is to rely on an 
objective, external source of normativity, then it would mean returning to the natural 
law school. At first, contractarians, dissatisfied with the natural law school, took 
voluntary consent to be the source of normativity. Then voluntarism was discarded 
and contractarians turned to explain the source of normativity in practical reason. But 
if practical reason is an unsatisfactory source as well, then at last contractarians may 
                                                 
11
 However, some contractarians also assume the existence of natural law in their contract theories. 
For example, although Hobbes and Locke were the representatives of classical contractarians, they 
also adopted the assumption of natural law. Nevertheless, these contractarians are still clearly different 
from the medieval natural law theorists. For natural law theorists, it is assumed that there is something 
objectively good, which determines the natural laws and what a good life is. But Hobbes and Locke 
disagreed with these themes. Their assumption of natural laws merely means there is something that 
people ‘should’ do. Also, the fact that Hobbes and Locke were fiercely criticised by the natural law 
theorists at that time, can also show the difference between these classical contractarians and the 
natural law theorists. I am indebted to Chandran Kukathas for these observations.  
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have to seek an external source of normativity, like the natural law school. 
Contractarianism originates from a departure from the natural law tradition, but may 
end by returning to the natural law tradition. The Owl of Minerva ends its flight, only 
to find that it has returned to the tree from which it set out. 
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